FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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APRIL 1966

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE FACELESS VIET CONG

By George A. Carver, Jr.

> . . . we [the Lao Dong (Communist) Party] are building socialism in Vietnam. We are building it, however, only in half of the country, while in the other half, we must still bring to a conclusion the democratic-bourgeois and anti-imperialist revolution. Actually, our party must now accomplish, contemporaneously, two different revolutions, in the north and in the south. This is one of the most characteristic traits of our struggle.
>
> —Ho Chi Minh, June 1959[1]

THE present struggle in South Viet Nam is in essence the third act of a continuous political drama whose prologue spanned the 1930s, whose first act was played in the years between 1941 and 1945, and whose second encompassed the 1946–1954 Franco-Viet Minh war. The scene of major action in this drama has shifted several times, as have the identities of the auxiliary players (*e.g.* the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the French, the Chinese Communists and now the Americans) and the political guises of some of the principals. Throughout its course, however, the unifying theme of this drama has been the unrelenting struggle of the Vietnamese Communist Party to acquire political control over all of Viet Nam. Its chief protagonists, furthermore, have always been and are today the small, dedicated and doctrinaire group who, under Ho Chi Minh's guidance and direction, organized and nurtured Viet Nam's Communist Party during the 1930s, usurped the nationalist revolution after World War II and subverted it to their ends. They are the same men who run the Communist state already established in North Viet Nam and who are now directing the insurgency designed to bring the southern part of the country under their domination.

The term "Viet Cong" came into circulation around 1956 as a

[1] From a Hanoi interview by two correspondents of the Italian Communist Party journal *Unita*, published in *Unita* on July 1, 1959, and in the Belgian Communist paper *Le Drapeau Rouge* on July 10, 1959.

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means of distinguishing some of the players in the current act of this ongoing political drama from the players in Act II. "Viet Cong" is a contraction of the phrase "Viet Nam Cong-San," which means, simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It is a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative except, perhaps, in the sense of "If the shoe fits. . . ." It is a useful, precise and, as we shall see, accurate generic label for the individuals leading the present insurgent movement, at all levels, and for the organizational structure through which that insurgency is controlled and directed.

Not surprisingly, the reactions of many whose concern with Viet Nam is of recent origin are analogous to those of theatergoers who walk into the middle of the third act of an extremely complex drama ignorant of what has gone before. To understand the Viet Cong insurgency, its relationship to the North Vietnamese régime in Hanoi (the D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation Front and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Viet Nam (and *their* respective interrelationships), it is essential to appreciate the historical setting within which the Viet Cong movement developed and the ends it was created to serve.

Throughout their almost four decades of unremitting struggle for political power, the Vietnamese Communists have demonstrated great skill in coping with new problems and great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwavering strategic objectives. Yet, though skillful in learning from past failures, they have often become the victims of previous successes. For the past quarter-century the Vietnamese Communists have been doctrinally addicted to the political device of a broad front organization, dominated and controlled from behind the scenes by disciplined Communist cadres, but espousing general sentiments to which persons of all political inclinations can subscribe (though the formulation of these sentiments has invariably involved a special lexicon of key terms to which Communists and non-Communists attach radically different meanings). They have always rigidly subordinated military activity to political ends, and employed it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy forces in the conventional sense, but as an abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will to fight and force their enemies to accept interim political settlements favorable to the continued pursuit of Communist political objectives.

Because of this Vietnamese Communist penchant for repeating political and military stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnamese history is particularly helpful in understanding the pres-

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ent insurgency. Although Westerners may be largely ignorant of the scenario and detailed plot development of the previous acts of Viet Nam's continuing political drama, the Vietnamese most decidedly are not. Virtually all politically minded Vietnamese have spent at least their adulthood, if not their whole lives, during the Communist struggle for power. Few indeed have not had their lives altered, conditioned or shaped thereby. Without appreciating what the Vietnamese have lived through and without recognizing some of the things they know intimately—often from all-too-firsthand experience—Westerners cannot hope to understand the attitude of Vietnamese now living south of the 17th parallel toward the insurgency, the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front and the Communist régime in Hanoi.

II

Under the direction of the man who now calls himself Ho Chi Minh, the Indochinese Communist Party was organized in January 1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese Communists concentrated on perfecting their organization, jockeying for position within the rising anti-French nationalist movement and attempting to undercut nationalist leaders or groups whom they could not subvert or bring under Communist control, using any means available, including betrayal to the French.

In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined a nationalist organization called the League for Vietnamese Independence (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi—or Viet Minh) which was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Vietnamese Communists to further their own political objectives. By 1945 the Viet Minh movement was under complete Communist control, despite the continued presence and subordinate participation therein of non-Communist nationalist elements whose names and talents the Communists were more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender, the Communists used the Viet Minh as a device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence of the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh.

On November 11, 1945, in an effort to make the Viet Minh government more palatable to non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chinese Nationalist forces then occupying Viet Nam down

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to the 16th parallel, Ho formally "dissolved" the Indochinese Communist Party, though the impact of this gesture on the discerning was considerably attenuated when the same day witnessed the formation of a new "Association for Marxist Studies." Complete control over the Viet Minh and the subsequent resistance struggle, however, remained unchanged in essentially the same hands as those which control North Viet Nam and the insurgency below the 17th parallel today.[2]

By the late spring of 1946, the fact of Communist control over the Viet Minh (despite the "non-existence" of the Party) was becoming increasingly apparent, as was the fact that Ho's political manœuvring and stalling negotiations with the returning French were not going to work. In preparation for the inevitable struggle, Ho endeavored to broaden the Communists' base of nationalist support. In May 1946 he announced the creation of a new "popular national front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam), known as the Lien Viet, whose announced objective was the achievement of "independence and democracy." The Viet Minh was merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve as a generic label for those who participated in the subsequent armed struggle against the French. The Communists also brought into the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties which by then were under complete Communist control: the "Democratic Party," designed to appeal to "bourgeois elements" (*i.e.* urban trade, business and professional circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party," designed to enlist the sympathies of students and intellectuals.

The war with the French broke out on December 19, 1946, and its general course is sufficiently well known to require no rehearsal here. The northern part of Viet Nam constituted the principal theater of military operations; the struggle in the south, though intense, was primarily a terrorist and harassing action designed to keep the French off balance and prevent them from concentrating either their attention or their forces on the war in the north. Though the Viet Minh achieved these objectives, their efforts in South Viet Nam were beset with a continuing series of problems. French control of the sea, air and major overland routes left the Viet Minh in the south dependent for supplies, reinforce-

[2] Despite the Vietnamese Communists' claim that their party did not "exist" under any name from 1945 until 1951, on August 31, 1953, the Cominform journal noted that Vietnamese Communist Party membership increased from 20,000 in 1946 to 500,000 in 1950.

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ments, cadres and communications on a tortuous set of jungle tracks running through Laos (along the western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which came to be known, collectively, as the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." Saigon politics were considerably more complex than those of Hanoi, and non-Communist Vietnamese political groups were both more numerous and more powerful in the south than they were in the north. Furthermore, the Communist leaders of the Viet Minh had a series of command and control problems with their southern organization which took several years to resolve.

In 1945, the senior Viet Minh representative in southern Viet Nam was a Moscow-educated disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the Third International named Tran Van Giau, whose blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate terrorist tactics alienated key groups that the Viet Minh were anxious to bring into their fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Giau was accordingly recalled to Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Viet Minh commander in the south were assumed by Nguyen Binh. Although eminently successful in harassing the French and furthering the cause of the nationalist revolution, Binh—a former member of the Communists' most militant nationalist rivals, the V.N.Q.D.D.—was never fully trusted by the Communist high command in the north and came to be considered excessively independent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a charter member of the Indochinese Communist Party who is now First Secretary of the Communist Party in North Viet Nam and one of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi régime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later, Le Duan continued to play a major role in developing and directing the Viet Minh organization in the south and in ensuring that it remained under firm Communist control. However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was apparently compelled to share his authority with Le Duc Tho, the present head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Organization Bureau and also a member of its Politburo.[3]

The 1949 Communist victory in China had a profound influence on the course of events in Viet Nam, particularly after the Viet Minh offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the French out of the frontier area and gave the Viet Minh a common border with

[3] During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and Le Duc Tho apparently had a violent quarrel over tactics which Ho Chi Minh himself had to settle. The details of this dispute are still obscure, but the resultant enmity between these two men has never been completely dissipated.

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their new Communist neighbor. The military consequences of ensuing Chinese Communist support to the Viet Minh cause are fairly well known. The political consequences, less well known in the West, were of at least equal significance. With an increasingly powerful fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the Communist leadership of the Viet Minh became progressively less dependent on the good will and support of non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists. The mask could now be slipped. The fact of Communist direction of the Viet Minh no longer had to be concealed, the instruments of Communist control could be made more effective, the nature of that control more rigid and its extent more pervasive.

The first major step in this direction was taken on March 3, 1951, when the Indochinese Communist Party reappeared as the Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, or Vietnamese Workers' Party. The Lao Dong swiftly assumed a position of absolute political primacy within the Lien Viet front, though for appearances' sake the "Democratic" and "Socialist" parties mentioned above were kept in existence. The overt reconstitution of the Communist Party was doubtless prompted by a variety of considerations, of which the most important was probably the fact that covert domination of the Viet Minh movement via a clandestine apparatus whose very existence had to be concealed was an awkward and inefficient process. It necessitated reliance on persuasion as well as coercion and, further, complicated the task of advancing Communist political objectives within those areas under Viet Minh control.

The Viet Minh was ostensibly a purely nationalist movement dedicated to the twin goals of independence and democracy; its stated objective during the first phase of the armed struggle (1946–1951) was simply to throw out the French. The emergence of the "new" party, however, brought forth a new slogan: "The anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal fights are of equal importance." What this meant became increasingly apparent during the course of a systematic program which the Communists soon initiated and took five years to complete. It was designed to make the Party itself more doctrinally orthodox and to restructure the whole society, at least of North Viet Nam, along lines consonant with Communist dogma. This program was conducted in five stages, each carefully prepared and each preceded by intensive sessions of "thought reform" for both Party and non-

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Party cadres to ensure that they would in fact execute the orders they were about to receive.

The first or "economic leveling" stage, launched in 1951, was designed to ruin the wealthier peasantry and the urban businessmen (to the extent that French control of the towns permitted this) through a complicated system of arbitrary and punitive taxes patterned on Chinese Communist models—as, indeed, were all phases of this Vietnamese Communist program.[4] The second stage was a short, sharp wave of terror launched throughout large parts of North Viet Nam one evening in February 1953, a week before Tet, the lunar new year, and sustained for precisely fifteen days.[5] The patent objectives of this terror campaign were to cow the populace, in preparation for what lay ahead, and eliminate all potential centers of effective resistance. When the terror was shut off after accomplishing its purpose, Ho Chi Minh made one of his celebrated weeping apologies.

The next phase of the Communist program, implemented during 1953 and 1954, was euphemistically labelled "Land Rent Reduction." Carefully selected and specially trained teams of hard-core Communist cadres (some of which almost certainly had Chinese "advisers") went quietly to each village, made friends with the poorest therein, organized them into cells and helped them to draw up lists classifying their more prosperous neighbors with respect to wealth, status, political leanings and revolutionary zeal. Once all was in readiness, the "land reform battalions" came out in the open, set up kangaroo courts and administered summary "people's justice" to "exploiters" and "traitors." Each land-reform team had a pre-assigned quota of death sentences and hard-labor imprisonments to mete out and these quotas were seldom underfulfilled. In addition to calculated and extensive use of terror, the Communists marshalled all the pettiness, jealousy and vindictiveness of village life to serve their political ends. The punishments carried out extended not only to those actually convicted of "crimes" but also to their families, who were stripped

[4] North Viet Nam had virtually no large businesses in the Western sense; Vietnamese termed "capitalists" by the Lao Dong were generally what we would term small businessmen or merchants. Though there were inequities in land ownership in North Viet Nam, the Red River delta had the most extensive pattern of private ownership to be found anywhere in Asia and there were virtually no large "feudal" holdings of the kind that existed in pre-Communist China, or even in the Mekong delta region of South Viet Nam.

[5] Tet is the most important traditional Vietnamese family and religious holiday. Launching a terror wave just before Tet in Viet Nam is like launching one a week before Christmas in the United States.

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of their possessions, turned out of their homes, denied means of obtaining a livelihood and deprived of the documentation (*e.g.* ration cards) essential to existence in a Communist-controlled society. They became, officially, "non-persons" whom it was a crime to succor. The fact that many of those convicted and far larger numbers of their immediate relatives who suffered the attendant consequences had taken an active part in the resistance against the French was considered immaterial and irrelevant. No one was safe or immune from the judgments of the "people's courts," not even life-long members of the Communist Party.

Despite its incredible barbarity and violence, the Land Rent Reduction Campaign was but a preliminary—and a mild one by comparison—to the Land Reform Campaign proper which followed, and which lasted from 1954 until 1956. Essentially the same methods and techniques were employed but on a much larger scale (*e.g.* the mandatory quota of death sentences and imprisonments for each village was increased fivefold). No one will ever know the exact human cost of these two campaigns, but the number of people killed was probably on the order of 100,000, and the number who suffered dire personal hardship was probably about half a million. Since North Viet Nam has a population of about 18 million, these campaigns had a political impact roughly equivalent to that which would be felt in America if the U.S. Government deliberately engineered the murder of over a million American citizens.

The rationale for this politically motivated slaughter was rooted in the dogmatic fanaticism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership. The fact that only a small percentage of the Party membership had genuine proletarian or "poor peasant" origins was doctrinally embarrassing and made a purge doctrinally mandatory. Dogma required that the "feudal-landlord" class be eliminated. Though no such class really existed in North Viet Nam, it had to be created so that it could be destroyed. The object of the exercise was to purge the Party, restructure North Vietnamese society, smash all real or potential opposition, and impose an iron grip of Communist control. The excesses, however unfortunate, were "necessary."

Once the Land Rent Reduction and Land Reform campaigns had accomplished their objectives, the Lao Dong in 1956 opened the final phase of its five-step program. It was known as the "Rectification of Errors" and designed to restore North Viet

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Nam to the Communist version of "normalcy." The excesses of the recent past were officially admitted and, by implication at least, apologies were tendered. Ho wept (again). Truong Chinh resigned as Secretary-General of the Party (though he remained a member of its Politburo); so too did the D.R.V.'s vice minister for land reform. General Giap made a speech to the Tenth Congress of the Party Central Committee during the course of which he acknowledged a long list of "errors" and mentioned that 12,000 Party members had been released from jails to which they had been unjustly consigned. (How many were imprisoned in the first place was never stated.) The apologies and explanations, however, provided an overwhelming body of irrefutable evidence regarding what had actually transpired and made it abundantly clear that throughout the whole process the Party (as one of its spokesmen admitted) had been guided by the principle that "it is better to kill ten innocent people than to let one enemy escape."[6]

III

In the midst of the events we have so briefly described, the 1954 Geneva Conference brought the Franco-Viet Minh war to a close and ended the second act of Viet Nam's present political drama. This conference produced a set of four interrelated documents known collectively as the "Geneva Accords." Three were cease-fire agreements (one each for Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam) and the fourth an unsigned "Final Declaration," whose juridical status is open to dispute. A variety of external political considerations and pressures (including French domestic politics) had considerably more influence on the language of the Accords than the objective realities of the situation in Viet Nam. The problem of extricating France from her Indochinese entanglements as gracefully as possible was effectively solved and the shooting was temporarily halted, but more fundamental questions regarding Viet Nam's political future were ignored or swept under the rug. At the time, the Accords' crucial lacunæ and ambiguities seemed relatively unimportant, since most of the Conference's participants considered it virtually inevitable that all of Viet Nam would soon be ruled by a Viet Minh régime headed by the benign and (so it was thought) universally es-

[6] Hoang Van Chi, "From Colonialism to Communism." London: Pall Mall, 1964 (also Praeger, New York), p. 213. This detailed study of the events we have outlined by a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre merits the careful attention of anyone interested in Vietnamese affairs.

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teemed "Uncle Ho." Their significance did not become manifest until several years later.

Although the legal predecessor of the present Saigon government attended the Conference (as the "Associated State of Viet Nam"), none of the documents emanating from Geneva mentioned it by name or assigned it any rights or status. The Viet Nam cease-fire agreement was signed by a French general on behalf of the "Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina" and by the D.R.V.'s Vice Minister for National Defense on behalf of the "Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet Nam." In discussing "political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones" (Article 14), it makes a passing reference to "general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam," a theme amplified but not clarified in the Conference's "Final Declaration" (which set a July 1956 deadline). Nowhere was it specified what precisely the Vietnamese were supposed to vote on or how the rights of various elements within the Vietnamese body politic were to be protected. Not surprisingly, the Saigon government objected formally and strenuously to these vague and airy dicta concerning Viet Nam's future fate, stressing that it was not a party to these agreements and hence could not consider itself bound by them.[7]

Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the Geneva settlement had cheated them of the full fruits of their victory, but on the whole the Communists had no reason to be dissatisfied with the results. The land-reform program was then in full cry and consolidation of Communist control over the North was the task immediately at hand. The South could wait, particularly since its chances of survival as an independent political entity seemed nil at the time.

The Lao Dong leadership went through the motions of overt compliance with the provisions of the Viet Nam cease-fire agreement, though in doing so they took a number of steps to preserve

[7] The American position was formally enunciated by President Eisenhower in a July 21, 1954, statement, which said in part: ". . . the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern."

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a subversive potential in the South and thus ensure themselves against unfavorable political contingencies. In accordance with the agreement, some 50,000 Viet Minh troops were regrouped in specified areas below the 17th parallel and taken north, along with 25,000-odd Viet Minh adherents and supporters. The Communists were very careful, however, to leave behind a network of cadres, which were instructed to blend into the scenery, deny Communist affiliation and agitate in favor of the scheduled elections. They also left behind a large number of weapons caches (3,561 of which were discovered between September 1954 and June 1959) against the day when their southern apparatus might have to augment political action with armed force. The composition of the units taken north was also carefully structured with an eye to possible future needs. The Communists made sure that many of the persons involved were young, employing both coercion and impressment to get the kind of people that they wanted. Before they departed, personnel designated for regroupment were strongly encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered to contract local marriages and family alliances in South Viet Nam. These would stand them in good stead if they ever had to return.

In the aftermath of Geneva, the area south of the 17th parallel was in a state of political chaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo Dinh Diem, who became Premier on July 7, 1954, had only the shell of a government, no competent civil service and a far from trustworthy army. In addition to all its other difficulties, the Diem government was also soon faced with an unexpected problem of major magnitude: refugees from the North. The myth that the Viet Minh was a purely nationalist movement to which virtually all Vietnamese freely gave their political allegiance and that "Uncle Ho" was almost universally loved and esteemed by his compatriots was rudely shattered soon after Geneva by what became, proportionately, one of history's most spectacular politically motivated migrations.

Article 14-d of the Viet Nam cease-fire agreement promised that civilians could move freely to whichever "regrouping zone" they preferred. The Communists accepted this provision with a notable lack of enthusiasm, hindered its implementation in a variety of ways and eventually, when its application became altogether too embarrassing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all Communist intimidation, obstruction and harassment, however, some 900,000 people fled from the North to the South uprooting

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themselves and their families in order to avoid living under Ho Chi Minh's Communist régime. (Given the relative population sizes, this was the political equivalent of 9,000,000 Americans leaving the United States.) As many as 400,000 more wanted to leave, and were entitled to do so under Article 14-d, but were not permitted by the Communist authorities to depart.

The two-year period from 1954 to 1956 was one of political progress and achievement in South Viet Nam that would have been considered impossible at the time of Geneva. The situation which prevailed in the summer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock of its prospects. The rather pro forma protests made by North Viet Nam at the passing of the Geneva election deadline suggest that Hanoi's rulers were not so perturbed by the fact that the elections were not held as they were over the increasing disparity between political life north and south of the 17th parallel, a contrast considerably less than flattering to their régime. The North was just emerging from the throes of the land-reform campaign and was in a state of economic turmoil, while the South presented a picture of increasing political stability and incipient prosperity.

Hanoi accordingly recognized that more decisive action would be required if the South was to be brought under its control. Instructions were transmitted to the Communist network left behind in the South directing these cadres to begin agitation and political organization. The Lao Dong Party set up a department of its Central Committee called "the Central Reunification Department," which was made responsible for all matters concerning individuals who had been regrouped to the North during the post-Geneva exchange of forces. The following year (1957) a P.A.V.N. Major-General named Nguyen Van Vinh, who had served in various responsible posts in the South during the Franco-Viet Minh war, was named chairman of this Reunification Department, an office he still holds.

The 1956–1958 period was unusually complex, even for Viet Nam. Diem, in effect, reached his political high-water mark sometime around mid-1957. After that, his methods of operation, traits of character and dependence on his family became set with ever increasing rigidity along lines which ultimately led to his downfall. Despite the undeniable progress of its early years, his government was never successful in giving the bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry positive reasons for identifying their personal fortunes with its political cause. The administrators Diem

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posted to the countryside were often corrupt and seldom native to the areas to which they were assigned, a fact which caused them to be considered as "foreigners" by the intensely clannish and provincial peasantry. Land policies, often admirable in phraseology, were notably weak in execution and frequently operated to the benefit of absentee landlords rather than those who actually tilled the soil.

Such factors as these, coupled with the still manifest consequences of a decade of war, generated genuine grievances among the peasantry which the Communists were quick to exploit and exacerbate. Communist cadres began their organizational efforts among the disgruntled and the ill-served. They harped on local issues and avoided preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were formed, village committees established and small military units organized. A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society: schoolteachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly but steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong," constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability.

Despite the increasing trouble that Viet Cong bands were causing and despite the Viet Cong's initial success in organizational work, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the pace of Viet Cong progress and was particularly chagrined at the movement's failure to win a really significant political following. Several Viet Cong cadre members who were subsequently captured have reported that in late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an extensive inspection trip in the South, and that upon his return to Hanoi in early 1959 he presented a list of recommendations subsequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central Committee and referred to in Viet Cong cadre training sessions as "Resolution 15." These recommendations laid out the whole future course of the southern insurgency, including the establishment of a National Liberation Front to be controlled by the Central Committee of

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the South Vietnamese branch of the Lao Dong Party and supported by a South Vietnamese "liberation army." The Front was to be charged with conducting a political struggle, backed by armed force, designed to neutralize the South and pave the way for "reunification," *i.e.* political domination by Hanoi. We can be certain that some such decisions were made about this time, for in May 1959 the Lao Dong Central Committee declared that "the time has come to struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash [the G.V.N.]."

The consequences of these Hanoi decisions became increasingly apparent during the eighteen months which followed the Central Committee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and intensity of Viet Cong activity began to increase by quantum jumps. Communist military moves in Laos secured the corridor area along the North Vietnamese border and infiltrators from the North began moving down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail": a few hundred in 1959, around 3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000 in 1961.

During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of the various stresses within the South Vietnamese body politic occurred. Diem's military establishment had been designed to counter the threat of conventional invasion and proved ill suited to cope with insurrectionary warfare. The quality of government administrators grew worse rather than better as Diem became increasingly inclined, in making key appointments, to put loyalty to himself and his family ahead of ability. His agrarian policies, particularly the disastrous "agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh sources of rural discontent. The Viet Cong were quick to take advantage of the government's errors and steadily heightened the intensity of their terrorist activity. To complicate matters further there were rising political pressures within the non-Communist camp and a growing feeling that Diem had to be ousted before his methods of government made a Communist victory inevitable.

During the 1958–1960 period, Hanoi's hand in southern troubles was quite imperfectly concealed. In August 1958 Hanoi Radio, billing itself as "the voice of the Liberation Front," broadcast instructions to the Viet Cong armed forces and village cadres directing them to adapt themselves to the requirements of the South Vietnamese political situation in order to carry out their missions. In October 1958, it openly appealed to the highland tribes to revolt, noting that "the government of our beloved Ho is standing behind you." In September 1959 and again in Feb-

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ruary 1960, Hanoi commented on recent Viet Cong military forays by terming them "our attacks" and praising the "skill of our commander and the good will of our soldiers."

In September 1960 an almost open official seal was affixed to Hanoi's plans for southern insurgency when, at the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan made a lengthy speech in which he stated: "The present National Congress . . . will define for the whole Party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification." In this speech Le Duan made a public call for the creation of a "broad national united front" in the South. In effect, he was making public the policy decisions which the Lao Dong Party had made during the preceding months. From the tone and temper of Le Duan's address it was apparent that the Viet Cong insurrection was about to move into the stage of open war.

IV

Toward the end of January 1961, Hanoi Radio announced that "various forces opposing the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem régime" had formed a "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam" (N.L.F.) on December 20, 1960, and that it had issued a manifesto and ten-point political program. The language of both, as broadcast by Hanoi, made the Front's political parentage abundantly clear. The program's fourth point, for example, was "to carry out land rent reduction, guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land, and redistribute communal land in preparation for land reform." To knowledgeable Vietnamese, such words as these made it chillingly obvious who was behind the Front and what lay in store for South Viet Nam should it ever come to power.

On February 11, 1961, Hanoi devoted a second broadcast to the N.L.F.'s manifesto and program, blandly changing the language of both to tone down the more blatant Communist terminology of the initial version. However, even the milder second version (which became the "official" text) borrowed extensively from Le Duan's September speech and left little doubt about the Front's true sponsors or objectives.

After the Hanoi Radio announcements, the Viet Cong immediately began consolidating all of its activities—military as well

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as political—under the N.L.F. banner and conducting intensive organizational activity in its name. A propaganda outlet, the Liberation News Agency, was promptly established and began pouring forth announcements and stories (replayed by Hanoi and by Communist media throughout the world) designed to portray the Front as a spontaneous, indigenous coalition of South Vietnamese nationalists. For the first year of its alleged existence, however, the N.L.F. was a shadowy thing with no definable structure and a faceless, unidentified leadership.

The Front was but one of the two organizational instruments Hanoi had deemed essential to the successful pursuit of its political objectives south of the 17th parallel. The other—designedly less well known in the West but more important within South Viet Nam itself—was first brought to light in a Liberation News Agency broadcast on January 13, 1962, which announced that a "conference of Marxist-Leninist delegates" had met in South Viet Nam "during the last days of December 1961," and decided that "to fulfill their historic and glorious duty . . . workers, peasants and laborers in South Viet Nam need a vanguard group serving as a thoroughly revolutionary party." Accordingly, the conference had established the People's Revolutionary Party (P.R.P.), which came into official existence on January 1, 1962.[8] The founders "warmly supported" the program of the N.L.F. and "volunteered to join its ranks." In point of fact, the P.R.P. immediately took complete control of the Front ("assumed the historic mission of playing the role of vanguard body to the southern revolution") and is currently referred to by Hanoi as "the soul" of the N.L.F.[9]

Captured Communist documents have since made it abundantly clear that the "creation" of the P.R.P. involved what would be termed in American business parlance the "spin-off" of a wholly owned subsidiary. The P.R.P. was and is, in fact, simply the southern branch of the Lao Dong. As one pertinent Party

[8] The only two of these "delegates" who have been subsequently identified are Vo Chi Chong, now a Vice Chairman of N.L.F.'s Presidium and member of the P.R.P.'s Executive Committee, and Huynh Van Tam, now the N.L.F.'s representative in Algiers, where he devotes considerable time to cultivating Western newsmen, deceiving some of them about his own political background and the true nature of the organization he represents in a manner reminiscent of Chou En-lai's similar successes during the mid-1940s.

[9] These phrases appear in "The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and Its Historic Mission of Liberating the South," an article in the January 1966 issue of the Lao Dong Party's theoretical journal *Hoc Tap*. The same article notes: "The experiences of the world and our country's revolutions have shown that in order to win the greatest success, the national democratic revolution must be led by a workers' revolutionary party"—*i.e.* a Communist party.

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directive put it: "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet Nam (Viet Minh Communist Party) unified from north to south under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho."[10] The P.R.P. serves as the principal vehicle for maintaining Lao Dong—*i.e.* North Vietnamese—control over the Viet Cong insurgency.

As the organizational structure of the Viet Cong movement has expanded over the past four years, its general outlines have become fairly well known. In the insurgency's initial phase (1954–1959), the Communists retained the Viet Minh's division of what is now South Viet Nam into "Interzone V" (French Annam below the 17th parallel) and the "Nambo" (Cochin China), with each area under Hanoi's direct control. In late 1960 or early 1961, this arrangement was scrapped and field control over all aspects of the Viet Cong insurgency vested in a still existing, single command headquarters, originally known as the Central Office for South Viet Nam (or C.O.S.V.N.—a term still in circulation) but now usually referred to by captured Viet Cong as simply the P.R.P.'s Central Committee. This command entity, which also contains the headquarters of the N.L.F., is a mobile and sometimes peripatetic body, usually located in the extreme northwestern tip of Tay Ninh province in prudent proximity to the Cambodian border. Under this Central Committee headquarters, the Viet Cong divide South Viet Nam into five numbered military "regions" and one "special zone" for Saigon and its immediate environs. Each of the five regions, in turn, is divided into provinces; each province into districts; and each district into villages.[11] The Viet Cong's provinces, districts and villages are administratively comparable and roughly equivalent in area to those of the South Vietnamese Government. But their boundaries do not coincide, thus complicating Saigon's administrative problems in reacting to insurgent activities.

Though the outlines of the Viet Cong's organizational structure are fairly well known, the identities of its leaders are not. They are faceless men, veteran Communist revolutionaries who

[10] This particular document, dated December 7, 1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen Province. Its text may be found, among other places, in the Department of State's White Paper, "Aggression from the North."

[11] In Viet Nam, a "village" is not a cluster of huts but an administrative entity roughly comparable to an American township.

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have made a lifetime practice of masking their identities under various aliases and *noms de guerre* and who take particular pains to stay hidden in the background in order to support the political fiction that the insurgency is directed by the N.L.F. and the Front's ostensible officers.

At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a member of the North Vietnamese delegation inadvertently commented that the published roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee did not include some members whose identities were kept secret because they were "directing military operations in South Viet Nam." One of the four examples he cited was "Nguyen Van Cuc,"[12] which is one of the aliases used by the Chairman of the P.R.P. This Lao Dong Central Committee member, whose true name we do not know, is probably the overall field director of the Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet Nam. The overall commander of Viet Cong military forces (who would be a subordinate of Cuc's within the Communist command structure) is almost certainly the Chairman of the (P.R.P.) Central Committee's Military Committee—a man who uses the name Tran Nam Trung but whom several captured Viet Cong cadre members have insisted is actually Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese army and an alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The director of all Viet Cong activity in V.C. Military Region 5 (the northernmost third of South Viet Nam) is Nguyen Don, a Major-General in the North Vietnamese army and another alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, who in 1961 was commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division but came south late that year or early in 1962. In short, not only does the P.R.P. control all aspects of the Viet Cong movement, including the N.L.F., and not only is it a subordinate echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, but the P.R.P.'s own leaders appear to be individuals who themselves occupy ranking positions within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy.

As indicated above, for the first year of its existence the N.L.F. was as shadowy and faceless an organization as the P.R.P. is today. It was allegedly created "after a conference of representatives of various forces opposing the fascist régime in South Viet Nam," but the identities of these representatives or the "forces"

[12] P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolutionary Party," *Pacific Affairs Quarterly*, Winter 1962–1963, p. 383.

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they represented were never specified. The myth of the Front was not fleshed out with public organizational substance or overt leadership until after the P.R.P was presented as its "vanguard" element. The N.L.F. now claims to be a coalition of over forty "associated organizations" which, collectively, purport to represent virtually all shades and strata of South Vietnamese political and social life. This coalition includes three "political parties": the P.R.P., the "Democratic Party" and the "Radical Socialist Party." (The latter two bear almost exactly the same names as the two "minor" parties allowed to exist in North Viet Nam and are obviously intended to play similar roles.) In their present name or form, virtually none of its affiliated organizations antedates the founding of the N.L.F. itself, many almost certainly exist only on paper, and a careful analysis of the N.L.F.'s own propaganda makes it clear that a goodly number have identical officers, directorates and staffs. Some of these organizations, however, have acquired substance after the fact, as it were, and now play important roles in the N.L.F.'s efforts to organize and control the rural populace.

It is fairly easy to devise an organizational structure capable of lending verisimilitude to a political fiction, doubly so if one is trying to deceive a foreign audience unversed in local political affairs. Fleshing this structure out with live, known individuals to occupy posts of public prominence is considerably more difficult. The Viet Cong obviously hoped to attract to the N.L.F. South Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, preferably individuals not immediately identifiable as Communists or Communist sympathizers, who could enhance the Front's prestige and political attractiveness and provide a more or less innocent façade behind which the N.L.F.'s Communist masters could operate in secure obscurity. To date the Viet Cong have been notably unsuccessful in this regard, though the full measure of their failure is far better appreciated within South Viet Nam itself than it is abroad. No Vietnamese of what could accurately be described as significant personal prestige or professional standing —not even one of known leftist persuasion—has ever been willing to associate himself publicly with the N.L.F. or lend it the use of his name.

The N.L.F.'s first Central Committee was not announced until March 1962, well over a year after the Front's supposedly spontaneous creation. Though the Committee purportedly had 52

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members, the N.L.F. was able to come up with only 31 names, most of which were virtually unknown even within South Viet Nam. The 41-member second (and current) Central Committee, announced in January 1964, is equally lacking in distinction.

The Chairman of the N.L.F.'s Presidium and Central Committee is Nguyen Huu Tho, a former provincial lawyer with a long record of activity in Communist-sponsored causes but of little political repute or professional standing among his former colleagues at the South Vietnamese bar, who generally categorize him as having been an "*avocat sans brefs*." The N.L.F.'s present Secretary-General (also the Secretary-General of the "Democratic Party" and the Chairman of the N.L.F.'s Saigon Zone Committee) is Huynh Tan Phat, usually described in N.L.F. propaganda as an "architect," though one would be hard pressed to point to any edifices he has designed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently served as a member of the Viet Minh/Viet Cong Executive Committee in Nambo and as the Communists' propaganda chief for their Saigon Special Zone. The N.L.F.'s First Secretary-General (also the Secretary-General of the "Radical Socialist Party") was Nguyen Van Hieu, now its principal travelling representative abroad. A former journalist and teacher (some say of biology, some of mathematics), Hieu has been a Communist propagandist since the late 1940s. The Chairman of the N.L.F.'s External Relations (*i.e.* foreign affairs and propaganda) Committee is Tran Buu Kiem, a Central Committee member who served briefly as Secretary-General after Hieu and before Phat. Described in official N.L.F. biographies as an "intellectual and ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the past two decades as a leader in various Communist-front youth groups. Such figures as these are the best the Front has been able to come up with to staff its most prominent public offices. Their organizational and revolutionary talents may be impressive, but their personal stature and prestige among the South Vietnamese people are not.

V

Over the past four years the Viet Cong have labored mightily to improve their image beyond South Viet Nam's borders and to enlist a broad spectrum of international support for their cause; to develop their organizational structure within South Viet Nam, thus strengthening their internal political position;

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and to expand their military effort, to facilitate achievement of their political goals and if possible to generate an aura of invincibility capable of breaking their adversaries' will to continue the struggle.

The image-building campaign abroad has been designed to publicize the N.L.F. and inflate its prestige and reputation. Its goal has been to get the N.L.F. generally accepted as an indigenous South Vietnamese political coalition (admittedly with some Communist members) which sprang up spontaneously to combat the harsh excesses of the U.S.-supported Diem régime, and which seeks only peace, democracy and reunification as provided for in the Geneva agreements. Though moral—and, to some extent perhaps, physical—support may be afforded by North Viet Nam and other fraternal socialist states (so the argument runs), the N.L.F. is basically an independent political entity with a policy and will of its own. This campaign has been waged through the propaganda disseminated by the Liberation News Agency, replayed and echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) media throughout the world; through a steady flow of messages from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state (particularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); by ever increasing attendance at foreign conferences and meetings (generally Communist or leftist sponsored) by a small handful of indefatigable N.L.F. representatives; and by the establishment of permanent N.L.F. "missions" in Havana, Peking, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Djakarta and Algiers. All of this activity has profited from the fact that knowledge of the realities of political life in South Viet Nam does not extend much beyond its frontiers; all of it has been guided by a keen awareness of the effectiveness of incessant repetition in converting myth to assumed reality.

Throughout South Viet Nam, the Viet Cong have developed and employed the N.L.F. apparatus in their intensive effort to organize the population (especially the rural population), involve it in their insurgency campaign and bring it under their political domination. The detailed application of this effort varies from locality to locality, and is materially influenced by such local factors as the relative degree of Viet Cong strength in the area. The objective, however, is always to secure total participation and total involvement on the part of the local population in order to establish total Viet Cong control. They endeavor to

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persuade—and, if conditions permit, compel—every inhabitant of a given area to join and work actively in some N.L.F. component organization. Farmers are encouraged or forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Association; women, the Liberation Women's Association; children, the Liberation Youth Association. Where Viet Cong control is strong, no one escapes the net. Physically fit males not sent off to some other Viet Cong military unit serve in the local militia squad or self-defense platoon; women, children and old men help make bamboo stakes and traps or dig up roads to harass government forces. They serve as informants and couriers, or go on purchasing expeditions to nearby government-controlled market towns. Everyone participates and ensures that his neighbor does so as well. All of this activity is coördinated and directed by local N.L.F. committees which, where circumstances permit, assume the prerogatives and functions of local government. These local committees in turn are directed by superior echelons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the Central Committee of the N.L.F. itself.

The N.L.F.'s organizational structure is paralleled and controlled at each echelon by a complementary P.R.P. structure. Under the general command of its Central Committee, the P.R.P. is organized on a geographic basis through the various regions, provinces and districts down to the village level. Each geographic echelon has a directing committee responsible for controlling all P.R.P.—hence all Viet Cong, including N.L.F.—activities within its area. These committees vary in size and organizational complexity, even among equivalent geographic echelons, but each one has a single chairman and several subordinate members or subcommittees with specific functional responsibilities. The number and nomenclature of these functional subcommittees also varies from area to area, but they normally cover military affairs, economic and financial affairs, and what the Communists term "front affairs and civilian proselytizing," whose chairman is responsible for controlling all N.L.F. activity in that area. If the P.R.P. organization at that echelon is sufficiently well developed, he in turn will have subordinate members of his P.R.P. subcommittee to direct each of the local associations affiliated with the N.L.F. Though captured documents indicate that the Viet Cong try to keep the level of overt P.R.P. participation below two-fifths of the total membership of any given N.L.F. component, the organizational

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structure we have just described (reinforced by a network of covert P.R.P. cells throughout the N.L.F.) keeps all components of the N.L.F. at every level under complete P.R.P. control.

The Viet Cong's terrorist and military apparatus was developed and is directed by this same organizational structure, which ensures that armed activity at all levels is rigidly subordinated to political objectives and kept under tight Party control. The Viet Cong military establishment now has over 90,000 full-time troops (including over 12,000 North Vietnamese regulars) augmented and supported by something over 100,000 paramilitary personnel and part-time guerrillas. This whole force, however, was built up for political reasons, to serve political ends. The Viet Cong political apparatus was at work laying the foundations for insurgency long before there was even so much as a Viet Cong hamlet self-defense squad.

The director of the military affairs subcommittee (mentioned above) is frequently also the commander of the Viet Cong force attached to that geographic echelon. Village directing committees have village platoons under their control; district committees, district companies; provincial committees, provincial battalions. Regional committees have forces of regimental and multi-regimental size at their disposal, and the whole Viet Cong military establishment is subject to the direction of the P.R.P.'s Central Committee. Throughout this military structure, the same basic principles of organization and command relationship are uniformly applied. There is no such thing as a Viet Cong military unit of any size independent of the Party's political apparatus or free from tight political control. Probably no more than a third of the Viet Cong forces are Party members, but by virtue of its organizational mechanism the P.R.P. controls the "Liberation Army" in the same way that it controls the National Liberation Front.

An understanding of the Viet Cong's organizational structure enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into South Viet Nam since the Lao Dong Party's 1959 decision to pursue its objective of political conquest by waging insurgent war. Until mid- to late 1963 these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from the pool of regrouped Viet Minh forces and supporters taken north in 1954. They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Viet-

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namese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications specialists who built the Viet Cong's military force into what it is today. They also became the village, district, provincial and regional committee chiefs and key committee members who built the Viet Cong's political apparatus.

The earlier arrivals had had at least five years of indoctrination and training in North Viet Nam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, before departing on their southern missions; some of the later arrivals have had nearly a decade of such preparation. Until the recent sharp rise in Viet Cong battlefield casualties, approximately a third of all the personnel in Viet Cong military units at and above the district company level were "returnees" trained in the North. At least half of the membership of most P.R.P. district committees, and an even larger proportion at higher echelons, also appear to be "returnees." Without this infiltration from the North, in short, the present Viet Cong organization could never have been developed.

VI

The Viet Cong insurgency is clearly a masterpiece of revolutionary organization, but its total effectiveness and real political strength are extremely difficult to assess. The bulk of the Viet Cong's organizational efforts have been expended in rural areas and it is there that they are strongest. (The government controls all of the cities, major towns and provincial capitals and all but a handful of the district seats.) There are indications, however, that sharply rising Viet Cong taxation rates, increasingly frequent resort to impressment to secure troops, and the Viet Cong's manifest inability to deliver on political promises of earlier years are all beginning to erode their base of rural support. During the past year nearly 800,000 refugees fled from the hinterland to the vicinity of government-controlled towns. Some of these were fleeing from natural disasters, some from the simple hazards of war (though the direction in which persons of this category opted to flee is significant), but many were obviously endeavoring to get out from under the Viet Cong. Furthermore, in assessing Communist claims of control it should be noted that over half of the rural population voted in the May 1965 provincial elections, despite Viet Cong orders to boycott them.

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In the cities, the Viet Cong have an obvious terrorist capability but are politically quite weak—a fact of which they are aware and which, according to captured documents, causes them considerable embarrassment. They have been unable to turn the urban political ferment of the past three years to any obvious immediate advantage. None of the participants in the genuine social revolution now taking place in the urban areas of South Viet Nam has sought Viet Cong support or entertained overtures of political alliance. Though they have undoubtedly penetrated such groups as the Buddhists and the students, the Viet Cong have made no visible headway in subverting or bringing them under the N.L.F. banner. Just how weak the Viet Cong are in the cities was demonstrated twice last fall (on October 15 and December 19) when two public calls by the Viet Cong for a "general strike" went totally unheeded and produced no visible change whatsoever in the pattern of urban life.

Despite its leaders' obvious organizational talents and revolutionary skills, the Viet Cong movement is beset with a number of fundamental weaknesses. It has no universally appealing theme in any way comparable to the Viet Minh's espousal of anti-French nationalism. Persistent propaganda efforts to portray the Americans as successor imperialists to the French have simply never taken hold. The concept of reunification has relatively little appeal for peasants who regard someone from the next province as an alien. The idea of reunification does appeal to politically minded urban elements, particularly to refugees from the North, but within such circles there is a great reluctance to accept the Viet Cong's identification of "reunification" with political domination by the present Hanoi régime. Having lived through the sequence of historical events we have outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are not easily deceived by the N.L.F.'s pretensions to independence and freedom from northern control, particularly since the military side of the Viet Cong insurgency is now being waged with an ever larger number of North Vietnamese troops.

The current struggle in South Viet Nam is an historically rooted, political phenomenon of infinite complexity, particularly since it involves an externally directed Communist drive for power interlarded with a genuine indigenous social revolution. In analyzing such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a function of one's angle of vision, and myth is not always easy to distinguish from reality. Despite the fact that there are many aspects of the cur-

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rent situation in Viet Nam concerning which confident assertion is a mark of ignorance or disingenuous intent, there are certain aspects of the insurgency, and of the Viet Cong structure through which it is being waged, which are not open to intellectually honest dispute.

There are unquestionably many non-Communists heroically serving in various components of the National Liberation Front out of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in the honest belief that they are thereby helping to build a better political structure for their native land. As an organization, however, the N.L.F. is a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi.

The relationship between the Viet Cong and the D.R.V. is not that of politically like-minded allies. Instead, it is essentially the relationship between a field command and its parent headquarters. Such relationships are never free from elements of tension and discord. Within the Viet Cong movement, and even within its controlling hierarchy, there are unquestionably varying judgments (at least privately held ones) about the wisdom of present tactics and the best course of future action. (There are obvious differences of opinion regarding the struggle in Viet Nam even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) Nevertheless, the whole Viet Cong organizational structure and chain of command has been carefully designed to minimize the risks of insubordination. Though for tactical reasons the overt propaganda outlets and spokesmen of the N.L.F. sometimes take political positions which differ at least in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of the Viet Cong's developing or adopting a genuinely independent political line in opposition to orders received from North Viet Nam through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are slight indeed.

Finally, although the Viet Cong organization is unquestionably a major factor in the South Vietnamese political scene, the N.L.F. mechanism which it controls has no serious claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists, the "sole legitimate voice of the South Vietnamese people." Were it ever to be accepted as such, the record of what has happened in North Viet Nam in the years since 1951 makes it abundantly clear what lies in store for the more than 16,000,000 Vietnamese who live south of the 17th parallel, especially for those who have resolutely fought against the Viet Cong insurgency from its inception.

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RHODESIA IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

By Julius K. Nyerere

THE deep and intense anger of Africa on the subject of Southern Rhodesia is by now widely realized. It is not, however, so clearly understood. In consequence, the mutual suspicion which already exists between free African states and nations of the West is in danger of getting very much worse.

Before November 11, 1965, African states, individually and collectively, had frequently expressed their great concern about the position of Southern Rhodesia. But it was only with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith régime that this concern was transformed into impatient wrath. The catalyst of this changed attitude was the rebellion against British sovereignty. This was not because Africa wished Southern Rhodesia to remain a colony; Africa's earlier demands had been for action to end colonialism. Nor was it evidence of a deep-rooted objection to illegality in the anti-colonial struggle. It is a fact that Africa prefers to use constitutional, legal and peaceful methods in the campaigns for national freedom; but if these fail then other methods are accepted. Thus, for example, an Algerian Government-in-Exile was recognized by many African states long before France conceded independence. And at the present time a government-in-exile, headed by Holden Roberto, is recognized by the Organization of African Unity as the rightful authority in Angola, despite the fact that legally Portugal continues to dominate that area. With respect to Southern Rhodesia, Africa's objection is to this particular assumption of authority, not to illegality in general. It would be hypocrisy to pretend otherwise.

The hostility aroused by the Smith declaration of independence is based on rational interpretations of its purpose and its effects in relation to the total legitimate goals of Africa. For this rebellion is not an uprising of the people; it represents an attempt to expand the area, and strengthen the hold in Africa, of doctrines which are inimical to the whole future of freedom in this continent. It represents an advance by the forces of racialism, fascism and, indeed, colonialism in Southern Africa.

To the independent states of Africa this is not a development which can be viewed with Olympian detachment. We are on the

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frontiers of the conflict with these forces, and our own future demands their defeat. Gradually and somewhat painfully, colonialism and racialism have been pushed out of Northern and Central Africa. But while they remain in this continent none of us can really be free to live in peace and dignity, or be able to concentrate on the economic development which was a large part of the purpose of our political revolution. The Smith declaration of independence represents a counter-attack by these forces, and it is in that context that Africa has reacted, and demands its defeat.

This should not be difficult to comprehend. It might have been possible for the Allied powers to make peace with Hitler after France, Belgium and Holland were liberated. They were not prepared to try. Still less were the Jews outside Germany willing to support any compromise which would have left their compatriots under the control of a Nazi régime—even had the ultimate horror of racial extermination been excluded. Both the states concerned and the peoples who were being treated as racially inferior realized that the war had to continue until Nazism was politically ended in Europe.

The parallels are almost exact. The separate freedom movements in Africa were but different arms of one liberation process. When Dr. Nkrumah said in 1957 that the independence of Ghana was incomplete until the whole of Africa was free, he spoke a truth which is still valid for all of us. The struggle has to continue until final victory; colonialism must be wiped out in Africa before any post-colonial independent state can feel secure. And no citizen of Africa—white or black—can live in the comfort of his own self-respect while other African citizens are suffering discrimination and humiliation for being born what they are.

Yet at the present time the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, together with South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, constitute almost one-seventh of the land mass of Africa. About 12 percent of Africa's population lives in these areas. And each of these territories in different ways is governed on the principles of racial inequality and minority domination.

Portugal pretends that her African colonies are really part of Europe, and that she abjures racial discrimination. She claims instead to be in the process of making European Gentlemen out of the African inhabitants of those areas, and talks proudly of

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the policy of equality for the *assimilado*. But Africans are not European, could not become European and do not want to become European. They demand instead the right to be Africans in Africa, and to determine their own cultural, economic and political future. This right is what Portugal denies. The inhabitants of her colonies can certainly be "African;" but if they are, then they are subjected to special laws, and special taxation and labor levies; their participation in the functions of their own government is ruled out.

In South Africa there is no longer even the pretense that citizens of different races are equal before the law, or in social and economic rights and duties. The "separate but equal" concept which was defeated in the United States in 1954 has been defeated in South Africa too; but there, inside Africa, it is the "equal" aspect which has been abandoned. In providing separate facilities for people of different races, the courts have ruled that the separate schools, housing, waiting rooms and so on do not have to be of equal standard; it is enough that they are separate. Africans can be—and are—treated as a sub-species of mankind. No legal or political restraint now prevents the white minority government in the Republic of South Africa from imposing its harsh, discriminatory will upon the African majority. To be an African is to beg for a permit to live in your own country—or to leave it; it is to need permission to work in a particular place or in a particular job; it is to carry a pass at all times—day and night—and be subjected at any moment to arbitrary arrest. And it is to have no legal means whatsoever to participate in the determination of your own wages and conditions of employment, your own place or conditions of living—much less to participate in the governing of your country. To be an African in South Africa is to have permission, unlimited permission, to say "Yes, Baas" —and preferably even then in Afrikaans. It is to have permission to be humiliated by any man, woman or child who has a white skin just for the reason that he has a white skin.

It is conditions and attitudes of this kind which Free Africa is determined to fight. And there can be no questioning of the fact that (regardless of some reasonable criticisms of particular independent African states) the elimination of colonialism and racial domination in these countries to the south is justified by all the basic principles of mankind. Every principle of national and individual freedom, every principle of human equality, of

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justice and of humanity, makes it imperative that the rule of the minorities shall be ended. For they are judge, jury, prosecuting attorney and lawmaker in their own dispute. And the question at issue now is whether Southern Rhodesia shall for the foreseeable future be governed on that same basis of human inequality, or whether the existing, at present very slightly modified, version of racial domination shall be replaced by progress toward human justice and equality.

II

While Africa is determined that the whole of Southern Africa shall be freed before the struggle ceases, it recognizes that the strategy and tactics of the fight will vary according to the particular circumstances of the three different areas (four if South West Africa is counted separately). The monster of "unfreedom" in Southern Africa has three heads, and although each draws strength and sustenance from the existence of the others, it remains true that each has its own separate vulnerability to determined assault by the world forces of freedom.

The best armored, and in many ways the most tragic, of the three heads in Southern Africa is the Republic of South Africa itself. There, racialism has become a self-justifying religion of survival, which demands ever-increasing ruthlessness to protect its adherents against the hatred it has induced. Its doctrines of superiority are inculcated into the white community from the moment of birth; its teaching of inferiority dominates the lives of the non-whites from a similar moment. And it is in grave danger of convincing all South Africans—if it has not already done so—that there are not human beings in the world, but whites and non-whites. If it succeeds in this, then there will also one day be learned the dreadful lesson that the whites constitute less than one-fifth of the South African population, and that numbers provide strength. Yet because this religion of racialism has already been responsible for so much human humiliation and suffering, only a miracle could provide any real hope of its peaceful reversal and the growth of practical brotherhood. For it has already promoted hatred and justified fear. It now appears inevitable that sooner or later an overwhelming internal explosion will occur in South Africa and bring the whole present edifice of apartheid to an end; we can only pray that it is not followed by a mere reversal of the racial domination, for that would be the logic of the

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doctrines which are now being propagated by the South African Government.

But if there is no hope of peaceful change from inside, it remains true that the Republic of South Africa is an industrial state, inextricably involved in international commerce. It is also true that the South African Government's policies suffer the expressed disapproval of nearly every nation and political organization in the world. This disapproval, however, remains a verbal one; no action is taken to activate it. This is largely because of the international economic links of the capitalist world (and thus international business involvement in apartheid). This reluctance to take economic action is backed up by the fact that South Africa is a legally constituted, internationally recognized, sovereign nation. Fears of the implications of intervention from outside—through the United Nations or by any other means—have thus caused the democratic and even the anti-colonial nations of the West to eschew, on grounds of legality, any deliberate activity designed to reverse the apartheid policies of South Africa. It is claimed that however reprehensible these may be, there must be no outside intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Legality is given paramountcy over morality. In consequence, the only prospect for South Africa is long, drawn-out suffering, violence and bitterness. For the struggle will go on until the cause of freedom ultimately triumphs.

The position in relation to Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea is different. This is, or should be, a classic colonial situation. The problem is that Portugal refuses to live in the twentieth century; she persists in believing that colonialism can be maintained, even by the poorest and most backward of the states of Europe. The question therefore is how to wake up Portugal to the facts of politics in the modern day.

Portugal's European and American allies could, of course, have great influence upon her—particularly if they were prepared to deny her the right to use their military strength in her defense while she uses her own (and their ammunition) in suppressing incipient revolt in her colonies. They could even help her to make the transition to the twentieth century by building her internal economy. But if the free countries of the West fail to try, or if they fail to succeed, then Africa will have to pursue this battle on her own, or with what allies she can find. Our own weakness means that we shall have only one way of doing that—by sup-

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porting guerrilla warfare until, after suffering and destruction, Portugal wakes up to her own realities.

III

Until November 11, 1965, there was a hope that Southern Rhodesia would be able to avoid this dreadful path to freedom. Certainly the de facto government was a racialist, racially constituted, minority government. Certainly apartheid, under other names, restricted the Africans' freedom to choose their place of living and working, and certainly separate educational, health and other public services ensured that the Africans maintained their existing lowly position. But the vital difference was that Southern Rhodesia was legally a British colony; British surrender of power to the settler minority had been tragically real, but it stopped short of legal transfer. This meant that, although she was faced with difficulties of implementation, Britain was the power responsible for the future in Southern Rhodesia. And Africa took comfort from the fact that Britain's declared policy, in relation to all her colonies, has been to bring them to democratic independence under conditions which safeguard the people from oppression from any quarter.

The legal power and responsibility of Britain therefore meant that Africa expected gradual constitutional advance towards democracy or majority rule. What appeared to be required was to make Britain realize the seriousness of a situation in which Southern Rhodesia existed as an outpost of South Africa, but operated under the name and responsibility of the British Crown. Once this was realized Africa expected that Britain would at last take steps to deal with the white settlers who were misappropriating public power.

In other words, what Africa has been demanding from Britain in Southern Rhodesia is a transition from the white minority domination in government to majority rule, and only after that, independence for the colony. This has been the position of the nationalist forces in the colony; it has been the position of all African leaders. The argument has not been about the timing of this transition—how long it would take, or how many steps are involved—but about the principle of it.

It is in that context that Africa looks at the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority government in Southern Rhodesia; it is because of these reasonable and justified expecta-

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tions that the Smith move is of such importance. The Settler Régime has said, in effect, that the very existence of legal restraints upon the minority is unbearable. And as Britain refused to give them independence without asking for some assurances about the future development to majority rule, they took independence. And in so doing their leader had the temerity to paraphrase the greatest freedom document of all time—the American Declaration of Independence!

Mr. Ian Smith justified his seizure of power, and his quotations, by claiming that his move was "anti-colonial," and that his government is the "defender of civilized standards"—not racialistic at all. He has argued that, because countries to the north with black majority governments were granted independence, it is unreasonable that Southern Rhodesia should remain a colony after 43 years of "governing ourselves responsibly."

The facts do not support Mr. Smith. The facts show that Southern Rhodesia has been governed responsibly only as far as the white community is concerned, and that every aspect of that society is based on racial distinctions to the detriment of the African community. The facts prove, once again, that any elected government is responsive only to the desires of the electorate; even if its ministers wish to consider the interests of non-voters, they are virtually powerless to do anything really effective.

Writing in *Punch* recently, Mr. Smith said, "Our Parliament is open to all races, our Civil Service offers senior posts on parity terms for all races, our University opens its doors to all races, and our voters' rolls are open to all races. Merit is, and must be, the only criterion. . . ."

The fact of the matter is that of the 65 seats in Parliament 50 are elected by the "A" Roll, and 15 by the "B" Roll. To get on to the "A" Roll it is necessary to have an income of £792 per annum, or an income of £330 per annum plus four years' secondary school education (or certain other intermediate combinations). To get on to the "B" Roll the figures are lower; an income of £264 per annum, or a combination of being over 30 years of age with an income of £132 per annum plus primary education. In consequence, of the 94,080 people on the "A" Roll, 89,278 were whites; Africans predominated on the "B" Roll with more than 10,000 voters, as against 1,000 non-Africans, but these figures are not very revealing, as the nationalist organizations called for a boycott of the elections. The comparative population figures

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show that there are in Southern Rhodesia almost four million Africans and less than 250,000 people of European descent.

The Government of Southern Rhodesia is thus firmly in the hands of the white voters, and is likely to remain so. The "B" Roll seats are not even sufficient to veto changes in the constitution. Neither are there in fact any Africans in senior positions in the Civil Service; and if there were, the existing legislation would force them to live in the designated "African Areas" of the towns regardless of their income. And behind all this smokescreen of "responsibility" and "merit" are complete segregation and absolute inequality in the availability of education.

Schooling for non-African children is compulsory between the ages of 7 and 15 years; and in 1963 there were 19,898 European children in secondary schools out of the 53,000 total European school enrollment. Only 7,045 African pupils were attending secondary schools during that year, and only 81 of these were in Form VI, where entrance to the University can be attempted. It is hard to argue that these differences of secondary school attendance are due to differences in innate ability when something like ten times more money is allocated for each European pupil than for each African pupil. The truth is that educational opportunities just do not exist for the African community in the way they do for whites. There are places in the sixth-year class for only 50 percent of the African children who attend school for the first five years; out of those who do pass that hurdle, only 25 percent will find a place in a secondary school three years later.

It is not my purpose to deny that there are difficulties in providing the educational expansion which is required in Africa now; Tanzania's problems are too real for that. But when this racial distinction is made in educational opportunities, it is rank dishonesty to talk of equality of opportunity in other fields which depend on an educational or income qualification. Neither is it realistic to expect the voters (*i.e.* the people in the upper income brackets, who have reserved educational opportunities for their own children) to break down the racial distinctions which maintain their current privileged position.

Recent history in Southern Rhodesia supports this negative expectation. Since 1957 there has been a steady electoral move toward political parties and groups which have been most fierce in their declared intention to resist racial integration. The Rhodesian Front, which is the party of the present Smith régime,

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was elected when it opposed the United Federal Party proposal to amend the Land Apportionment Act (which, among other things, reserves 37 percent of the land area of the country for European ownership). In its manifesto the Rhodesian Front declared that it would seek to amend the constitution, on the grounds that it would bring about "premature African dominance;" the manifesto also recognized the right of government to "provide separate amenities for various [racial] groups."

Since that election, successive Rhodesian Front governments have indeed concentrated on political questions, and particularly on the question of independence. In the process they have gained, and used, all the powers of a police state. All African nationalist parties have been banned, and their leaders imprisoned or detained; meetings have been prohibited, demonstrations broken up by police violence. And since independence, press censorship has been imposed on all media of public communication, and the harshest penalties imposed for any refusal to bow down to the behests of this illegal, minority administration. The régime has, in fact, moved consistently along the path it laid down for itself—the path which leads directly and in a short time to the imposition in Southern Rhodesia of an unabashed apartheid policy as it is operated in South Africa.

Many of these developments, and certainly the groundwork for them, had taken place before U.D.I. Independence merely represented a logical further stage; it had to come—legally or otherwise—or there had to be a reversal of direction. What independence under the present minority régime means, therefore, is that the Rubicon has been crossed. If this independence is sustained, the hope of a peaceful (even if gradual) development to majority rule has been obliterated. The only hope now remaining, therefore, is for the rebellion to be defeated by the legal power and a new start made on the road to peaceful progress.

IV

The importance of this cannot be overestimated. A successful declaration of independence by the minority government of Southern Rhodesia represents an expansion of racialism and fascism in Africa, and a step backward in the drive for African freedom. It is as though one of the southern states in the United States of America now, in the year 1966, succeeded in enlarging and strengthening the segregation and discrimination within its

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area of jurisdiction. The reaction of the Federal authorities, and of the civil-rights organizations, can be easily imagined. They would know that their future was at stake, and that the battle was joined as surely as it was at Fort Sumter in 1861. So it is in Africa.

But the parallel does not stop there. Just as would be the case in America, so in Africa, the success of the Southern Rhodesian minority would strengthen the forces of reaction in other parts of the continent. South Africa and Portugal must want the Smith rebellion to succeed. Their interest is one of ideological sympathy; but it is also one of geography. The map of Africa shows their reasons for wanting white domination safely entrenched in Southern Rhodesia—just as it indicates the special interest of countries like Zambia and Bechuanaland that it shall not succeed.

Yet although South Africa and Portugal want white domination to be firmly established in Southern Rhodesia, the illegality of the present situation is an embarrassment to them. They cannot afford to intervene actively on the side of Rhodesia unless and until they are certain that the rebellion will succeed. For in supporting the illegal régime they are staking their own future on its success.

South Africa's strongest defense against international criticism of her policies is the legality of her government, the recognized sovereignty of the state, and the doctrine that the internal affairs of any nation are outside the competence of the United Nations or any other international official body. If she openly supports a rebellion against legal authority in another state, then it is infinitely more difficult for her to resist international intervention in her own affairs. Consequently, we have the position where the Verwoerd Government claims to stand neutral in the conflict between the sovereign authority (Britain) and the de facto authority (the Smith régime) in Southern Rhodesia.

This official neutrality is at the moment possible because the economic sanctions are voluntary acts of each separate nation-state. By refusing to participate in these sanctions South Africa is thus breaking no international commitment and infringing neither domestic nor international law. This situation would be changed if the United Nations applied Chapter Seven of the Charter (even Article 41 alone), which makes sanctions mandatory on all members. South Africa would then either have to coöperate, or she would draw upon herself the international ac-

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tion she is so concerned to avoid. That is to say, she would either have to stop trading with Southern Rhodesia and be prepared to answer questions about the ultimate destination of goods she is importing, or she would be liable to be included in the area covered by sanctions.

The implications of the present position are well understood by the present South African Government. They account for its failure to give the "independent" Smith régime all the support it hoped for. Yet it is clear that white public opinion inside South Africa is willing to do at least some of the things the government fears to do—and that the government will not interfere. The "Oil for Rhodesia" campaign depends for its success on publicity and is thus known outside Southern Africa. There is little doubt, however, that through private business deals with South African firms and citizens, the cutting edge of international sanctions against Southern Rhodesia is being—and will be—blunted. By these means South Africa is able, without risking her own position, to assist the white régime in Southern Rhodesia to survive.

Portugal, too, is hamstrung by the illegality of the present Southern Rhodesian position. She, too, is relying upon legalistic niceties to prevent Western pressure building up against her occupation of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea. She can therefore hardly afford to defend and assist a rebellion in the territory of a major European ally. Yet again, it is (to say the least) highly probable that she is giving undercover assistance to Rhodesia. As Sir Edgar Whitehead, a past Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, said in the *Spectator* of January 28, "Mozambique could not survive if an African nationalist government took over in Rhodesia, and would be utterly ruined if the Rhodesian economy collapsed." Sir Edgar went on to refer to the oil refinery at Lourenço Marques, and the assistance which it can give quietly to the Smith régime despite the absence of crude oil for the Umtali refinery. Once again, this position exists because there is no international "illegality" in trading with Southern Rhodesia. The situation would be changed if Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter were applied, for in that case Portugal (even more than South Africa) would be forced by her own needs to cease giving active support to the Smith régime.

South Africa and Portugal are thus unable to give open support to Smith because they depend upon claims of legality to defend their own positions. There is thus a weakness in the racial-

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ist Southern African front which could be exploited by the forces of justice. And it is, in fact, this same question of legality which makes it imperative for Britain and the West generally to use this weakness and to defeat Smith and white domination in Southern Rhodesia.

Western governments have repeatedly declared their hostility to apartheid and their adherence to the principles of racial equality. They have frequently made verbal declarations of their sympathy with the forces in opposition to South African policies. But they have excused their failure to act in support of their words on the grounds of South Africa's sovereignty. Africa has shown a great deal of skepticism about this argument, believing that it masked a reluctance to intervene on the side of justice when white privilege was involved. Now, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, legality is on the side of intervention. What is the West going to do? Will it justify or confound African suspicions?

So far the West has demonstrated its intentions by the gradual increase of voluntary economic sanctions; there has been a refusal even to challenge South African and Portuguese support for Smith by making the sanctions mandatory upon all members of the United Nations. And there have been repeated statements by the responsible authority that force will not be used except in case of a breakdown in law and order—which apparently does not cover the illegal seizure of power! What happens if the economic sanctions fail to bring down the Smith régime is left vague. The suggestion therefore remains that, despite legality and despite the protestations of belief in human equality, the domination of a white minority over blacks is acceptable to the West.

V

This suspicion about the sincerity of the West can be eliminated only by the defeat of the Smith régime, and a new start being made on the path to majority rule before independence. It would not be enough for Smith to resign and for a different "more liberal," white-dominated, independent government to be legally established. If Britain and her allies, with the support of Africa, defeat Smith, then the minimum must be the reëstablishment of effective British authority, and an interim government which is charged with the task of leading the colony to majority rule. This will inevitably require the presence of British civil servants and British troops—or, better still, United Nations

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administrators and forces. Experience in South Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia itself, makes it absurd for anyone to expect Africa to trust Rhodesian whites (even under nominal British sovereignty) with the task of effecting the transition to majority rule.

It is important, too, that Britain should make a public declaration of her intentions in Southern Rhodesia. It must be made clear that there will be a rapid move (even if in stages) to majority rule, with safeguards for human rights, and after that—but only after that—independence for the colony. This public declaration is essential. Its absence has already caused major diplomatic difficulties between Britain and Africa, because it leaves open the possibility of a simple return to the pre-U.D.I. status quo in Rhodesia.

It is true that such a declaration would be opposed by South Africa and Portugal, and that the Rhodesian whites would be bitterly hostile. But this is what the present crisis is all about: Is Southern Rhodesia to become a nation of equal citizens or is it to become an outpost of white racialism? The fears of Southern Rhodesia's minorities have been dealt with by Britain's many assurances about the transitional period after the rebellion comes to an end. It is now time to consider the fears of the African majority, both inside the country and elsewhere in the continent. It is time, in other words, for Britain and the United States of America to make clear whether they really believe in the principles they claim to espouse, or whether their policies are governed by consideration for the privileges of their "kith and kin."

By its unilateral declaration of independence, Southern Rhodesia has come out openly in support of racialism in Africa. The rest of Africa cannot, for the sake of its own future, acquiesce in this. But circumstances have meant that Southern Rhodesia's action is also a challenge to Britain and to the West generally. Their future relations with Africa, and Africa's future attitude to them, depend upon this challenge being answered effectively. At present the world is willing to support them in meeting this challenge; for once no complications of the cold war or the "international Communist menace" enter into the problem. But if the West fails to bring down Smith, or having defeated him, fails to establish conditions which will lead to majority rule before independence, then Africa will have to take up the challenge. In that case there will be no question of a transition to majority

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rule. And Africa's economic and military weakness means that she would have to find allies. It is worth considering whether, if that happens, it will then still be true to say that the cold war does not enter into the situation, and that the "Communist bogey" is a nonsensical red herring.

It is vital that Africa's legitimate concern in this matter should be recognized. For each sovereign African nation has had to overcome the power of racialism in order to become independent. It is, to us, the ultimate horror. We can never surrender to it, or allow it to continue unchallenged on the African continent. Our own future is too much involved.

But the United States, Britain and all other countries of the world are also involved in the issue of racialism. Smith has thrown a challenge at the world, and particularly at the Western powers. He has thrown it on behalf of the whole of Southern Africa. Free Africa is now waiting, with some impatience, to see whether the West really intends to stand on the side of human equality and human freedom.

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COMING DILEMMAS FOR CHINA'S LEADERS

By Lucian W. Pye

THERE is no major political system today about which we have less data and fewer meaningful facts than that of Communist China. Yet decisions which will shape our diplomacy, and more concretely our military establishment, for years ahead must be made in the light of what we now surmise to be the Chinese people's character and dynamics. Inescapably we fall back upon abstractions and gross generalizations.

True, Peking's wall of secretiveness does not hide everything, and time does bring corrections as seasoned observers constantly reassess Chinese behavior over the years. One can glean much from the reports dispersed by Peking, from reading between the lines of the Chinese Communist press, and from interviewing people in Hong Kong with first-hand experience in different parts of the mainland. The danger is that such limited scraps of information may bulk too large in the interpretations we try to make of something as complex as Chinese Communism. In the end there is no escaping the fact that our perception of China must be distorted to some extent by the existence of the Bamboo Curtain.

Attempts to surmise the realities of Chinese political development are not limited only by a shortage of data; there is also the larger problem of trying to set appropriate standards for judging Chinese performance. Within what larger historical context should we place Communist China in our effort to get a clearer idea of the patterns in its current development? What assumptions can we safely make about its longer-range prospects? And in considering our own policy responses, how fatalistically should we observe the glacial movements of the Chinese as they advance from forming one-quarter of the world's population to being one-half, and from being weak and disorganized to being united and assertive?

Chinese realities might be viewed from one of several wide perspectives. Should we, for example, think of China as one of the developing countries of the Afro-Asian world in a transitional stage as it moves out of a traditional order into the modern world? If so, we could compare and contrast Chinese experiences with those of currently underdeveloped countries like India, Indonesia

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and Egypt. That approach, however, would have been more appropriate to the China of the 1910s, 1920s and even the 1930s. In the 1960s it seems that China has reached a point beyond that of any of the other underdeveloped countries we know, and although she is far from conquering her massive problems she is now moving on uncharted seas.

The Chinese case is also somewhat different because it involves the political development of a society which at one time represented one of the great civilizations of the world. Do we still put China within the context of earlier historical evolution and see it as moving out of a period of confusion and entering another period of stability and order under a new dynasty? Or do we see China breaking entirely with its earlier history and becoming a new type of civilization? How do we treat the problems of continuity and change? To pose this question is to realize the difficulty of getting a disciplined basis for analyzing the current trends of Chinese political development.

Another approach is to view China as a Communist system and in the grip of a totalitarian order. This again raises a host of new questions because we do not know how strong are the sources of this system of enveloping controls, nor do we know the strength of the forces which may in time erode it away. Also, were we to focus solely on the Communist aspects of the country's development, we might lose perspective on the qualities which are essentially Chinese. It is inviting, of course, to engage in a systematic comparison of Chinese and Russian Communism; but this is an extremely ambitious task that calls for deep knowledge of both societies and both systems if we are to avoid superficiality.

Even setting aside larger historical issues for a moment and concentrating on contemporary short-run trends, we still face many problems due to our shortage of information and lack of perspective for evaluating Chinese performance. How far should we go in characterizing the Chinese Communist leaders as aggressive, reckless and irresponsible (as the Russians would have us believe)? How far should we attribute foolish fanaticism to them, as indicated by the Great Leap? How far should we consider them sober and skilled manipulators of their society, as demonstrated during their recovery from the follies of the Great Leap? How seriously should we credit them with a capacity to reach out into the underdeveloped areas of Africa and Latin America and spread revolutionary movements there? How much

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should we discount their pretentions and bluster? How far should we go in extrapolating their recent growth in terms of real power?

Numerous stereotypes of the Peking régime bid for our attention, each holding some element of truth. A composite of all these stereotypes would give an image made up of a host of contradictions. We would see a régime that seems committed to reckless and violent acts at one moment and capable of cautious, patient manœuvre at the next.

If, however, we ignore the stereotypes and turn for counsel to professional observers of Chinese developments over the last decade, a somewhat different picture takes shape; we are shown a China which is perhaps more balanced, more consistent. The more we give central attention to the modest but persistent pattern of domestic development, the more the extremes of Chinese behavior fade in significance. China then appears to have a calculating régime which is trying in a more or less intelligent fashion to build up slowly the basis for national unity and strength. Among those who construct what we shall call this "prudence model" of Communist China, there is a tendency to stress that while the leaders in Peking have made mistakes and have committed numerous follies they are not madmen and they have a capacity to learn. Basic to the prudence model is the belief that Communist ideology, fully and blithely accepted, does from time to time inspire and confuse the Chinese leaders into evil and stupid acts, but that, whenever doctrine does not get the upper hand, Chinese behavior is eminently intelligent, ingenious and rational. By sharply compartmentalizing ideology and rationality in this Jekyll-and-Hyde manner, the prudence model isolates, and in a sense discounts as aberrations, the more shocking Chinese actions.

In this view, while the régime is deeply committed to a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist approach, while it does want to expand its influence wherever possible, and while it is committed to building both a socialist revolution and Chinese national power, it is essentially rational in seeking these goals and not prone to taking excessive risks.

This view of Communist China, arising from close study of domestic developments, is heavily influenced by judgments about the prospects of the Chinese economy. Specifically, it takes account of the fact that the Chinese do not possess any magic in the economic realm and will have to settle for the modest gains

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that come from growth through compound interest. The nature of economic development being what it is, we understandably have found it easier to arrive at realistic appreciations of China's economic possibilities than of its political ones. Since limits of what can possibly happen to the Chinese economy are fairly well set, it is tempting to assume that Chinese political developments will follow along analogous lines, overlooking the fact that the economic possibilities are more circumscribed than are the political possibilities.

The prudence model probably also reflects the rationality and sobriety of the analysts who have constructed it. In trying to make sense out of what the Chinese have done and are likely to do, they feel compelled to search out reasonable explanations; and in trying to put themselves in the shoes of the Chinese decision-makers, they readily appreciate the need to adopt the presumed values and ideological perspectives of the Communists, but find it difficult to shed their own concepts of pragmatic reasoning and common sense.

Above all, the prudence model reflects the fact that it is easier to foresee the fulfillment of ordinary trends than to predict the extraordinary. Thus even though the past 15 years have been filled with unexpected Chinese actions, the tendency is to expect to find a more routine China in future. Before the Chinese attacked India, for instance, this did not seem a likely possibility. Similarly, it was difficult to foresee something as extreme as the Great Leap.

Despite these qualifications, it is tempting to settle upon the prudence model of Chinese Communism, pointing out that extreme developments may possibly occur, but then focusing attention on the orderly political development within China which might go hand in hand with economic recovery. Admittedly, it is artificial to place such stress on rationality, since no political system is particularly rational; yet it still is a useful way of deflating the bombastic language which the Chinese enjoy employing and of reminding ourselves of the severe limits of Chinese power. Further, the rationality-prudence model would seem even more relevant if China were to suffer a setback in Viet Nam and thus experience one more frustration in a relatively uninterrupted series of foreign-policy defeats.

Even if for the moment we accept some variation of this model as a reasonable approximation of Chinese decision-making, we

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would do well to be prepared for unexpected changes. Just now there is a relative lull in Chinese domestic political developments, but this is not likely to last indefinitely. In the past, the rhythm of Chinese politics has been an almost frantic movement from one trauma to another; thus the present lull is by no means normal.

Various features of the current situation likewise suggest that the régime is in a state of precarious equilibrium and that some forms of change are almost certain. To suggest significant changes is not at all to forecast a collapse of the present system. Communism will not miraculously disappear from the largest country in the world. But though Communist China is here to stay, what Communist China is like is certainly going to change greatly. Let us now examine some of the factors making for instability.

II

The first and most conspicuous reason to expect significant change in China is the inordinate age of the ruling circle. Mao Tse-tung himself is not only old but also feeble in health. There are many indications that over the last year the system has lost some of its resilience simply because decision-making at the top has been so slow. It is not, however, merely that Mao will pass from the scene in the not-too-distant future, but that the entire top leadership is also of much the same generation. No other government in the world is now ruled by so old a group of men. The average age of the Politburo is 68. Significant changes in a large number of top posts will come in the foreseeable future.

The Peking leadership is strikingly self-conscious about the imminent passing of their generation. Ever since Stalin's death and the radical changes that came in Russia with the Khrushchev period, Mao has been explicitly trying to plan ahead to ensure that, upon his death, China will not embark upon any comparable change in course. Concern for personal mortality has produced a cult of Mao's personality now possibly as extreme as the Stalin cult once was; and concern for the durability of ideological commitment has gone to the extreme of requiring that the majority of people must attend twice-a-week study sessions on Mao's thought. In spite of these heroic but essentially pathetic efforts by Mao to strengthen the grip of his own ideology, he and those about him know that much will pass out of the Chinese

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system once the generation of the Long March is gone. The current mood of the Peking leadership was revealed in a statement by Chao Han: "The Ancient said: 'An old horse lying in the stables hopes to run 1,000 *li* a day, and a hero has a great ambition in the evening of life.' We should use these words to urge us on."[1]

We will do well to remind ourselves that, precisely because it is so difficult to weigh the influences of individual personalities in shaping history, sophisticated analysts often slip into the error of overstressing the importance of impersonal social and economic factors. Yet in recent years we have discovered in country after country that profound changes in the political system do generally follow from shifts in top leadership.

It would not be profitable to speculate here on who the new leaders will be or what particular policies they are likely to pursue. We can limit our speculation to the hypothesis that the singular stability of the top leadership of Peking for the last few years—arising as it does out of the shared experience of the rise of Chinese Communism and the comradeship of the Long March—will not persist into another generation. Once Mao and his group are gone, the Chinese are likely to have increasing difficulties in maintaining stability at the top. Tensions and conflicts will begin to appear, and the competition for influence will be more open. Such tensions are typical of Chinese organizations and have always been prevalent in Chinese politics. Until now the leadership of Mao and the relative power of the other members of the Politburo have been unquestioned. But acceptance of the appropriate influence of particular individuals will disappear as leaders of the next generation have to prove themselves in competition with one another.

This potential divisiveness is likely to have profound consequences for the whole of Chinese society. First, because the Chinese people are completely unprepared for any such spectacle, and from all that we know about their attitudes toward authority, it seems likely that they will find it most unsettling to see their leaders engaged in what will appear to be unbecoming behavior. The loss of respect for their leaders can result in the spread of cynicism and a sharp decline in confidence in the system.

A further instability likely to follow a change in leadership

[1] "Forever Maintain the Revolutionary Quality of the Proletariat—On Rereading 'How to be a Good Communist,'" *Red Flag*, February 4, 1964.

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arises from the fact that so little has been done in 15 years to institutionalize and routinize the system of authority. To an extraordinary degree, government in China today is still of a quasi-revolutionary nature, highly dependent upon special campaigns or drives and upon the personal dedication of individual cadres. Even in day-to-day activities there is little in the way of regular bureaucratic management, though the Chinese do have a huge bureaucracy. The Chinese apparently lack the capacity to get things done quietly and efficiently; they still must rely heavily upon total mobilization, calling for intensive propaganda based on the impression of unanimity. This, of course, will be difficult to create if there are signs or rumors of conflict at the center. For these and other reasons it seems likely that the Chinese system is not yet so stable or so institutionalized as to be able to endure a major shift in leadership without significant structural change.

There is a second reason to expect radical change in Chinese political development. During the last few years the Peking leadership has been excessively concerned with a limited set of problems, and this has created certain rigidities within the system which cannot long endure. Above all, the Sino-Soviet dispute has absorbed the concentrated attention and energies of the leaders. There is much evidence to suggest that Mao has been obsessed with the struggle with Khrushchev and his successors; as a result, many domestic problems have not received direct attention from the top leaders. The problem is not just one of the pressure of time; the Sino-Soviet clash has greatly reduced the possibility of flexibility in domestic policies. For the Chinese, the appearance of singlemindedness has been even more important than the reality.

The régime has been able to carry on because technicians have pushed ahead with the tasks assigned to them. But it is extraordinary, for example, to find a Communist system going along for over six years without a five-year plan. In the field of education, too, important decisions are pending that will seriously affect the allocation of resources. For nearly three years the Chinese did not build any new classrooms, and today their construction effort is trivial in comparison to the rate at which the population is growing. In many fields of development significant regional differences are apparent; it is unlikely that these have been explicitly sanctioned at the center.

Inevitably many of the decisions that have been made almost

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by default in the past will sooner or later have to come under review; substantive issues will then have to be considered on their own merits. Once this happens, tensions are likely to arise among cadres who are called upon to shift their focus of activities and accept new priorities. Indeed, with a step-up in centralized direction, the age-old Chinese problems of bureaucratic control and conflict between the center and local authorities are likely to be intensified. During the first decade, the régime seemed to be steadily overcoming regionalism, but in the last years certain latent forms of autonomy have crept into the system.

A third challenge to the prudence model may come from problems in Chinese foreign policy. Many people might argue that the Chinese have been remarkably successful in the last few years in extending their influence into foreign areas, particularly in Southeast Asia, Africa and even Latin America. In fact, however, much of this activity has been only a function of the Sino-Soviet dispute; whatever success China has had in her foreign efforts has been not so much a consequence of her own power as a result of others finding it convenient to have a revolutionary China in the world. Furthermore, Chinese influences have not been built upon solid foundations and may easily be compromised in the next few years.

As a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute the Chinese have attached unrealistic importance to influencing odd Communist parties here and there in the world, and may be chasing mirages. Out of this they have gained some successes in embarrassing the Russians and challenging the position of Moscow. On the other hand, it would be wrong to read these developments as examples of Chinese power or cunning. Many Communist countries or parties have found it expedient to sympathize—if not identify—with the Chinese position merely as a way of gaining more autonomy for themselves within the Communist movement.

Similarly, the Chinese have shown some success in establishing friendly contacts with non-Communist nations in Asia and Africa. Yet in most of these cases it was more that other countries found it convenient to use China than that China exploited them. Pakistan, for example, finds it useful to establish close links with Peking because of the conflict with India. In Africa it has been easy for leaders to regain their revolutionary image merely by shaking the hand of Chou En-lai, while carrying on policies that are by no means revolutionary. A Nasser and even a King of

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Morocco are able to strengthen their identities as revolutionaries by merely treating with the Chinese. Whenever the Chinese have sought to attain concrete ends in Africa and Latin America, they have found the path more difficult; indeed, they have experienced defeat after defeat.

Eventually Peking will have to work out foreign relations based on more stable and enduring considerations. In so doing it will be placed increasingly under cross-pressures from various countries and will no longer find it so easy to play the role of irresponsible spokesman for world revolution.

Another possible source of traumatic change in China is the heavy priority that Peking has given to modernizing its military establishment. Its most dramatic form, of course, is the investment in atomic energy for military purposes. We should recognize that the detonation of two atomic devices was an impressive feat, involving an expensive commitment of scarce resources, from which Peking must expect to get some significant returns.

China's investment in the military field goes far deeper than just the detonation of an atomic bomb, however. Throughout the economic crisis of 1959–62, when much industrial development was at a standstill, the régime continued almost without interruption to direct its skilled resources and its best manpower into developing military technology. It is significant that, close to economic disaster as we now know the Chinese were, the Government should have risked so much to sustain a high rate of military development. The efforts of the Chinese in the aircraft industry, in the electronics field, in anti-aircraft development and possibly in the naval and submarine fields represent some of their greatest successes.

In part, this pattern of investment reflects the philosophy of a régime that came to power through military means, and of a society where military considerations have been important in almost all political developments of the last century. At the same time, Peking is no doubt reacting to the fact that, after rapidly modernizing its military establishment during the Korean War through Soviet aid, it faced as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet dispute the threat of falling behind in the one segment of its society which was close to being modernized. It may be almost instinctive for the Chinese to give first priority to the military; and perhaps we should not be surprised.

On the other hand, a serious imbalance seems to be growing

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between the allocation to the military and to other elements of Chinese society. The situation is certain to become more acute in the next few years, because the demands of the military will have to escalate very sharply if the Chinese are to keep up with the race in military technology. The armed forces stand ready to demand much of whatever increment can be squeezed out of the economy. The present leaders in Peking have in the main been predisposed to be sympathetic to these requests. But is this likely to continue with the new generation, which may be more technologically oriented and less convinced of the importance of armed force in the building of a revolution? If not, the military might feel compelled to act according to their concept of the national interest, and seek to preserve the dynamic spirit of the "Chinese revolution." The issue may not result in a dramatic confrontation, but there remains the basic question whether any society can have domestic political stability when there is such a gross imbalance between the allocation of resources to the military as against the civilian side of life.

Another possible source of significant change in Communist China lies in the management of ideology. For some time now, the régime has had to rely upon various administrative programs to strengthen the ideological commitment of the citizenry. More recently, however, the problem has become one of attempting to bureaucratize ideological training. The year before last, for example, Peking made new administrative arrangements which introduced into some of the ministries a new chain of command dealing with ideological questions. This organizational development has brought to civilian establishments some of the features of the political commissar system of the People's Liberation Army. In part this development is a reflection of the general campaign of "Learning from the People's Liberation Army;" in part it is a reflection of Mao's concern about the need to strengthen the revolutionary quality of his government. But it also addresses itself to the very fundamental problem of the conflict between political loyalty and technical competence—a problem which may constitute a basic flaw in the Chinese system.

This is a critical area not only because of the great importance of ideology within the Communist system, but also because of the extreme shortages of skilled manpower. The Chinese Communists explicitly speak of this problem as the issue of "red and expert." It is impossible to discuss here the ups and downs in the

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relative power of the two groups during the last few years; we need only note that at present the régime is far from working out a satisfactory and comfortable arrangement between its aspirations in the realm of ideology and its requirements in terms of technical skill.

This was a serious problem in Russia during the early years of Communism; in China it seems likely to prove even more troublesome. First of all, formal power is so overwhelmingly in the hands of the ideologues at the moment that it is hard to imagine any easing of their demands for total control. Even before the revolution, the Chinese did not have a tradition of respecting technical competence and recognizing the appropriate authority of specialists under the general control of a political or administrative decision-maker. They have always tended to picture authority as monopolistic, total and undifferentiated. It has therefore not been easy for them to articulate any division of labor and authority between the ideological guardian and the technical specialist. At best they are able to come up only with the rather banal idea that people should be both red and specialist.

During 1963–64 some grumbling was heard from the small Chinese scientific community indicating a desire for more freedom from ideological interference. Some scientists argued that it should be possible for students who are really good in their specialty to pay less attention to ideology, while non-specialists should focus more on ideology. It is difficult to measure the significance of these grumblings or to estimate how much power scientists are likely to have in the next few years, given the needs of the system for even greater technical skills. But clearly there is a problem that could become troublesome. Indeed, with the passing of Mao and of the old-time Communist leaders, this issue may become more insistent and explicit since the ideologues will no longer have the mystical authority of Mao to back them up.

Be this as it may, it does seem likely that China is going to face something of a crisis in the next few years as a result of having had such a large proportion of its more talented people move into the areas of propaganda management and ideological direction.

In this respect, China presents a significant contrast with Stalin's Russia. In the more violent Russian era, many of the more intelligent people sought to avoid politics and party work in favor of the relative security of technological and scientific

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education. In China, paradoxically, the personal threats and insecurities are not so great in careers of party work, and it is here that the rewards are highest. In this respect China is not repeating the Russian pattern, which permitted a great expansion of scientific talent even under a régime of severe political repression. In China, bright and intelligent youths find it easiest to advance themselves by political work, especially as such demanding careers as those in science are not at present appropriately rewarded. It is true that the régime's discrimination against the sons of landlords and former capitalists has forced many of these young men into technical and scientific activities, but this phenomenon can only intensify the basic clash between political work and technical skills.

It is notable that below the top level of management China is extremely short of skilled talent, largely because the generation of 35–45-year-olds was profoundly affected by the war and the Japanese occupation. There are also grounds for wondering whether enough talented young people are even now being trained in technical skills to meet expected future needs. Even according to inflated Chinese figures, less than 1.5 percent of college-age youth are now given the opportunity of a college education. And with the system of half schooling and half work, it is not clear what the quality of this education is.

III

A final source of potential instability in China is the passing of the revolutionary mystique and the need for the régime and the people alike to learn to live without the elation of their earlier dreams. At all levels, people have had to give up their expectation of miracles, and the party itself now recognizes that there is no shortcut to transforming society; the only course is hard work and gradual improvement. At one time the mystique of Communism, the esoteric doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, and the thoughts of Mao were expected to contain miraculous answers to China's problems of modernization. Now, however, the Chinese have to settle merely for the potency of compound interest and the prospect of slow incremental improvement. In short, China finds herself in the same boat with the rest of mankind.

It is natural that the glow of revolution will dim in any society, and with it the charisma of even the most revolutionary party.

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This development in China may be of peculiar significance, however, for in the earlier days the Chinese placed tremendous emphasis on the role of the human spirit in changing history. Possibly the most distinctive characteristic of Chinese Communism has been its reliance on voluntarism and its belief that progressive forces, in terms of the attitudes of men, can indeed shape history to a degree that is out of keeping with a supposedly materialistic and deterministic philosophy. It is not going to be easy for the Chinese leadership to accept the idea that hard work and exhortation are not enough to bring about political development and rapid economic growth.

The vigorous and imaginative use of mass campaigns and organized drives which characterized the first years of the régime have by now taken a serious psychological toll. The evidence suggests that the Chinese peasant and also the city worker have become more cynical and, above all, more calculating in their response to government policies. People still do what they are told and still seek whatever security they can find within the system; but the individual is also more inclined now to ask what benefits he himself will derive, rather than to subordinate such considerations, as was more generally the case during the first years.

This change in attitude is possibly one of the most damaging consequences of the Great Leap and the attempt to introduce free distribution within the communes. That experience shattered whatever spirit of self-sacrifice the peasantry may have had and created a major problem of incentives. When the party leaders learned how quick many peasants were to sense what they could get for nothing, and how slow to make any collective contribution, they opened a public debate as to what should be the rewards for labor. Once this discussion began, people started to ask why anybody should be paid more than anyone else, and the Chinese in general grew more sensitive to inequalities and injustices. There is even some weakening in the old attitude of the peasant—that life is hard and one must work without asking why administrative talent should be rewarded more than manual labor. Discussion along these lines has appeared in sophisticated economic journals as well as in village groups.

The effort to make everyone more self-conscious about economic production and incentives has finally caught up with the party, as people ask questions about the relationship between

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production and reward. One of the factors—in addition to transportation difficulties—making it necessary for the régime to continue grain imports is that the government no longer feels quite so able to siphon off increased production in one area to provide more food for others in short supply. Communes and production teams that have, say, a 10 percent increase in output now tend to expect that they should also have a 10 percent increase in consumption. If the entire increment of their production were siphoned off, the result might well be a lowering of output in the next period.

In short, rural Chinese society is moving into a more complex phase in which questions of incentives and rewards are being more widely raised than when the struggle was merely to survive and overcome brute hardship. Within urban areas, too, the increase in specialization means increased demand for consumer goods and a more satisfying way of life. As city dwellers become more sensitive to questions of the relative status and rewards of different pursuits, Chinese society will no longer be the same as when first organized by the Communists for the purposes of revolutionary change.

On the other hand, the Chinese may not have needed the mystique of revolution as much as has been supposed, and perhaps they will prove more effective than one expects in a more routinized world. While in many of the underdeveloped countries there is a serious problem of mobilizing popular energies and shaking people out of their traditional and more lethargic habits, this has not been the problem of the industrious Chinese. For several decades Chinese cities have contained a remarkably disciplined labor force fully capable of responding to the conventional dictates of industrial society. The Chinese peasant, too, has shown himself no less energetic and concerned with raising productivity whenever he is given the resources and the opportunity.

In this respect, all the political agitation of recent years has possibly deterred and impeded Chinese development rather than effectively mobilized the energies of the society. China's problem in the past has been less one of mobilizing energies than a serious deficiency in the imagination and capacity of leadership and management. One certainly can question whether the endless sequence of campaigns and drives of the last decade has done much to raise the level of imagination in management. What is clear

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is that for nearly a decade the utilization of such campaigns has kept the Chinese from facing up to the long-run fundamental question of how rewards and incentives are going to be handled. Thus the end of the revolutionary spirit is likely to be more of a personal crisis for the rulers than a problem for the society as a whole.

For these and a number of other reasons, then, it seems likely that the Chinese Communist system will in time undergo sharp and critical changes which cannot be readily forecast from the prudence model. Once again we stress that this prophecy does not mean that Communism will collapse. Nor does it mean necessarily that Peking is advancing toward a more mellow form of totalitarianism, or that the Chinese will follow precisely the same sequence of historical stages as have the Soviets. Indeed, the massive and ominous growth of China's population will in itself probably preclude relaxation of controls to any great extent in the years ahead. The mere assignment of ruling what may become half the world's population with only a small fraction of the world's resources will compel Chinese leaders to keep their society on a tight leash. This may have been one of the compelling reasons why during the last year and a half Peking tripled the size of the Control Commission at both national and provincial levels.

The difficulties we foresee are largely centered in the political sphere, but if we were to expand the scope of our analysis to include the economy there would be further reasons to wonder about China's future. As we suggested earlier, the prudence model has been influenced in large measure by the relatively balanced economic policies of the Chinese in recovering from the mistakes of the Great Leap. They have drawn back from the brink of economic disaster; but their economy may still give them great difficulties and even prudent decision-making may prove inadequate in meeting the fundamental problems of a weak agricultural sector and a relentlessly growing population. At present, for example, the Chinese purchases of wheat from abroad are using up nearly one-half of current foreign exchange earnings. The significance of these grain purchases is dramatized by the fact that during the last three years of heavy purchases the Chinese have bought only some $70 to $80 million worth of industrial plants. Moreover, the current yearly purchases of wheat, amounting to more than $400 million, exceed what the

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Chinese claim to have spent on importing industrial plants even during the years of the Great Leap. In short, the current constraints in the economy have called for greater actual outlays for the importation of basic necessities than Chinese propagandists dreamed of spending at the time of their greatest euphoria about the prospects for industrial development and "surpassing Great Britain."

The Chinese system is thus certain to be confronted in the years ahead with a wide range of strains which will possibly be more decisive than current trends in determining the ways in which Communism is to evolve in China.

Ultimately the Chinese will have to work out political arrangements which will make it possible for them to live with each other and with the modern world. Historically, their genius was to provide themselves with remarkably enduring forms of government, but it is still not clear that they have as yet been able to adapt Communism to their needs. In the years ahead they will certainly have to live with their version of Communism, and as they learn how to do so it will be easier for the rest of the world to forecast the degree to which China will be an external threat. In the meantime, it would be well if those who are anxious about China's potential for becoming the major threat to world order refrained from using arguments based on the prudence model to justify the need for premature responses. Likewise, those with more benign or optimistic feelings about the Chinese should recognize that, by disseminating a view of Communist China which understates both the rigidity of ideology and the constraints imposed by the realities of its situation, they may be giving currency to a fanciful and even magical view of Chinese capabilities, which if seriously believed should cause great anxieties.

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WHAT PRIVATE ENTERPRISE MEANS TO LATIN AMERICA

By David Rockefeller

THE ultimate success or failure of the Alliance for Progress will be determined, in my judgment, primarily by the attitudes and actions of the business community in both the United States and the Latin American republics. This is not to say that the role of governments is unimportant; it is, indeed, essential. But without the enlightened coöperation of private enterprise, which provides 80 percent of the gross national product in Latin America, the growth pattern prescribed by the Alliance is unlikely to be realized.

The experience of United States private business to date reveals that a fundamental obstacle to its effective participation in hemispheric development is the existence of a deep-rooted misunderstanding of its purpose, practice and potential. In many countries this misunderstanding has led to laws and regulations unfavorable to business and to extreme forms of nationalism which create a climate unfavorable to foreign investment. The clichés responsible, endlessly repeated, are in some cases the result of ignorance, while others have been cunningly insinuated by those who seek to undermine free and democratic societies and confidence in free enterprise as the economic system that can best advance the public welfare.

Communist propaganda stridently blames the United States and United States business for all the readily visible ills of Latin America. Soviet, Castro and Chinese Communist agents move through city and village spreading half-truths and whole falsehoods. North American capitalists, they say, are out to exploit resources and markets to the detriment of the host nations; the capitalists want to keep the people in poverty so they can take over their minerals and metals; they are obsessed with excessive profits and have no concern for the land or its inhabitants.

Although these charges are largely without foundation, United States companies, with a few notable exceptions, are doing little to refute the misinformation and clear up the suspicion spread by Communist propaganda. Yet combat it we must, for otherwise we are in grave danger of losing our investments, our markets and—more importantly—our friends and allies in a critical sector

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of the world. Unless we convince Latin Americans that their best interests lie in providing an environment in which both domestic and foreign private enterprise can thrive, then the Alliance for Progress will be in deep trouble. This is something that should be done even if there were no Communist threat, but that threat has underscored the necessity for prompt action.

Perhaps we can best arrive at an understanding of the situation by examining a few of the more widely held misconceptions reflected in a significant body of Latin American opinion, and then considering ways in which an improved understanding of private enterprise can be encouraged. It seems to me that four myths are especially important and generally representative:

Myth 1: The United States Government and U. S. business want to perpetuate a primitive economy in Latin America.

Not only is this contention not supported by the facts, but it ignores the novelty and complexity of the whole global economic development problem. So novel is this problem that few minds have yet begun to produce meaningful answers. Two-thirds of the world's people, living in countries where the per capita income averages between a dime and a quarter a day, have suddenly become aware that their poverty is not inevitable, and they are resolved to overcome it. The result is a massive determination in scores of countries to move from purely agricultural subsistence economies into the kind of world that lives by buying and selling, by making and assembling things. "The impact of modern science and technology," says Eugene Black, "has made traditional ways obsolete without as yet providing a tolerable alternative. Change is becoming the price of survival."

Economic development is a problem so complex that one economist has aptly described it as a series of "vicious circles within vicious circles and interlocking vicious circles." For example, development requires change—but change is strongly resisted by many of those in power today in the developing countries. Development requires capital—but capital comes from savings, savings come from postponing consumption, and a poorer economy must consume most of its meager produce. Development requires a balance between population and production—but the developing nations cannot achieve a higher standard of living without some form of population control, and they cannot achieve population control without a higher standard of living and the higher level of education that goes with it.

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Industrialization is desirable, inevitable, indeed crucial in the economic growth of any area. Quick to acknowledge that the nations of Latin America should have a rapidly expanding industrial plant, the United States Government and the American private sector have contributed significantly to the industrial development that leads to eventual economic sophistication. Our assistance has been extended to a host of enterprises, ranging from retail stores to paper mills to heavy industry. Loans by the United States Government played an important part in building Altos Hornos in Mexico, Volta Redonda in Brazil and Huachipato in Chile, to mention but three major Latin American steel mills. But the bulk of United States Government aid has properly gone for infrastructure projects, which certainly are essential to any industrial growth. Loans from the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) have helped finance rural electrification projects in Chile and Ecuador, highway studies in Peru and the first hydroelectric plant in Honduras.

The direct and complementary contributions from the American private sector are epitomized by operations in a wide variety of commercial and industrial enterprises. Sears' Roebuck & Co., for instance, has a record of exemplary performance throughout the Hemisphere. In one country where it has trained over 1,000 employees, Sears makes purchases from 1,400 local factories, many of which did not even exist before it came on the scene. Other examples are legion in nearly every sector of industry and commerce.

However, history teaches that it is exceedingly important for the modernization, diversification and expansion of agriculture to develop in proportion to industrial expansion. As the Latin American population of 230,000,000 swells to more than 300,000,000 in the next decade, insufficient attention to agriculture could obliterate many of the economic gains in the industrial sector.

Yet many Latin American and United States economists fear some Latin countries are neglecting their agricultural base in the headlong rush toward industrialization. For nations in the early stages of development, a steel mill is more apt to be a status symbol than the most efficient means of accelerating economic growth. If, as I believe to be the case, much of a country's potential to generate wealth depends on producing food to support a rapidly growing population, it is essential that prime emphasis be given to stimulating more efficient and diversified agriculture.

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The case of Panama is illustrative. A dozen years ago, the Chase Manhattan Bank launched a program to improve cattle-raising in the republic. On radio and television, the Bank advertised that it would finance the modernization of ranches if cattlemen were prepared to follow a scientific program of seeding, feeding and breeding. As collateral, it accepted not only real estate but also liens on cattle. It even developed its own "C.M.B." brand for these steers. The brand came to be looked upon by the people as a status symbol because it marked a rancher as progressive enough to be supported by an American bank.

The cattle program was aimed at upgrading the quality of beef, encouraging higher meat consumption to improve dietary standards, and making the country eventually an exporter of beef. These goals have now been achieved and Panama has been transformed—in a relatively few years—from a large importer of beef to an exporter. So enthusiastic has been the reception for the program that the Bank now has five cattle experts assigned to its Latin American branches. All are local citizens, trained in the United States. They have recently conducted studies of the cattle potential in Trinidad and Venezuela and are now preparing similar reports for members of the new Central American Common Market—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Much of the apprehension about directing energies and investments toward improving agriculture stems from the fact that certain Latin nations traditionally have depended heavily on a single agricultural crop for their foreign exchange. They have experienced severe trade imbalances and serious balance-of-payments problems as a result of fluctuations in the price of the commodity on which they depend so heavily; hence they are reluctant to become still more dependent on its production. To counteract extreme price fluctuations, the United States has made special efforts in relation to commodities on which individual countries are almost entirely dependent. We have adopted sugar quotas and we sustain sugar prices at a level above the world market. Similarly, we support the International Coffee Agreement.

Yet these are, at best, imperfect measures. There are many valid reasons for not wishing to see them substitute for supply and demand in regulating the market. It would be far preferable for an exporting country to avoid excessive dependence on a sin-

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gle commodity by providing enough variety of supply to adjust to shifts in demand. It is for this reason that the United States strongly urges agricultural diversification as a solid basis for industrial development. This is an essential foundation if the Latin American countries are to emerge as a strong industrial force in the world's economy.

The cliché that North American business wants to hold its southern neighbors in the bondage of a primitive economy includes the charge that its industrial exports are too highly priced. This is an inaccurate and misleading charge. On the whole, most United States industrial prices in the past ten years have remained quite constant. Any increase has been the result, in large part, of increased quality and sophistication of products. Any American who has gone shopping for computers becomes keenly aware of this fact. The same holds true for most capital goods, and it is certainly evident to the housewife who sees the new packaging of goods in the supermarket. The quality, presentation and other characteristics of manufactured goods are changing in many instances, and so must their prices.

By expanding and diversifying agricultural production, by encouraging commodity exports to earn more foreign exchange, by enlarging regional markets, and by creating a better environment for private investment, Latin America will be able to increase its industrial capacity in a balanced and rational manner. This is the objective that the United States Government and business are working with the Latin American nations to achieve.

Myth 2: United States private investors seek to exploit Latin America economically.

This simply does not square with reality. A few statistics will give some idea of the nature and magnitude of the direct contribution being made. United States businesses operating in Latin America supply one-tenth of Latin America's production, pay one-fifth of all taxes and account for a third of all export earnings. An estimated 1,500,000 Latin Americans are employed by United States businesses, in many cases at higher wages than they would earn in other, local industries. United States citizens, on the other hand, account for only 2 percent of all employees of United States firms in Latin America. The United States investment in Latin America has fortunately been moderately successful on balance, but it can hardly be called "exploitative."

The Punta del Este target for new foreign investment from

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private sources was $600,000,000 annually, of which $300,000,000 was to come from the United States. In 1964 the United States figure was only half that, and the European figure even less. On the other hand, if reinvested earnings are added to direct investments, the total contribution of United States business exceeds the target level.

In my view, a primary reason for this relatively good performance, which is of recent date, is a change in the policy which prevailed in the early years of the Alliance of placing too much emphasis on rapid and revolutionary social change and on strictly government-to-government assistance. This approach, while it took account of the fact that there is a genuine and urgent need to do away with social inequities, did not encourage the conditions which are essential to stimulating private investment and economic growth. Revolutionary change which shakes confidence in the fair treatment of private property is incompatible with rapid economic expansion. Now that the vital role of private enterprise is being recognized more fully in a number of Latin American nations, we see the development of a more favorable business climate. I am confident that companies and individuals alike, both United States and local, will respond to the increasing opportunity in those countries where this attitude prevails, and that the rate of investment will grow more rapidly as a result. This should make possible more meaningful social reform since it will be accompanied by a rising standard of living. Progress along these lines will not be possible, however, if misunderstandings are allowed to hamper investment and frustrate honest efforts to stimulate a widely shared economic advance.

The Latin American businessman can do much to help encourage investment. By pooling the vast resources of talent, initiative and knowledge of local conditions which he has at his command, he can work with governments to sustain a business climate that attracts foreign capital and retains local funds. United States investors seek no special favors, but like most other businessmen they look for stability, for guarantees that contracts between the two parties are binding on both and will be honored, and for evidence that threats of expropriation will not cast ominous shadows on capital investment.

Myth 3: United States private business does not want Latin America to share in the ownership or management of promising enterprises.

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It is true that certain types of enterprises do not readily lend themselves to joint ventures. But a growing number of United States companies are seeking Latin American participation in the management of investments they have in Latin America. Such joint ventures represent a most promising area in which Latin American businessmen can improve the investment climate and advance the goals of the *Alianza.*

The Chase Manhattan Bank's experience substantiates this belief. Its affiliation with Banco Lar Brasileiro in Rio de Janeiro in 1962, as well as a second venture the same year with the Banco Mercantil y Agricola of Caracas, led to a third in 1965 with the Banco Continental in Lima. In each case, the Bank has found that the organizations have been complementary. To the intimate knowledge of the local economy contributed by the Bank's partner, it has been able to add modern techniques in fields such as personnel policy, credit analysis and operations procedures, bringing rewarding results and much good will.

A model joint venture has been Brazil's manganese ore company, Industria e Comercio de Minerios, with 51 percent ownership by Brazilians and 49 percent by Bethlehem Steel. In 1949, backed by loans from the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank, this company laid a 122-mile railroad through the jungle, dredged part of the Amazon for ocean-going ships and built docks and roads. Since its first manganese shipments in 1957, the company has netted between $12,000,000 and $15,000,000 each year and has been able to pay back its Export-Import Bank loan three years early. The venture also made possible Brazil's first private foundation to support agricultural research, education and development in backward areas. Its workers enjoy modern homes, a fully staffed hospital and some of the best schools in Brazil.

Kaiser Industries started automobile companies in Brazil and Argentina and then turned a majority of the stock over to Latin Americans. All but a handful of employees are now local nationals. Kaiser sought out local industries to produce parts for the cars. The company established educational programs to train skilled technicians and sent bright young men abroad for further training.

The International Basic Economy Corporation, better known as IBEC, has introduced modern merchandising techniques in supermarkets in Venezuela and other countries, enabling

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housewives to save as much as 20 percent on their food bills. The supermarkets buy most of their wares from local suppliers whom they have trained in mass production, packaging and marketing. Ninety percent of the employees are recruited in the local area and taught how to stock supermarket shelves, to keep up the inventory and to run the checkout counters.

All these companies and many others like them are demonstrating American economic democracy at work—and working successfully. Their partnership approach is a rebuttal to contentions of economic imperialism.

Myth 4: Latin American economic integration is opposed by U. S. businessmen.

On the contrary, most businessmen I talk with consider it absolutely imperative for true progress. Without such integration, there is inefficient division of markets and costly duplication of effort. Only by closer coöperation can the Latin nations make the best of their own resources and provide the broadest appeal to additional foreign investments. President Kennedy emphasized this stand in announcing plans for the Alliance for Progress when he said: "We must support all economic integration which is a genuine step toward larger markets and greater competitive opportunity. The fragmentation of South American economies is a serious barrier to industrial growth." This policy is being continued by the Johnson Administration under the leadership of Under Secretary Thomas Mann.

In the case of the Central American Common Market, U.S. businessmen have been among the first to applaud the encouraging results of economic integration: elimination of almost all internal tariffs, harmonized duties on nearly all outside imports, a broad internal market of 12,000,000 people and United States investments by mid-1964 of about $350,000,000.

The Latin American Free Trade Area (including the eight countries of South America as well as Mexico) has struggled to build on less substantial but nevertheless hopeful foundations. Trade among its nine members climbed 83 percent between 1961 and 1964, with an import figure among them of $646,000,000. Yet progress was slowed by historic problems of protectionism, political instability and inflation.

Most U.S. businessmen recognize that as tariff barriers between nations are dropped, the increased demand for finished goods will create a broader general market. Agricultural nations

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will be buying within the Latin American market many of the goods they now import from other areas. The resulting generation of domestic capital will decrease the emphasis on foreign aid and open up new opportunities for investment. To suggest that businessmen in the United States oppose such developments is not only untrue but illogical as well.

Representatives of private enterprise in all parts of the Hemisphere are being encouraged to stimulate and support economic integration through groups such as the Council for Latin America. This organization, resulting from a merger of three separate groups concerned with Latin American affairs, provides an effective channel of coöperation between businessmen in the United States and their counterparts in the countries to the south. It also offers a means of continuing communication and consultation with the White House, the State Department and other agencies of our government.

All the evidence suggests that popular misunderstanding of the role of U.S. business in Latin America is not rooted in substantial fact. Nevertheless, myths persist and they must be answered on an expanded and more effective scale. It seems to me that the approach must be essentially threefold.

First, U.S. business must develop an effective message, one that will explain clearly and affirmatively what it stands for and is trying to accomplish. In such a message the key idea is "identification."

Each individual company operating in, or trading with, Latin America must identify itself with Latin American aspirations; it must become a positive factor in the region's economic development. The United States business community as a whole must become a creative and constructive force working for Latin American growth and progress. Each member of it must, in contacts with Latin Americans, identify private enterprise as the system with the potential for the fastest and surest means of economic development in an atmosphere of individual freedom and human dignity.

One of the most formidable roadblocks to identification is the habit of Latin Americans of describing their own aspirations as "socialist" and of verbally rejecting "capitalism." If the semantic smog is lifted, however, we see that the "socialism" they are talking about is really a combination of "social security" and "social justice," both of which are unimpeachably orthodox concepts in

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our own country. The "capitalism" they are criticizing turns out to be the predatory system of tightly held power and privilege which they have read about in Karl Marx. This was a system which may have had reality in the nineteenth century when Marx made his observations, but it has long since been outlawed in our own country.

It is well for us to remember, however, that the evolution of business ethics in the United States was a relatively slow process. Corporations did things in the 1870s and 1880s which advancing business standards later made clearly improper. Many of the same corporations fought bitterly in the old days against attempts at public regulation which they now accept as a matter of enlightened self-interest. The developing countries of Latin America have not had this same history of ethical evolution, so it is not surprising that some of their concepts of business standards differ markedly from our own.

What the Latin Americans actually want, though, is basically what we ourselves stand for and are continually striving to achieve. One of our chief tasks, then, is to cut through the deceptive labels which serve only to create divergence where there is none. We need a new image of ourselves, and some new phrases to describe it.

The case for private investment must be stated in the context of what it can do to help achieve two goals which the majority of Latin Americans dearly want. One is economic growth. Private investment promotes this by mobilizing the initiative, know-how, manpower and property of millions of individuals to achieve optimum output of goods and services. The other goal is political stability. Private investment promotes this by supporting the rise and vitality of a group of managers, property owners and small capitalists, and by providing a bulwark for individual freedom against the rise of arbitrary power.

Furthermore, it must be made clear that an atmosphere conducive to private investment can facilitate the accomplishment of other goals such as improved sanitation and health, better and more universal education, a more equitable distribution of wealth and a meaningful expansion of political democracy. All these goals are more readily attainable in countries where the standard of living is rising. In explaining why this is so, American businessmen have a wide range of examples to document their case, and they should not hesitate to use them.

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The second step must be to distribute this message effectively. As the Joint Congressional Economic Subcommittee on Latin America said: "The virtues of the free-enterprise system need to be better understood and more aggressively presented and 'sold'." This calls for a sensitive awareness of cultural differences and tact, which Jean Cocteau has defined as "knowing how far to go in going too far." The objective must be to win the active support of as many people as possible in creating broader understanding of the role of business and private enterprise.

The most important group to reach is the Latin American business community. Not only is this group significant in itself but it is a good vehicle for reaching other audiences—employees, customers, clients, dealers, government officials. The business community needs attention because sections of it lack a true appreciation of the role of foreign investments in their countries. Some businessmen fear that such investments mean increased competition, which they are reluctant to face. However, one heartening aspect is that a new generation of business leaders is now moving into positions of influence in many countries. Most of these leaders are in their forties or early fifties, well educated men bent on bringing about far-ranging improvements in both government administration and business management. I have met many of these men and have been enormously impressed with their grasp of current problems and their determination to do something about them. They can be most effective salesmen in emphasizing the virtues of free enterprise in their respective countries.

A scarcely less important audience consists of members of the national governments in the Latin American countries, where governmental influence goes far beyond anything we experience in the United States. In many countries, wages and hours are fixed by decree, rents are tightly controlled, employee profit-sharing is determined by edict, and the government operates a growing array of business enterprises—most of them, incidentally, at a substantial loss. This means that we must promote within the government agencies an understanding and appreciation of private enterprise as a strengthening force in the economy. It is not enough for Latin American businessmen to be convinced that what they advocate is right and fair; the appropriate people in government must also understand that it is right and fair.

Still another important audience consists of the leaders in

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forming public opinion—educators, intellectuals, professional men and women, labor leaders and the clergy. It is vital to establish a mutuality of interest and understanding with this relatively small but highly influential group. Educators and intellectuals occupy a special position of respect in Latin America, as indicated by the fact that the Communists spend considerable time and money infiltrating the universities and establishing close links with intellectual groups. They offer teachers numerous opportunities for self-expression and public recognition by sponsoring travel programs and lectures and subsidizing publications. If we are to persuade the makers of opinion of the importance of private enterprise, we must convince them that we are genuinely concerned about them and about the welfare of their countries. We must help them accommodate their hopes and plans to the realities of today's world. Above all, we must emphasize continually that our common aspirations and convictions place us on the same side.

The third step is to demonstrate the validity of what we preach through our own performance. Our success in convincing Latin Americans of the importance of free enterprise will depend, essentially and profoundly, on the way we practice it ourselves. No wizardry of words can cover up callousness or conceal corporate cupidity. American business must demonstrate in action that the exploitative capitalism that the Communist propaganda machine constantly inveighs against is a thing of the past. We must demonstrate that a new brand of capitalism has evolved, based on the concept of a fair profit for free enterprise combined with social responsibility to the community as a whole; that we are not against change *per se;* and that we believe business can itself be a creative force for constructive change, as has been shown in some of the cases already mentioned.

To deal effectively with this situation, U.S. management must assign its best brains to the developing nations—particularly those of Latin America—and train them further in their dual role of businessmen and representative Americans. These managers should relish the challenge of doing business in new ways and with new hazards, but with the potentiality of new rewards.

Specifically, the manager should have at least a working knowledge of the language of the country in which he is settling. He should know something of its history, culture, institutions and national goals. He should have a natural curiosity about the

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country and a desire and ability to mix with its people. Only with this background can he hope to earn respect for his business and further an understanding of the United States. Too often, regrettably, Americans going abroad do not have this background, with the result that American business has acquired a bad name in many places overseas.

Business management must also be knowledgeable about the policy of the United States Government and help shape it along constructive lines that will stimulate faster economic development abroad. This, to me, is an essential part of management's social responsibility. The time is long overdue when the business manager should speak up to the public, to the government and to the governments of the developing areas on issues with which he is familiar and on which he has a qualified judgment. He should say that economic development is fundamentally a product of a nation's own policies and attitudes; that for the good of their own people, governments must discourage extreme nationalistic attitudes toward foreign business which not only lead to stultifying regulation and expropriation but arouse concern about the safety of local private investment as well; and explain the vital contribution of American business to local economies around the world in terms of products, policies and—above all—profits.

One of the most formidable barriers to private investment abroad, in my judgment, is the barrier existing in the minds and emotions of those who need foreign investment most. Because they wrongly tend to equate it with colonialism, they are reluctant to accept it, adopting instead a coldly anti-capitalist attitude and challenging the profit motive which in the industrialized nations of the Western world has been the prime generating force producing economic growth since the Industrial Revolution.

This hostility to profit among many people in Latin America is based, in part, on a lack of understanding of its essential role in attracting investment and, in part, on a misconception of the magnitude of profits actually made by foreign investors in Latin America. On this latter point it is generally believed that profits have been exorbitant and have resulted in the exploitation and impoverishment of the host country. This belief was brought out in a special Gallup Poll conducted not long ago in fourteen nations of the non-Communist world. Participants were asked what percent of profits they thought a typical United States industrial firm earned. The estimates ranged from 25 percent profit in

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Rome to 60 percent in Montevideo. Actually, a recent survey of 100 large North American corporations showed that foreign assets returned 14 percent before taxes and domestic assets returned 13 percent; close to half the companies studied had pretax profits of no more than 10 percent.

Today, Latin America is going through a social revolution that represents a dramatic and far-reaching restructuring of an entire society. After this transformation, whether accomplished through violent or peaceful means, the continent will ultimately bear little resemblance to the Latin America we have known up to now. Millions of Latin Americans are determined to have a better life in the future than they have had in the past. The obstacles in their way must be removed by men of good sense and good will, north and south.

To accomplish its objectives, however, Latin America does not have to be changed into a violently radical or Communist continent. Indeed, if this were to happen, the people of Latin America would find themselves sold down the river, for many of their objectives would not be achieved by this route. The modern social revolution can develop peacefully and democratically, and such is the aim of the Alliance for Progress. There is a growing realization that economic development and social reform must go hand in hand. While this new approach cannot produce economic and political stability overnight, it seems to me to offer greater hope for success than the overly ambitious concepts of revolutionary social change which typified the thinking of many who played an important part in the Alliance in its early days.

The outcome of the Alliance for Progress in Latin America is bound to affect the larger contest between Western democracy and Communism as to which is to be the world's way of the future. In this contest, United States business has been thrust into a new and difficult role. It must spread its message abroad and demonstrate the validity of that message in day-to-day actions. Some companies have already acted on this realization, and more must do so. Business must heed the democratic clamor in Latin America. Blatant propaganda will not bring about better relations with our historic "good neighbors." That will be done only by emphasizing the identity of our objectives, by putting into practice the conviction that economic growth with freedom is something to be shared by all.

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THE NECESSARY PARTNERSHIP

By J. Robert Schaetzel

OVER the full range of contemporary foreign affairs, American policy toward Western Europe has been marked by durability and rare continuity. The change of neither Presidents, Secretaries of State nor political parties has altered the lines of basic policy. The Government marches with American public opinion, for that ubiquitous man in the street still feels deeply that Western Europe is vital to the United States.

NATO has been the symbol of the metamorphosis of our foreign policy—of American rejection of 150 years of isolation, of a willingness to play a leading role and of recognition that American security can be assured only in collaboration with a free Western Europe. Due to our awareness of Europe's increasing importance in the economic affairs of the world, the United States in 1960 took an initiative which led to the establishment of a companion body to NATO, the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development.

The second major element of American policy has been support for the idea of a united Europe. Even before Robert Schuman's proposal of May 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community, Congress each year inserted in authorizations for the Marshall Plan an admonition urging Europe to unite. This American reaction is not surprising, since it is natural to assume that political institutions which serve one people well might serve others with equal benefit. One of the first Americans to offer this advice to Europe was Benjamin Franklin, who wrote from Philadelphia to Ferdinand Grand in Paris, on October 22, 1787:

> I send you enclos'd the propos'd new Federal Constitution for these States. I was engag'd 4 months of the last Summer in the Convention that form'd it. It is now sent by Congress to the Several States for their Confirmation. If it succeeds, I do not see why you might not in Europe carry the Project of good Henry the 4th into Execution, by forming a Federal Union and One Grand Republick of all its different States and Kingdoms, by means of a like Convention, for we had many Interests to reconcile.

By the fall of 1962 the vision of an Atlantic partnership—of a uniting Europe and America working in constructive harmony—at least seemed within grasp. But our expectations, even our assessment as to where European and Atlantic affairs in fact stood,

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were strongly colored by our native optimism and, not infrequently, by unreality. As the Lord Privy Seal suggested to the House of Commons in November 1962, it seemed only a matter of weeks, or at most months, until the United Kingdom would have completed her negotiations and become a member of the Common Market.

Reacting to the prospect of great events in Europe, Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act. This legislation gave the President totally unprecedented authority to negotiate tariff reductions. It hinged on expectations that Europe would be taking new steps toward union, that Britain and several other nations would be a part of this Europe, and that the two sides of the Atlantic would see their common interest in reducing trade barriers.

Today the mood is different. Questions and doubts have replaced hope. There are two large questions. First, does not the unhappy state of affairs across the Atlantic prove that the idea of a united Europe remains a shimmering but unattainable goal, as has been the case down the centuries? Is not the real world made up of nation states? On the assumption that the European Community resolves its current difficulties and begins to move again, the next question is whether American interest would in fact be served by a Europe unified economically and politically, with a population larger than ours, with an economic and technical capacity of potentially equal size, and, perhaps the most alarming thought of all, with a mind of its own?

The crisis now confronting the Common Market is part of a conflict far larger than the fortunes of six European nations. What is at stake is how the free world will be organized. Is it to be preeminently along the lines of national states, or is it to be through increasingly intimate forms of coöperation and within the framework of new institutions? While the six nations have more ambitious goals and have created most novel and interesting institutions, NATO and the O.E.C.D. are entirely consistent with the political philosophy that underlies the European Economic Community. Similarly, the general objections that the French Government has offered to NATO, to its integrated command structure and procedures for political consultation, are in essence the same questions the French have raised about the Common Market, as did President de Gaulle, for example, at his press conference on September 9, 1965.

One preliminary question answers itself: Is Western Europe

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still important? All the old reasons carry the same force. Western Europe is the only stable and prosperous region capable of sharing with us the burden of providing for the security and economic well-being of the free world as a whole. Together, the two sides of the Atlantic have a towering preponderance of strength compared to any other aggregation of power. Should Western Europe slip to the East this shift in the power balance would be disastrous. While Western Europe is stable today, and the common interests of the several European states dominate, even those with short memories should be able to recall the catastrophies visited upon the world by old European quarrels. Prudence dictates a continuing effort to preserve what we have achieved.

II

What are the long-term prospects for European unity? On the basis of what evidence can reasonable American judgments be drawn? First, there is a vast body of material that defies even summarization. It includes the network of Community institutions, governmental and private groups in support of unity, the European Parliament, the potent Monnet Action Committee for a United States of Europe, the commitment to a united Europe by labor, agriculture and business organizations, and, finally, the public opinion polls. One quotation gives the flavor of this support. Last November, M. George Villiers, President of the Council of French Industries (C.N.P.F.), said: "Our French enterprise wants this [a surmounting of the Common Market crisis] the more strongly because for almost ten years now it has resolutely planned and carried out its investment programs, its modernization and the establishment of its sales networks to fit into the new European competition created by the Common Market." (*France Actuelle,* November 15, 1965, p. 2.)

One of the most reliable general indicators of the prospects for a united Europe would seem to be the bullish calculations of European and foreign investors. Another is the commitment to the idea by young people in all European countries—and especially in England. In short, in 15 years a broad and deep European movement has developed. After the French presidential election, the distinguished French political economist, Raymond Aron, wrote in *Le Figaro:* "Judging by the efforts of all candidates for the presidency of the Republic to appear as 'good Europeans,' French opinion remains dedicated to the idea of Europe."

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Without French ideas and leadership there would have been no European movement. But beginning with the French rejection of the European Defense Community in 1954, the French attitude toward European unity has become the critical factor. At bottom it is a question of whether France and its people, whose genius and participation are the *sine qua non* of a united Europe, are in the process of turning away from integration and back to the traditional system of independent national states. An American seeking the answer to this question had best rely on expert and disinterested French opinion.

There are many sides to opinion. *Réalités* in January summarized a thorough study of French views on foreign policy. A distillation of those views is: "Yes, to united Europe, but let's approach it with prudence . . . the French know it is a clear, burning issue that must be solved. Generally they are partisans of unification, but differ on the form it should take. Many want the effectiveness of a strong European government, with an assembly functioning on a majority basis. They want European integration, but the majority want a union which insures the rights of each, which preserves national independence, which permits withdrawal in case of grave disagreement." In these rather contradictory ideas French opinion seems remarkably akin to the desire of all people for change without changing.

Public opinion polls before and after the French election support these general conclusions. After the election, Alain Duhamel (*Le Monde,* January 1, 1966) analyzed the polls of the Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique and concluded that Europe and the Common Market ranked third among major issues—after economic and social questions and the prestige of France. A poll conducted in mid-December by the Institut de Science Politique of Paris University drew the opinion from 79 percent that "Europe represented a major issue in the electoral campaign," against 15 percent who said "no" and 6 percent who had "no opinion." In this same poll, in answer to the question, "Has your own vote been influenced by the positions of the candidates on Europe and the Common Market," 51 percent said "no" and 41 percent "yes," while 8 percent had "no opinion." Another question was, "Do you believe that the Common Market is good or bad for France?" Eighty-two percent replied "good," 6 percent "bad" and 12 percent "no opinion."

Aron draws a conclusion from similar evidence that if the

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French Government were to press the present crisis to the point where the Common Market dissolved, then it would be running directly counter to the preponderant opinion in France. Aron bases his optimism about the future and expectations for a compromise on the fact that the Government "wants to be the interpreter of the profound aspirations of the country. And the majority of the nation remains sold on the European idea. . . ." (*Le Figaro,* January 7, 1966.)

One can only conclude that the French are strongly for a united Europe, that foreign policy is certainly an important but still not dominant political issue and, finally, that the average voter had still not been able to sort out the differences among the various candidates on this issue. It would seem that the basic issue of Europe remains obscured in the French mind rather than clearly drawn.

In searching for the main currents of national opinion, we look naturally enough at the major interest groups. In the crop year ending July 1965, France received special payments from the Common Market of over $100,000,000. These payments are in addition to her preferred access to the large European Community market as a member of the E.E.C. and one of its most efficient producers of farm products. As the Common Agricultural Policy goes into effect, the market for French agriculture should improve and the payments should also rise substantially. French farm organizations do not think it would be easy for the Government to find alternatives should France withdraw or should the Common Market collapse.

The most responsible view from the French business community on this issue was given last November by M. Villiers. "Our C.N.P.F. [Council of French Industries] has always attached and continues to attach great importance to the complete realization of the Common Market." He argued for a true economic union, which, "with a common market for farm products as well as industrial ones, with harmonization of general policies, legislation and regulations, is basic to fair and fertile competition. Already there has been too much delay in these developments of capital importance. . . ." (*France Actuelle,* November 15, 1965.)

These views are not cited to prove or predict political decisions on the basis of public opinion and the positions taken by interest groups. While these are important, they serve only as guides to and limitations on governmental action. But several impor-

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tant points seem established: that France is Europe-minded; that suspicion and rancor toward Germany have substantially died out; and that the Common Market and European unity have strong support.

III

In any assessment of European opinion, British views take on special interest. Only recently have doubts entered the minds of this island people that when the fog settles in the Channel it is the Continent that is isolated. Until Macmillan's announcement in 1961 that Britain would seek membership in the Common Market, the general British attitude was to look upon European integration as quixotic, a project at best of dubious merit, and in all probability contrary to British interests. By 1962, however, there had been a considerable shift in British opinion favorable to entry into Europe. But it was an uneasy majority at best.

Last October the National Opinion Poll indicated that 50 percent favored the entry of Britain into the Common Market, 22 percent disapproved and 28 percent had no opinion. The trend is apparent when compared with a poll taken in August 1964 in which only 41 percent gave a favorable response to the same general question, 37 percent wished to have the idea dropped and 22 percent were in the don't-know category.

Again, the most striking element is the attitude of the young people. In the course of a recent seminar at Cambridge University, both Christopher Soames, Shadow Foreign Secretary, and Lord Walston, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, were hard-pressed by an undergraduate audience that wanted a much more forthright British policy toward Europe.

Current debate of the issue in England is restricted of necessity to general goals rather than specifics. The British see little chance for an early resumption of negotiations, for the position of the French Government, which led to the breaking off of negotiations in January 1963, seems unchanged.

In outlining the current argument for the European Community and British participation in it, Kenneth Younger of Chatham House develops a point which has become an immediate preoccupation of Europeans on both sides of the Channel and may well be the principal motivation of those committed to the idea of an integrated Europe. He argues that European unity ". . . alone offers any hope of her [Europe] exerting the influence in world

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affairs to which her industrial and technical skill entitle her." (*Listener*, November 25, 1965.)

Younger then goes on to raise another basic consideration which strongly influences the thinking of those in Britain, on the Continent and in the United States who favor a united Europe —and that is the German problem. "The future of Germany remains the central problem for Europe's future." He feels that Germany is not seeking world or European hegemony such as led to World Wars I and II, ". . . but nevertheless there is a grave German problem, deriving from the rivalry of the great powers, the division of Germany in 1945, and the exposed situation in Berlin—a problem made harder by the terrible legacy of recent German history, especially in the Nazi period." Younger argues that "Post-war German statesmen saw the solution not in a revival of purely national German patriotism, nor in the acceptance by Germany of a permanently inferior status among the nations, but in the creation of a wider community in which Germans could find a worthy role without conjuring up among their partners the specter of a new German domination."

I share Younger's conviction that this benign concept is succeeding. In Germany there is almost unanimous support for a united Europe within the framework of North Atlantic institutions, with special emphasis on NATO. These policies have been complementary to a basic and natural German objective: reunification of the country. In this, the Federal Republic has full American support. There is danger to Germany and potentially to her allies in the frustration of the strong and constructive German desires for European integration and Atlantic coöperation. If it were stopped on this front, restless Germany's energy might turn exclusively toward other outlets, particularly reunification, and neglect the important international responsibilities which it must carry. But the German leaders feel that Soviet intransigence makes the prospects of an early movement on this front dim to non-existent. The end result for Germany could be a series of foreign-policy cul-de-sacs and dangerous frustrations.

Younger asks what the Germans will feel if the future we hold up to them is a Europe of national states in which "the badge of nationhood is a national nuclear bomb," while France and Britain both have these weapons and intend to keep them. He suggests that this is, essentially, an invitation to them to fall back upon "their own purely German resources—a hardworking, industrial

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population in a key geographical position which will enable them, if they wish, to renew the dangerous policy of *Realpolitik* which they first learned from Frederick the Great."

Finally, in a year-end analysis (January 3, 1966) the London *Times* summed up the situation: "The new Labour government have seen at firsthand something of Europe and learnt much; their experience has come at a time when the twin pillars of sterling and the Commonwealth both appear to crack . . . when Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, can tell a Socialist gathering that he favours in Europe something resembling more the European Economic Community principle than the EFTA principle, times have clearly changed. In short, Britain stands far closer to Europe than ever before. The great question is not if, but when."

IV

If we assume that a continued although sporadic movement toward a united Europe will continue, the question remains whether this is desirable from an American point of view. In considering this matter we should have one thing clearly in mind. What the Europeans do will not necessarily match at all points what we conceive to be in our own interests, nor will American conceptions of European organization dominate their thinking. None the less, we have no excuse for failing to think through the kind of Europe that we hope will develop.

First, in the simplest terms, what we wish for—and need—is a politically stable and economically expanding Europe, able and willing to make an equitable contribution to its own and the Alliance's security. Second, it is our objective that Germany, as the central unsolved problem of World War II, should share as an equal the burdens and responsibilities of the Atlantic world; and that she should play this role within the stabilizing framework which she herself seeks—namely, the institutions of the European Community and of NATO. Third, we want Europe—the only really great-power center of the free world outside the United States—to expand rather than contract its efforts for economic development and security elsewhere in the world. Fourth, we hope that Western Europe will coöperate with us in a common search for ways of enlarging the peaceful contacts between East and West, the object being an evolutionary change in the East toward more normal and mutually beneficial relations between

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the nations of Eastern Europe and those of the North Atlantic.

There are basically three broad alternative ways in which European and North American relations can be organized. There is first the national-state system. Its most evident appeal is that everyone is used to it. It is a system that permits people to continue to do what comes naturally. For those in the United States who look with apprehension on a united Europe and anticipate that such a Europe might have a mind of its own, the nineteenth-century arrangement of nation-states has the advantage of offering the known rather than the unknown dangers. With the largest European state (Germany) having a gross national product about 15 percent of that of the United States, there is not much reason for Americans to fear that even the major European states will individually be able to dictate Western policy. In a word, this pattern of Atlantic organization seems to hold the seductive promise of conscious or unconscious American dominance which some see as a kind of American Commonwealth.

The second arrangement is the Atlantic Union or the federated Atlantic Community. In the late 1940s, in the immediate aftermath of a world war that changed all things and for a time made all things seem possible, the goal of a federated Atlantic union attracted considerable attention. Congressional resolutions endorsed the principle. Those who have tirelessly advocated this course do so with the highest of motives. They appreciate the common cultural and political heritage of Europe and America and see clearly the need to organize the great potential strength of the North Atlantic. They urge that Washington take the lead in convening an Atlantic convention, drawing on the historic achievement of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. They are enthusiastic over the prospect of a twentieth-century conference framing a charter for a North Atlantic federation.

Whatever chance there was for Atlantic Union existed during the dark postwar years. Then a destitute and politically demoralized Europe had few choices and in desperation was ready to explore almost any solution. With new-found strength the United States, freed from the foreign policy restraints of the past, showed a remarkable willingness to innovate and, not least important, had been forced by 1948 to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. under Stalin was bent on pursuing its crusade for world domina-

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tion. Yet even in this unique period of ferment and creativity, Atlantic Union never became a matter of serious inter-governmental negotiation. Today, while the goal remains credible and the motivations unassailable, it is hard to discern either popular or governmental support for this approach—especially in Europe. Some advocates of Atlantic federation argue that this approach would appeal to the French Government. But if a central issue in the current intra-European dispute has been French resistance to majority rule among six nations and unwillingness to concede powers to a common executive body, by what jump in logic can one assume French willingness to accept similar political restraints in a larger Atlantic Community, one, moreover, inevitably dominated by the United States?

There are problems common to both the system of national states and Atlantic Union. An overriding issue is the great and growing disparity in power—political, military and economic—between the United States and even the strongest of the European nations. While American dominance in both these systems may seem an attractive advantage to some Americans, the disadvantageous side effects should be recognized. The essential difficulty of a grossly disparate trans-Atlantic relationship is that it forces America to assume the major responsibility for the security of the free world. We have fallen heir to this burden at a time in history when leadership offers none of the real or even the illusory benefits that spurred Europe on in its imperial adventures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nor do Americans show any sign of enjoying the isolated splendor of world leadership. Psychologically we are a people who want colleagues and partners.

It is in connection with this point that the disparity of power becomes significant. Given the limited size and capacity of the individual European nations, they are neither willing nor able to play more than supporting roles. And the United States, carrying a large share of the burdens and the costs, cannot realistically share responsibility for policy decisions with reluctant junior associates. The axiom is inverted and becomes "no representation without taxation." A vicious circle sets in. We want European participation, but cannot fully share decisions in the absence of a European contribution commensurate with our own; the Europeans are neither organized to make this contribution nor much interested in doing so.

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Some of the smaller members of the Alliance, who profess the greatest contentment with the present arrangement by which American power ensures West European security, are at the same time the NATO members which make the smallest material sacrifice for their own or the common security. They are at the lower end of the spectrum of expenditure, with around 3 percent of their G.N.P. assigned to defense. For most of these NATO nations, there is no military service obligation, and the average tour of duty is about twelve months. In the United States, service is obligatory, and the average term of military service runs from two to four years. For the smaller nations, 1.1 percent of their population is in military service, as compared with 1.5 percent for the United States—about one third more. The conclusion I draw from these rough data is that there is a close correlation between size and responsibility. Why should small countries be ready and eager to pay costly bills for common defense? If they should double their defense efforts, can they persuade themselves that their security has been doubled?

What is alarming is the effect of the more limited European performance on American attitudes. We become irritable as we contemplate a world with Americans cast as the ubiquitous gendarmes, while the affluent Europeans, so the image goes, enjoy the security ensured by our "unappreciated" efforts. We tend to overlook a number of critical points: the European contribution to our common defense is real and substantial; we are in Europe not merely to protect Western Europe but to protect ourselves; we cannot equate ourselves, with our economy of $700 billion, with the several European states. But tides of irrational irritability and criticism can mount and lead to insistent demands that if Europe is unprepared to defend itself, or to provide further help to our balance of payments, or to make a fair contribution in Southeast Asia, then a reduction of the American commitment to Europe is in order.

It is at the scientific frontiers of the modern economy that the difference in power between the United States and the European states becomes striking. A recent O.E.C.D. report gave one of the best analyses of the disparity. It concluded that in 1962 we spent four times as much as Western Europe on research and development, and three to four times as much as the U.S.S.R. (*Summary Report* 31, April 16, 1965, p. 11). The same picture emerges in what is referred to as the "balance of payments" for technical

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know-how (patents, licensing and the like), which is running strongly in favor of the United States. A phenomenon much criticized has been the movement of scientists to America. While this country's attraction to skilled Europeans is as old as the Republic, the flow has continued to grow and has become a matter of controversy. Each year from 1952 to 1963, according to the report just cited, scientists and engineers emigrating to the United States "amounted to more than 4 percent of the total number of domestic [U.S.] graduates in engineering and science, reaching a peak of 8 percent in 1957."

V

The third policy choice is the concept of partnership with a uniting Europe. "Partnership" is a confining word. But as used by President Kennedy in 1962 and subsequently by President Johnson, it conveys a sweeping concept—the idea of a united Europe with which the United States could work in close cooperation and on equal terms.

Such a course of policy would by no means be free of problems or uncertainties. The uncertainties of the moment are all too evident, with the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, for instance, effectively stalled due to the unresolved Common Market crisis. Even assuming that agreement is reached among the Europeans and a sense of common purpose restored, the way of the Atlantic partners is bound to be difficult. The sheer magnitude and novelty of the task of unifying Europe will preoccupy the Europeans. Caught up in these affairs, their governments will be less inclined, at least in the short run, to give attention even to what they would agree are common problems, or to give an equal priority to urgent international questions.

A degree of "European nationalism" is also inevitable—not aggressive nationalism but an introspective egocentricity, a primary concern with the development of a united Europe. Nor can we expect that European attitudes will be wholly free of anti-Americanism. Just as giant America is one stimulus toward forming a united Europe, so the evolution of Atlantic relations will be colored by envy, resentment and, on occasion, policies that self-consciously set Europe apart from the United States.

However, seen from any distance and in any perspective, the basic interests of the United States and Europe appear to converge rather than conflict. We have few, if any, doctrinal differ-

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ences. Our complex industrial societies are theoretically and practically interconnected; we struggle with largely identical problems. We may fall into disagreement on solutions, as Americans or Europeans do among themselves. It is hard to visualize conflict among the Atlantic nations arising out of differing ambitions or objectives toward the less developed world. Outside the minds of propagandists and unregenerate Marxists, there is no European or American colonialist impulse. The problem today is precisely the opposite: how to restrain the European—and our own—instinct to withdraw, to find other shoulders to which the security and development burden can be transferred.

Europeans occasionally see hypocrisy in the American advocacy of European unity. If the loss of national sovereignty is good for Europe, why isn't it good for America? One answer is that Americans today are less aware of a need to consider limits on their freedom of national action. Willingness to consider restraints will presumably occur in time of crisis or when Europe is so organized as to make such changes or restraints attractive, necessary or inevitable. There is some evidence that such a stimulus can bring about fundamental change.

The American decision in 1962 to seek a bold new approach to trade liberalization is clearly traceable to the success of the Common Market and to European ideas on how tariff negotiations should be conducted. The Common Market had demonstrated to the Europeans that their protectionist fears were exaggerated and that economic growth could be stimulated and living standards raised through the removal of trade barriers. The Trade Expansion Act was designed in part to generalize this lesson, to extend the benefits from trade expansion to the rest of the world. Moreover, even the American thinking that lay behind the offer of a 50 percent linear cut had its roots in an earlier French proposal adopted by the Common Market to offer a 20 percent linear cut in the Community's common external tariff. This proposal put the United States under pressure, but at the time of the Dillon Round of negotiations we were unable to reciprocate on the same basis. It was out of this historic and European initiative that the President sought and obtained the new legislative authority.

Another example can be found in the monetary field—in the negotiations that took place in 1961 in the Group of Ten (United States, the major countries of Western Europe, Canada and

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Japan) on arrangements under which the International Monetary Fund could borrow from these countries to supplement its financial resources in time of need. Under its charter, the Fund makes its operating decisions on the basis of a voting formula weighted according to the size of subscriptions to the Fund. This formula provides the United States with the largest national voting power in the Fund. In the 1961 negotiations, the continental Europeans, whose financial position had by then become greatly strengthened, argued for, and we agreed to, a fundamental change in voting procedure which was in their favor.

While the evidence is merely suggestive, it does seem that in these cases where there was organized European power the United States was responsive to European views. The results in each case were to enhance the general interest—including our own.

VI

In the light of this analysis it is possible to test the three policy alternatives—nationalism, Atlantic union and Atlantic partnership—against the four major interests of the United States.

With regard to the objective of economic growth and a more equitable sharing of the burden of security, neither nationalism nor a loose Atlantic union dominated by the United States is as likely to achieve results as the policy of Atlantic partnership. This conclusion need not be based on political speculation but derives from known attitudes, current contributions of the smaller nations and the diminishing role of the major European states.

With respect to the German problem, both nationalism and the Atlantic-community approach decisively fail. The classical world order of sovereign national states leaves Germany alone once more to seek its own destiny. It was Adenauer's conscious choice in 1950 to place Germany's future within a European community. This has remained the heart of German foreign policy. At the same time Germany has never conceived of European unity outside the context of a strong Atlantic partnership.

As for the problems of the third world—the less developed countries in the Southern Hemisphere—the issue is how to encourage a further sense of European responsibility, and thus greater participation. The current evidence shows a diminishing European interest. Many Europeans today see themselves as playing only a supporting role to the United States. It would seem axiomatic that with a system of nation-states, or a political

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framework within which the Europeans are merely small components of a loosely organized Atlantic community, this state of mind would continue.

With respect to the complex problem of normalizing relations with the East, it would appear, as Professor Brzezinski has pointed out, that a prosperous, politically stable and unified Western Europe is most apt to induce the kinds of evolutionary changes we seek. Should West European unity fade and the system of nation-states reëmerge, then this present source of magnetic attraction to the East would be lost.

In even this abbreviated analysis it becomes clear that the choice is essentially between a system of national European states and Atlantic partnership. In this context Atlantic union—or federation—runs as a poor third principally because this alternative has so little appeal to the Europeans at the present time. It should be noted, however, that at some point in time interest in Atlantic partnership and in the goal of Atlantic union may very well converge. There is nothing in the concept of Atlantic partnership that precludes an eventual fusing of a united Europe and the United States.

But even if one accepts the validity of Atlantic partnership, it is a policy that for the moment is stalled. There is no effective European partner. Americans are acutely conscious of the fact that the world will not stand still waiting for the Atlantic nations to sort out their affairs. Since we are an impatient people we approach foreign policy with much the same attitude that impels us to turn in two-year-old automobiles. The older a policy, the more suspect it is. But the most suspect is the old policy that doesn't seem to be yielding results. This emotional reaction could hardly be at greater variance with the history of large political or social ideas. All movements that have basically changed men's thoughts or the organization of their affairs have had to overcome deep resistance and inertia.

The tenacity of Cavour in pressing for the unification of Italy is one of a host of examples that bear out this principle. Beginning in the 1830s and 40s, a generation of Italians undertook what must have seemed an overwhelming if not hopeless mission. Cavour was determined to throw off foreign domination and unify the small regional states into a single, independent Italy. The Mazzini uprising of 1833 failed; so did the Young Italy rising of 1834; the Sardinian forces were defeated in 1848

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and 1849; it was not until 1860 that the tides changed. Only in March 1861 did the first Italian parliament meet and proclaim the Kingdom of Italy. Three months later Cavour died. In judging the validity of long-term policies there have to be more sophisticated tests than immediate results.

But the fact remains that the policy of Atlantic partnership for the moment is stagnant. What can be done? There should certainly be a clear sense of "strategic direction." This should be in the minds of government officials and of the people who must make their own private decisions. This strategic direction manifests itself in periodic statements, such as President Johnson's speech of May 7, 1965, and the Johnson-Erhard communiqué following their meeting in Washington last December. But there is also the question of how we and the Europeans deal with immediate problems. For instance, despite the importance and urgency of the Kennedy Round negotiations, we and other participants in the discussions have recognized that the E.E.C. must straighten out its own affairs before the talks can be resumed in earnest. At the same time, we have recognized that the E.E.C. is central to these negotiations and that the Community should be dealt with as a unit.

A second example can be found in the European nuclear problem, whatever its ultimate disposition may be. The United States has indicated its willingness, in response to European desires, to envisage a "European clause" in any plan that may eventually emerge. The purpose of this clause would be to assure that certain options remained open. Without predicting what would happen in the organization of Europe, or indeed even indicating an American preference, the intent of this clause would be to say, "if at some juncture in the future a united Europe should come into being, able to make the most fundamental decisions of peace and war, then whatever we have agreed to now should be subject to review and renegotiation in the light of these fundamental changes." We should face the short term, therefore, with two thoughts in mind: to deal with immediate problems when we can in such a fashion as to advance us toward our strategic goals and, when this is not possible, at least to avoid foreclosing any options that both we and the Europeans wish to leave open.

It can be asked whether the sweeping goal of Atlantic partnership is not too ambitious. Today we accept as a matter of course

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audacity in the pure sciences, but seem reluctant to match it with similar audacity in our political behavior. It is generally argued that great political changes are possible only in times of stress or acute and evident danger. I take issue with this point of view. But if political innovation requires danger as a prod, then we have danger in abundance, even if it appears in ambiguous form. If comprehended, it should produce the stimulus out of which new, creative political ideas should emerge and persevere. One framework within which such ideas should take shape is the embryonic concept of an Atlantic partnership.

I have tried to bring out facts and identify basic interests rather than rely on speculation and hope. Yet the most significant "fact" may well be the tenacious hold the dream of unity has on the European mind. Ideas that lead to profound political change have generally been simple and easily grasped. European union is such an idea. Americans, in all prudence, should weigh this sentiment, recognize that the idea of unity has a firm hold on the minds of Europeans, and note that the new European institutions have worked and begun to meet the challenge of complex industrial societies.

But these conclusions do not help much in predicting the timing or the character of future steps. Not even dedicated Europeans are either optimistic or clear about the short run. A sense of perspective is essential. What the Europeans are about today and tomorrow—and, hopefully, the day after tomorrow in cooperation with the United States—is to penetrate new political frontiers. They are trying to find new methods of coping with the realities of their own political world that will meet the requirements and interests of their people. "Atlantic interdependence" is our way of agreeing that old patterns are inadequate and that we stand ready to consider new relationships. It is inconceivable to me that this nation, with its gift for political thought and record of successful political innovation, will be found wanting in the presence of a united Europe able and prepared to collaborate with us in the tasks that lie ahead.

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DE GAULLE AND AFTER

By Gaston Defferre

THE outcome of the presidential elections in France took public opinion abroad by surprise. General de Gaulle was thought to be so exceptional a politician, with such great personal radiance and such a firm grip on opinion that it seemed he would be elected by a substantial majority on the first ballot. The results he had obtained in referenda in the past led one to believe that he would do even better in the presidential elections. His main argument in those referenda had been that if he did not obtain an unequivocal and massive response he could not carry on with his task. This election centered, directly and personally, on him. The outcome, then, appeared clear in advance.

It is interesting to look now into the reasons why he was forced to submit to a runoff; for though they do not define the future precisely, they do permit us to analyze what it may be.

General de Gaulle's policies dissatisfied many Frenchmen. From his return to power in 1958 to 1963, inflation grew at a rate equal to what we had experienced in the Fourth Republic. The stabilization plan came too late, lasted too long and brought economic stagnation and social problems. The crisis touched nearly every professional and social class. Discontent was widespread. Its principal manifestation, generally forgotten, was the big miners' strike in 1962, which occurred even though the Government had declared it a "social year," a year when the claims of the workers would be recognized. Another group, the farmers, were equally discontented. They felt they were being sacrificed by the Government. They blocked roads with their tractors and sometimes even stormed prefectures. Later they hoped their troubles might be solved by bringing agriculture into the Common Market. The rupture of negotiations for that purpose at Brussels on June 30, 1965, was a very deep disappointment to them. Farmers are slow to change. But once they have lost confidence in a leader, it cannot be restored, even if repeated promises are made.

One characteristic of the recent election was that the traditionally Gaullist electorate in the rural areas voted for the opposition candidates. In the big cities, the Gaullist element was more faithful. There, some leftist voters—socialists, Communists or

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policy of real aid to the third world succeed. European coöperation with the countries on the road to development could avoid the constraints of anti-Communism and the appetites of private interests. Since Europe would not force the developing countries to bind their domestic policies to a particular foreign policy, they would not have to choose between renouncing socialism, which they may want, or integrating their economies into the Eastern bloc, which they do not want. In short, European aid would permit them more independence. And in Africa, South America and Asia neither of the two camps would look on it as a menacing intrusion of the other.

V

The right policy for attaining peace and progress is one which would permit us to be equal with the United States, not only in law but also in fact, so as to escape economic colonization and exert real influence in orienting American and world policies in a constructive direction. Such a policy will never materialize unless Europe finally becomes a reality. And General de Gaulle is the first obstacle to overcome. To the question, "What is needed for the construction of Europe?", the first response must be "for de Gaulle to get out." But that of itself is not enough, because the United States could also prevent the creation of Europe.

Having pushed Europe together following the war, the Americans have been uneasy about the economic implications of the progress of the E.E.C. For Europe to achieve equality and independence may be displeasing to business circles in the United States. But Americans must recognize that, in spite of the immediate inconvenience it may cause them, in the long run it is the only policy conducive to good relations between the United States and France, and to the maintenance of peace. Even if the economic growth of Europe constricts the United States, even if it meant that the U. S. Government could no longer deal alone with the East, nor enjoy exclusive power of decision, the Americans must accept it. The present situation cannot last.

If Europe is not built, American economic and political domination will provoke dangerous nationalist reactions, of which Gaullism is only a first expression. The spread of nuclear weapons will assume more and more dangerous proportions. Europe can avoid this. A creative European civilization, combining the most durable values of socialism with some of the more effective market

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then, Germany has become the best ally of the United States. This situation leads the United States increasingly to play its German trump card against France, and Germany to claim with growing insistence the right to nuclear arms and, one day, the reunification of the two Germanys. The only way to end this process is the construction of a Europe in which Germany would be firmly included.

Without European unity, the danger of war created by the present state of affairs can only grow. The U.S.S.R. will not agree that Germany be given nuclear arms; and the problem of German reunification cannot be resolved peacefully so long as it is posed in terms of a test of strength between the United States and the U.S.S.R. But if American policy in this respect is unfavorable to France, falling into step with Gaullist policy cannot change it, nor usefully combat it.

Another area in which a unified Europe could be most helpful is in extending aid to the third world. As presently administered through bilateral pacts between governments or by the operations of powerful private interests, aid is a form of neocolonialism. It can lead to political and even military intervention to protect private interests, or to armed intervention such as that of France in Gabon. Commercial or political clients are recruited under the pretext of generosity. Aid to the third world ought to be given in such a way that it cannot become a more-or-less camouflaged instrument of domination. It must not make battlefields of the countries involved, or even zones of struggle for influence between East and West. Aid must be depersonalized —that is, distributed by a group of nations, such as a united Europe.

The United States, because of the power of its private enterprises, its policies in Latin America and the Far East, and its feeling of responsibility to fight Communism all over the world, will not change its policy toward the third world unless forced to do so. So, too, the Soviet Union and China will doubtless continue for a long time to try to extend their zone of influence by offering aid to the undeveloped countries.

France alone cannot modify the course of events, either by voyages in space or by making promises it cannot keep, and definitely not by following the same policy, on a more modest scale, as that followed by the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China. On the other hand, a united Europe would be able to make a

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nomically and politically united, endowed with a supranational authority and a parliament elected by universal suffrage—in other words, the exact opposite of what General de Gaulle wants —will it be capable of confronting the dangers of economic colonization by the United States. Only within a European framework will it be possible to build enterprises powerful enough to hold their own with big American businesses. Only then will it be possible to end the sad spectacle of European statesmen taking turns ringing doorbells in Washington or paying visits to Moscow. To ensure its prosperity, Europe must control its own principal centers of decision. France's job should be to convince our European partners of this, as well as the United States. The Europe we want to build is not a roundabout way of camouflaging some kind of submission to the United States, but exactly the opposite.

IV

It may seem paradoxical that Franco-American relations depend in large part on the solution of the German problem; yet that happens to be the case. Germany's place in Europe and the world is such that relations between the United States and Germany, and the policies they pursue jointly, are of direct concern to France and have repercussions on Franco-American relations.

Economically, Germany has become the third strongest industrial power in the world and occupies second place in world trade. Politically and geographically, Germany is in the center of Europe and also faces the countries of the East. It is a divided country, and it will always have a tendency to wish for reunification. In the event of a serious economic crisis, there would be the risk of this desire becoming a need.

In refusing to build Europe and pushing the United States into the arms of an ever stronger and more nationalistic Germany, General de Gaulle has made Germany both the principal ally of the United States and even a sort of arbiter between the United States and Russia.

When the United States aided in the reconstruction of Europe after the war by pressing economic integration, it instituted a policy of nondiscrimination toward Germany in order to preserve control over it and make it accept the fact of division without offending its national touchiness. The result was that Germany's European partners were fitted into the same corset. Since

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businesses and the size of their investments in Europe (even if in some cases they are merely pursuing on our side of the Atlantic their own competitive domestic practices) are the beginning of the colonization of our economy. General de Gaulle is not sufficiently aware of this. He speaks often of national independence, but he does nothing to prevent the economic takeover of European enterprises by American big business.

The relative economic power of the United States is shown by the fact that its national income is eight times that of France; the annual increment alone is half the total French national income. A single American corporation, General Motors, has a budget nearly equivalent to that of France. The largest French enterprise would rank fiftieth among American firms, which are scaled to a continent of nearly 200,000,000 people. Clearly, French firms are unable to fight these competitors from across the sea. As a result, American investments are becoming more and more numerous in France and in Europe, particularly in fields of most rapid growth. The Bull concern, the only large French maker of electronic computers, is both a crushing example of this phenomenon and an illustration of how the Gaullist government meets it. When Bull was in difficult straits, the French Government helped it avoid bankruptcy; then it allowed the majority holdings to pass into the hands of General Electric, which competes on the world market with another American firm, I.B.M. Thenceforth the centers of decision in a vital sector, not only in the economic sense but for the national defense, were no longer in France but in the United States.

Thus it can be said that General de Gaulle's nationalist policy is not only carrying us back to a bygone era, but is leading—under an appearance of independence—to the colonization of the French economy by the United States. Some say that this is neither wished for nor welcomed by the U.S. Government, that it foils its efforts to maintain the stability of the dollar and that unfavorable reactions to it hamper American diplomacy. It none the less remains a dangerous and unacceptable fact. Colonization always leads sooner or later to decolonization—after trouble, suffering and sometimes war.

We do not want that. But unlike the Gaullists we are not content simply to say so; we want to provide ourselves with the means to resist. The formula for resistance is to make a reality of Europe, an independent Europe. Only when Europe is eco-

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Many French disapprove, as I personally do, of the policies of the United States in Santo Domingo and in Viet Nam, but they do not think that blustering communiqués will influence American policy. On the contrary, they are convinced that it is by creating Europe, and speaking in the name of Europe, that European statesmen will exert a real influence on the American Government and lead it to change its foreign policy in the direction of what they consider progress and peace.

Giving de Gaulle the benefit of the doubt, one can say that in order to regain some of his lost popularity he has decided at least provisionally to modify his economic and social policies. (The replacement of d'Estaing by Debré as Finance Minister is the evidence.) But he will not alter his foreign policy. He considers its realization essential to the accomplishment of his mission. Since he is a nineteenth-century nationalist, he ignores the fact that things have changed and that in a world where the great powers are of continental dimensions—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and, one might add, China—France's only chance for survival is to throw herself into the creation of Europe. Here his policy is very much behind the times. He once spoke of "papa's Algeria;" actually he is France's "grandpapa," refusing to open his eyes to the world's transformation in the last few decades.

It is not likely, then, that he will change his foreign policy. Probably, too, he will continue to refuse to talk with the Americans, which I think is a mistake. In the course of a trip to the United States in the spring of 1964, where I was received by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk and others, I emphasized that it was possible to follow a policy different from that of the United States, but only if it is fully explained. Whoever knows Americans knows that one can ask them to change their policy, and perhaps even persuade them to do so, provided the request is based not on antiquated nationalism but on moral values, the political principles which are the foundation of Western civilization, and which we share. General de Gaulle, locking himself in his ivory tower, stands no chance of persuading the Americans to change their policy. It is likely that he does not even want to do so, and rejoices in the mistakes they may make.

For France and Western Europe, the military danger inherent in Stalinist postwar policy is now much attenuated. In contrast, the economic invasion by the United States is a clear and present danger. American economic power, the dynamic power of its big

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had penetrated deeply into the French mind. Merchants, industrialists and farmers alike were convinced that to build Europe was the only way to maintain peace and to solve the economic problems ahead. It is comforting to note that the Gaullist propaganda did not succeed in fooling the public into believing that General de Gaulle was a true European. Though he called himself a more realistic European than his opponents, Frenchmen understood that to build Europe we must not only apply the Treaty of Rome, but also be imbued with a European spirit in order to surmount difficulties which the Treaty could not foresee. The French were taken with the idea of a supranational Europe, to which de Gaulle, who remains attached to concepts of the past, is fundamentally opposed.

The resumed negotiations on the Common Market have proved that, in spite of what he said during the campaign, de Gaulle remains opposed to a true Europe. He has protested the role of the Commission of the E.E.C., its only common organ, which acts not in the name of one country but in the name of the Six; and further, he has refused to accept majority rule as provided in the Treaty. This refusal means that all decisions must still be unanimous; in other words, a single state can exercise a veto.

The resulting arrangement is purely formal. De Gaulle has not given way on his principles. The Six have decided to continue to meet, but the role of the Commission will be diminished. Majority rule has not been abandoned in principle, but France declared that she would not accept it and the other five partners agreed not to apply it whenever an important question is under discussion. Our partners in the Common Market wished to avoid a break which would definitely jeopardize the construction of Europe.

General de Gaulle's foreign policy toward the United States flatters the nationalism and vanity of certain Frenchmen who like to see the chief of state stand up to a great world power. But this attitude is disturbing to others, and sometimes even to those who are anti-American. And incidentally, they are even more uneasy over his turning to the East. However, an agreement with Russia would bother the French less than a rapprochement with China. Many Frenchmen in fact realize that world peace depends on the peaceful coexistence of the United States and the U.S.S.R., but they wonder what role China will play in the world concert.

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established between the executive and legislative powers; the executive branch cannot impose its will on the legislature. In fact, it often happens that the Congress does not accept the proposals of the Executive.

In France, under the Gaullist system, everything is in the hands of the President of the Republic—executive power, the legislature and the judiciary. The ministers take part in all parliamentary debates, and the Government has the right to call for a vote of confidence in the Assembly. Under the 1958 Constitution, the Government automatically receives confidence if 50 percent of the deputies have not taken the initiative and introduced a motion of censure, and do not vote against the Government in a roll call. In addition, article 16 of the Constitution permits the President, at any moment he judges expedient, to suspend the parliament and exercise dictatorial power.

The essence of the Constitution, except for article 16, might well be preserved if it were applied in the spirit and the letter in which it was conceived in 1958. It would then secure ministerial stability. And if, as one might hope, the number of parties dwindles, it then will be possible to combine democracy, stability and efficiency.

De Gaulle's mediocre results in this respect are due to both his domestic and foreign policies. For a long time he thought he could displease various social and professional classes but carry his appeal to the masses and obtain their confidence. However, dissatisfactions accumulated until by the time of the election they were stronger than his charm and magnetism.

I myself, as a candidate, explained to the Breton farmers that it served no purpose to barricade the roads if afterwards they were going to vote for de Gaulle. They did in fact refrain from voting for de Gaulle on the first ballot. But in the runoff, some of them voted for him because Mitterrand had been officially endorsed by the Communist Party. The creation of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, of which I have spoken, will preclude this sort of result by bringing together all French democrats with a socialist leaning, but excluding the Communists.

III

During the campaign, all the opposition candidates spoke copiously about Europe, showing that this seemingly abstract idea

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porters of Giscard d'Estaing, a Gaullist conservative who was dismissed as Finance Minister after the election. He is now trying to set up a political party which after de Gaulle disappears would gather in the former Gaullist voters on the right. It is too soon to say whether d'Estaing and Lecanuet will compete for the traditionally moderate element which voted Gaullist for a time, or whether they will join forces.

In any case, it appears certain that political life in France is going to be simplified. The French realize by now that a multiplicity of parties prevents the formation of a real majority in the government and in parliament and provokes ministerial instability. And even the most anti-Gaullist of Frenchmen do not wish to return to that.

It seems to me impossible to build a homogeneous and lasting governing majority on the basis of agreements made between political parties after the elections, if during the elections they have been separate and opposed. In England, the candidates of a political party are presented together in the elections, with the result that they are more responsible in Parliament, and the solid majority increases ministerial stability. In France, difficulties generally do not arise from an attempt to carry out a program which has been established in advance, but from unforeseen events. Deputies elected in competition with one another are more likely to fall out among themselves, provoking a ministerial crisis, whereas if they are elected together they must face future difficulties together.

General de Gaulle has modified the Constitution of 1958 profoundly. He has violated its spirit in creating a "reserved domain" where he is sole master; it includes foreign policy, national defense and relations with underdeveloped countries. Further, he declared in his press conference of January 31, 1964, that, contrary to what the Constitution says, all powers—civil, military and even judicial—emanate from the President of the Republic. Now in France it is a very old tradition, indeed a rule, that legislative, executive and judicial powers are separate. De Gaulle wished to bring them together in his own hands. That is why it is said in France that he exercises personal power.

Again, by the referendum of November 1962, he caused the Constitution to be amended so that the President is elected by universal suffrage. The American President is elected in this way, but he is not responsible to Congress, and a balance has been

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I thought that what counted was to avoid the alternatives of either instability or personal power in which France has been locked for a hundred years, and not just since the Fourth Republic. My object was to create at least two large political forces, one left of center, the other conservative. The Communists and the extreme right would remain outside these groups. Since I did not succeed in this, the natural, honest and moral thing was for me to withdraw. I considered it my duty to withdraw in order to save the idea. Though I did not succeed, once the idea had been launched it was taken up in a narrower form, that of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left. I supported Mr. Mitterrand in the campaign, as he had me when I was a candidate, and I have now decided to back the Federation, which for a while was called the "little federation," as opposed to my broader plan.

The Federation must grow in two directions: to the left, toward the Unified Socialist Party, and toward certain men of the left center who worked with Lecanuet during the campaign but now are uneasy because they feel he is tending to the right. The Federation must present a single candidate in each constituency in the next elections. If certain questions are settled between now and then, its candidates might hope to win over the Communists and the Gaullists.

Among these questions, two are essential. First, individuals must be admitted as members of the Federation, at present composed wholly of old political parties and certain clubs. This would open the door to the floating voters who showed their interest at the time of the election but refused to adhere to the old parties. Second, the political groups which make up the Federation—that is, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, the Union of Socialist Democrats of the Resistance, and the clubs—must merge into a single new group, younger and more attractive than the old parties.

The other political force emerging from the presidential election is Lecanuet's right-oriented Democratic Center, made up of the conservative Popular Republican Movement, Christian in origin and entrenched especially in the east and west of France, and of the Independents—that is, moderates and conservatives. In the future the movement will probably become a rightist force.

A third element in the political situation consists of the sup-

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radicals, and particularly women—voted for de Gaulle, while in the countryside the opposite occurred.

Another factor in the success of the opposition was the fact that for the first time since de Gaulle returned to power, Frenchmen were exposed to a variety of views on radio and television. It is said that when André Malraux visited the United States he asked President Kennedy, "How do you manage to govern without a television monopoly?" De Gaulle thought that by allowing two hours to each candidate during the campaign the opposition would quickly weary the public—but the opposite happened. Two candidates in particular, François Mitterrand and Jean Lecanuet, young and intelligent men, passed the television test and showed the French public the heart of the problems at stake. The polls revealed, as the campaign progressed, that many who had formerly voted for de Gaulle were deciding to vote for the opposition. The General himself made a serious error in confusing elections and referenda, and in giving an impression of contempt for public opinion. In fact, he neglected to use his own speaking time fully and addressed the voters directly only twice.

As we shall note in detail later, de Gaulle's foreign policy also was disturbing and unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to the problem of Europe, which was at the center of the campaign.

II

Gaullism is based entirely on confidence in one man; and he refuses to define the policy he will follow. For a long time, de Gaulle gave the impression of infallibility. The shock to public opinion caused by his being forced into a run-off election shows that Gaullism will not survive de Gaulle.

Gaullist supporters are a very heterogeneous group, composed largely of conservatives, with some leftists—socialists, Communists and radicals—but especially of a mass of floating voters, representing 40 percent of the active electorate, whose choice is decisive on election day. The question for the future is which way these floaters will go.

Two great movements are taking shape, preparing for the aftermath of Gaullism. These are the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, of which François Mitterrand is president, and the Center Democrats led by Mr. Lecanuet.

When I was a candidate I attached more importance to transforming the French political structure than to getting elected.

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techniques, would give peaceful coexistence a richer content than that of the balance of terror. The growth of exchanges of products, ideas and administrative techniques would assist the integration of societies which are different but tend more and more to converge. The East-West détente and the thaw in Eastern Europe would benefit from it. Everything which lessens tension and develops ties between East and West facilitates the solution of the German problem and improves Franco-American relations.

The policy of General de Gaulle will have had one single merit, that is, to spotlight the fact that our relations with the United States could not remain as they were after the immediate postwar period. But as in many other areas, even if the President in this respect sees clearly, he does not know what inferences to draw for the future. To refuse to submit to the United States is useful and in the best interest of France. To plunge into out-of-date nationalism, to refuse to create Europe, is dangerous to France and to the peace of the world.

The presidential election pointed strikingly to the erosion of Gaullist power. Will the men who are given the opportunity when power changes hands know how to start off resolutely on a new path? Will they know how to escape the traditions, the old habits, which in the past have driven some to find attractions in the United States and others in Russia? And will they understand that Europe's role now is to pass from the balance of terror to active peaceful coexistence? We may hope so, since the candidates who ran against the General made the creation of Europe the central theme of their campaign.

But time is pressing. Perhaps tomorrow it will be too late to accomplish what is possible today. In political as in private life, it is rare to meet opportunities twice. If through the fault of General de Gaulle the opportunity to build Europe is lost, he will carry a grave responsibility with him into history.

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AUSTRALIA LOOKS AROUND

By Donald Horne

NOT long after I returned to Sydney in 1954, I met a friend I had not seen for five years. After a meagre offering of cordialities, he said: "How long do you give us? I give us three years." When I asked him what he was talking about he said that he expected that China would conquer Southeast Asia by 1957 and that Australia would become a Chinese dependency shortly after. He speculated for a while about who the members of Australia's first Quisling government would be. . . .

The feeling that one morning we shall wake up to find that we are no longer here has been one of the strong undertones of Australian life. For most of the first 100 years of settlement there was a shiftlessness about being an Australian. The sense of impermanence in the penal colonies, the gold rushes and the land seizures was even reflected in architecture: most of settled Australia looked like a camp. The arid interior did not provide the excitements and optimism of an expanding frontier; it seemed to be associated more with an ingrained doubt that life could be expected to hold anything very much (although one might as well "give it a go"). Even now most Australians still live in the city ports, clinging to a few bits and pieces of the edges of their continent. There is a long established anxiety about its emptiness. (Perhaps Australia should be renamed a "desert island"; there are too many rhetorical implications in the idea of one nation occupying a whole "continent," even if the "continent" is only Australia.) Between the two World Wars "populate or perish" was a fearsome slogan and it seemed to make sense when the Japanese destroyed Darwin in 1942. When Australians now consider that the tropical third of their island (the part that is closest to Southeast Asia) is almost completely unpopulated, they sometimes fear that by some act of natural justice they might lose title to it. This middle-class belief that success must be earned marries oddly with the role of a closed aristocracy that Australia plays beside the poverty of Asia, but Australians now profess little aristocratic sense of moral assurance about their place in the world. They are not South Africans. They no longer know who they are. No one has convinced them about who they are supposed to be since the First World War, when the nationalism that

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developed in the 1890s seemed to blow up so big that it burst.

I have referred to this submerged Australian obsession with the possibility of catastrophe because in discussing Australians' attitudes to foreign affairs I did not wish to begin in the more usual way by describing their "apathy." I wanted to draw attention to something that is so obvious that most Australian intellectuals forget about it: that one of the preconceptions of ordinary Australians about foreign policy is that from time to time they must go off and fight somewhere with an ally, in propitiation of distant danger—and even (in the past) for the sheer sport of it. In one of these paradoxes that are usual in everything in life except most descriptions of it, this submerged sense of melodrama exists in a society that in its day-to-day interrelations is as stolid as the brick suburban houses in which most of its people live. (It is boring to go on repeating it, but one must note that Australia is the most urbanized nation in the world.) Institutionalized in the suburbs is the belief in the Australian as a warrior, and the belief in Australia itself as some great power's best ally, somebody's brave and resourceful younger brother.

One token of this is that Australia's right to nationhood was considered to have been established not when Queen Victoria signed the Act that allowed the six self-governing colonies to federate but in 1915 when Australian troops shared in the disasters of the Gallipoli expedition. It is Anzac Day, the commemoration of this disaster, that constitutes the only effective native-grown ceremony in Australia. In this, their only folk festival, Australians see their history as a series of expeditions by gallant military contingents sent to the Anglo-Sudan War, the Boer War, the two World Wars, the Korean War, the Malayan "Emergency," and now the Indonesian *konfrontasi* and the war in South Viet Nam. The idea that they are one of nature's allies—central in Australian preconceptions of foreign affairs—means that they have looked openly and without hostility to big nations (first Britain, now America) to provide the massive power that seemed to assure their existence and that they have been prepared to pay the price of alliance. Australians were the first people in the Second World War to be saved by the Americans and their sense of the fitness of alliance has allowed them to forgive the Americans for saving them.

For most of the twentieth century, Australians did not think about Asia, the place near where they live, except in their

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submerged catastrophic moods, when it represented the Yellow Peril, the North Wind that might blow them away. At school they were taught as much of world history as seemed relevant to the domestic histories of Australia, Great Britain and France. If one examines their rhetoric, the idea that they were members of that late Victorian and Edwardian invention, "the British race," seems to have absorbed the imaginations of most Top People. (The idea that they were Irish seemed to absorb the imaginations of a significant proportion of Bottom People.) The Australian Empire Men (the influential minority) saw most of their fellow Australians as an inferior version of this imaginary race, and developed a kind of colonialists' distrust for them. Even the moderate Australian nationalists (probably the majority) saw their Australian-ness as lying in the fact that they were *really* "British," unlike the English who were too English to be British. The extreme nationalists, who were also extreme isolationists, saw themselves as a new civilization, the future hope of mankind. But Australian fraternalism—the customs of "mateship"—was an exclusive brotherhood. As the nationalistic *Bulletin* put it during the most virulent period of the "White Australia" immigration policy: "Australia for the White Man, and China for the Chows."

These old dreams brought over from Britain and grown peculiar in a new environment were useless as a basis for action as the Long War began in Asia with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. I remember the night when, as a country boy, I came home from shooting rabbits to find that the papers had arrived from Sydney with the news that the Japanese—whom we had never thought about—had invaded a part of the world not mentioned in our geography books. In the Australian fashion, war was a big and important thing in our family. During supper my parents discussed its prospects: would there be another Great War? There was nothing of special concern to Australia about this; Manchuria seemed as far away as Gallipoli. But we would, of course, send our expedition. Ten years later, after the Japanese had destroyed European colonialism in Southeast Asia in a few weeks, do-it-yourself Australians were making their blackout screens.

In one of those bursts of self-importance that alternate with its longer periods of modesty, Australia invented foreign policy as soon as the Japanese segment of Asia's Long War had ended. With little concern for the growth of Mao's strength in China, or

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for questions of power of any kind apart from getting representation on U.N. Committees, a hastily expanded External Affairs Department was pushed by the late Dr. H. V. Evatt into every world problem that could be detected. This was the period when the Labor Party government saw Australia as one of the consciences of the world, the literate voice of the smaller powers and an opponent of colonialism in Southeast Asia—where Australia assisted the destruction of Dutch rule in Indonesia. Looking back on it, this outburst of self-confidence seems to have come partly from Dr. Evatt's personal sense of adventure and partly from a continuation of the wartime recognition that after the fall of Singapore Australia could never again rely on British power. (The fall of Singapore marked the beginning of Australian foreign policy.) Perhaps what was most remarkable about it was that it was the first effective expression of a yearning that still exists—to do away with the inhibitions of alliance. It was also a reminder of that give-it-a-go delight in improvised action that lies concealed in Australian taciturnity and sometimes breaks through it. When Chiang fled to Taiwan in 1949 and Sir Robert Menzies (then but a Mr.) won government from the Labor Party and began his 16-year Prime Ministership, this sense of adventure departed from Australian foreign policy.

The early Menzies period was an unusually ideological time, in which the pressures of domestic politics may have helped determine foreign policy. At first Menzies' main concern was domestic: to grant Australia that "hundred percent freedom of enterprise" that would have destroyed it. In office, this revolutionary idealism was satisfied mainly by attacking the Australian Communists. The Communists had themselves made these attacks inevitable. As their contribution to the expression of Communist adventurism in Southeast Asia, they had used their considerable strength in the trade-union movement to produce so many provocative political strikes that, before Menzies took over, the Labor Government had already broken strikes with troops, jailed the party leader and set up a security service. Menzies attempted to ban the Communist Party—until his proposals were defeated in a referendum—and then, in the case of Petrov, the defecting Soviet agent, and in other ways, he continued to talk about Communism, particularly at election times, increasingly widening his references to include foreign Communists—first Russians, then Chinese. In a sense this initial ideological interest in Communism

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as the supreme enemy of "free enterprise" saved him from taking a serious interest in Asia (or even in Communism). He still saw Asia as he had read about it in British textbooks.

This concern with Communism was given much more intense expression by developments within the Labor Party. These were to determine the whole subsequent tone of Australian politics and foreign policy (and keep Menzies in office). Within the trade unions, where Catholic influence was traditionally strong, a Catholic secret society ("The Movement") was formed. Its main practical concern was to organize votes for anti-Communist union candidates but, through the connection between the trade unions and the Labor Party, it later became a kind of party-within-the-Labor-Party, with a fierce interest in international (and increasingly Chinese) Communism, expressed in high ideology. In 1954, for reasons that there is not space to describe, the Labor Party began to fall to pieces from its tensions; what was left of "The Movement" broke away as the Democratic Labor Party, and in election after election this breakaway party kept the Labor Party out of office because it had now become ambiguous in its foreign policy and spoke with conflicting voices on the American alliance. In this sense, all Australian elections since 1954 have been "about" foreign policy.

I have referred to these matters of domestic politics and of ordinary Australians' preconceptions about the world because the concern of an influential minority with Communism and the traditional concept of Australia as somebody's ally have been crucial to the politics lying behind Australian foreign policy, which (apart from subplots) has been one of alliance with America and Britain (and anyone else who will come in) in "forward defense" against what is taken to be a southward drive of Communist Chinese influence. Menzies' natural bent was to be a Queen's Man and a Commonwealth Man—the idea of Britishry seemed central to his beliefs—but events pushed him in another direction. Unlike the British, his government did not give diplomatic recognition to Peking, and with one exception it has given "me too" support to American policies of containment in Asia. The exception is overseas trade. Mainly through its wheat purchases, China is now Australia's fourth biggest customer.

Here again the pressures of domestic politics were decisive. Menzies depended on the support of the minority Country Party to make up his coalition governments, and the wheat growers had

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become the strongest single interest within the Country Party. Otherwise, in its relation to America, Australia under Menzies continued to play its traditional role as the faithful ally of a great power, except that the name of the great power was changed. Where American and British policies coincided, as in Korea, the Malayan "Emergency" and the Indonesian confrontation, Australia still sent contingents to fight alongside the British. Where they did not coincide, as in the question of recognition of China, the signing of the ANZUS Pact and in certain periods of the Viet Nam war, Australia sided with the Americans. But while Menzies' policies consolidated the replacement of Britain by America as Australia's crucial ally, he did not derive much satisfaction out of it. It was still questions of the break-up of the old British power that most moved his imagination, if gloomily. He conducted foreign policy with his eyes averted. This may partly account for the curious lack of communication that existed between him and the Australian people; he seemed to be reluctant to dramatize for them their new place in the world. Although questions of China, of Asia generally and of the American alliance were fundamental to his long term of office, Menzies did not talk much about Australia's place in Asia, or the dependence of his policy on America, but he did once confide that in the Cabinet room he sometimes looked at Asia on the map.

However non-communicative Menzies was, there is one sense in which Australia is already becoming an "Asian" country. In sections of both the Right and the Left there is obsession with the question: Will the Chinese become the supreme power in Asia? To believe that the future of China seems of crucial importance to the future of one's own country is one of the few ways of giving meaning (apart from merely geographical meaning) to the word "Asian." The future of China is now the central question in the Long War in which Asia has been sorting itself out. Because of the submerged theme of impermanence and even catastrophe in the Australian imagination, the idea of possible Chinese dominance is "believable" to Australians; they can even imagine that they could cease to exist while the rest of European civilization continued as if nothing much had happened. Among those in the Democratic Labor Party and their secret supporters in the other parties, including the Labor Party, who can imagine this, there is revolt against the traditional small-ally policy; they speak of an Australia rearmed, perhaps even with nuclear weapons, strong

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enough to play a more positive part in the American alliance, and by its assistance perhaps even encouraging the Americans to stay; if America should depart, they see this armed Australia taking the initiative in manufacturing alliances with Asian powers. In parts of the Labor Party the revulsion against traditional ideas of alliance has become complete; they believe that Australia should withdraw from the American alliance and arm itself sufficiently to become a "garrison Australia."

The more usual "leftist" position is one of *unarmed* neutrality. In this view the word "Asia" has replaced "the workers" as a name for a regenerative proletariat that is by peculiar definition necessarily good and always better than Australians, a benign force that can liberate Australians from the problems of having too many consumer durables, or whatever it is that is assumed to be wrong with them. Ignoring Asia's massive and perhaps unique divisiveness, this view sees a simple remedy for Australia's foreign policy: Australia should not do anything that would affront "Asian opinion." For this purpose "Asia" is defined in a way that excludes Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, South Viet Nam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and, after the border disputes with China, India; and perhaps Indonesia if the generals retain power there. It really means that "Asia" consists of China and those parts of Asia that support Communist China, or do not openly oppose it. Whatever problems the Chinese provide can be overcome by the therapeutic approach to foreign policy: like problem children, the delinquent Chinese would lose their hostilities if we showed them a little more affection.

In neither of the opposing ideological concepts of Asia—that of anti-Communism and that of the benign and regenerative proletariat—is there much natural feel for the texture of affairs in Asia, yet it is in these ideological terms that most of the more spirited debate on foreign policy occurs. The anti-Communist position has an important strength: it draws attention to the importance of China, but the considerable care that one should now exercise in explaining what one means by "Communism" in particular cases is often neglected by its exponents. It has two more important weaknesses: it tends to sort the sheep from the goats too arbitrarily and too ideologically, ignoring the ability of Asian countries to switch sides for reasons that are not related to ideology; and it is useless in a situation in which the issues have nothing to do directly with Communism. One might as well try

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to understand Europe by reading nothing but Karl Marx as try to understand Asia by concerning oneself with nothing but Communism. Those who hold to the concept of Asia as a regenerative proletariat, on the other hand, argue Communist activities out of existence as being nothing more than a necessary social-revolutionary approach to rural change (when the only two successful rural changes so far have been carried out in Japan and Taiwan!).

Among those who are less ideological, there has been, we are all agreed, a "growing awareness of Asia" of a more detailed kind. The amount of information provided by newspapers has increased; there is more background interpretation available than there used to be; the universities have established various kinds of schools of Asian studies; there are exchanges of visits between dignitaries; more ordinary Australians visit Asia; businessmen are expanding their interests there; almost 12,000 Asian students are now in Australia; there are technical assistance and aid programs (not as many as are talked about); the opinion polls suggest that a majority of Australians now want reform of the "White Australia" immigration policy (the policy has already been marginally reformed in administration and is no longer publicly stated in offensive terms); the principal public interest of the younger generation seems to lie in Australia's relation to Asia. Yet most Australians still talk about Asia as if they were looking at it from London—peremptorily, in generalities, and with the unreality of a line of conversation one has politely adopted so that one can talk over the fence to one's new neighbors.

Even the future of Australia's two territories in East New Guinea is a subject that only occasionally interests Australians. If you ask them, most Australians would probably say that there is a danger that these territories might become yet another subject of Indonesian expansionism, yet amongst some Top People there is now something of a cut-and-run attitude. What the hell? The present evidence suggests that, if the people of New Guinea were allowed to say what they would like to happen to them, a majority would want New Guinea to become the seventh State of Australia. This prospect would horrify most Australians, but, beyond a general assurance that sooner or later the people of New Guinea will be allowed to decide their own future, the Australian Government has refused to say what kind of relations Australia would find acceptable. Meanwhile, the elected House of Assembly in New Guinea will no doubt develop a political momentum that

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will bring decision sooner rather than later. It is in the general area of the Pacific Islands, including the present British colonies, that Australia's blindness to its environment seems least excusable. Here, by comparison, Australia is a big power that might be expected to provide the initiative that Australia itself expects from a world power. Beyond a trade agreement that is almost meaningless, nothing has been done to initiate coöperation even with New Zealand.

Nevertheless, developments in New Guinea began a process that may now be giving at least some Australians something more of a feel for at least one part of Asia. The acquisition of West New Guinea by the Indonesians set in train events that may provide one of those shocks of recognition that could shake Australia into a new way of looking at things. Though attempting to remain friendly with the Sukarno government, Australian diplomacy strongly supported the Dutch policy of leading its colony in West New Guinea to independence, rather than giving it to the Indonesians; there was general Australian belief that this policy would succeed. When Sukarno began his confrontation against the Dutch on the question of West New Guinea, there was some rattling of unofficial sabres in Australia, but Australia was too weak to offer the Dutch any decisive military support; it had failed in its attempt to arouse American interest and was unable to carry out the kind of propaganda onslaught that in Southeast Asia can go by the name of diplomacy. Australian policy collapsed under its own lack of substance. In its only go-it-alone episode in foreign policy, what the Menzies government had done was to encourage the Dutch to make useless sacrifices and to throw away the Indonesian friendship that had come from earlier Australian support against the Dutch, without achieving anything for the people of West New Guinea. When, after taking over West New Guinea, Sukarno passed on to his next confrontation—against the newly formed Malaysia—Australians were on more familiar ground; Britain was ready to put up an army in this pseudo-war, so Australia sent its contingent to North Borneo.

Last year, when Singapore was pushed out of Malaysia and the generals took over in Djakarta and began liquidating the Indonesian Communists, Australian diplomacy found itself in a most intricate situation in which it is now trying to maintain cordial relations with two nations (Malaysia and Singapore) that have quarrelled with each other but are nevertheless combined in

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a counter-confrontation of a third nation (Indonesia), with which Australia is now trying to obtain more cordial relations, although it has troops on the other side. There have been more delicate shifts and subtleties in diplomatic policy than probably even the Government has understood, but the general issues are reasonably well accepted in Australia as being those of stability—of concern with Indonesian expansionism and with the possibility that the Malays might attempt some violence on Singapore, or that the Singapore Chinese might take some desperate measure to maintain their independence from the Malays. Running through this concern with stability has been a preoccupation with China: until the coup against the generals failed, strong Peking influence made Indonesia a world problem (that the world, including America, very largely failed to recognize), and there is still the anxiety—smaller, but nevertheless real—of what the final attitude will be of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia toward the struggle for power in Asia. Even if it is limited to a tiny proportion of Australians, there is more serious and prolonged concern about these questions in Australia than almost anywhere else. (As well there might be!) This is not to say that it is not the fighting in Viet Nam that has done more to awaken most Australians' interest in Asia than events in the Malay Archipelago. The dispatch of a contingent and the casualty lists provide a reënactment of major themes in the Australian imagination. However, most of the discussion on Viet Nam, teach-ins and all, came ready-mixed from America. Australian government spokesmen seem unable to dramatize Australian participation in this war.

Whether Australia goes on seeing itself as an ally, and whether it is a strong ally or a weak ally, and whether it is allied with Britain or America, or for that matter with Japan or India, or whether it breaks policy and sees itself as a neutral or as an "independent," either armed or unarmed, it has to know more about Asia than it now does—perhaps more than any other European nation except America—because Australia is going to be there forever. And because suburban Australia, living on the edges of its deserts, is the only European nation to which developments in Asia can be *crucial*, it must—even as a minor ally—learn more about policy and decision-making than perhaps any Western European nation of similar population need ever again worry about, at least within the imaginable future.

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Weaknesses in the Australian élites may make this difficult. Perhaps the central weakness is in the educational system. Australia spends proportionately less on education than countries of comparable prosperity—sometimes alarmingly less. Perhaps even more important, there is a distrust of the defining of issues and of conceptualization: Australians do not like to imagine that they can see things whole or that one should think very much, with any sustained, serious interest, about anything; they prefer daily detail, individual tasks performed with no general conceptual framework. And there is a feeling of provincial unimportance: new ideas are distrusted; to Australians it seems unlikely that fellow Australians could think up new things; new things come from overseas. The horizon of the possible in Australia seems small, not far from under one's own nose. And among the élites there is an extraordinary distrust—often a hatred—of the ordinary people. The people get blamed even for the inadequacies of the élites. In foreign affairs it is the apathy of the people that is attacked, as if foreign policy were usually initiated by a series of impulses from below. Yet what is remarkable about Australia is the lack of informed and sustained public discussion on foreign affairs among the élites themselves.

Three areas of government important in foreign policy—the Departments of Defense, External Affairs and Trade—show some of the weaknesses and the potential strengths of the people who run things in Australia. Defense planning is completely devoid of general policy. There is a massive superstructure of committees, but no coherent structure of armed forces—only bits and pieces. For most of the Menzies period of government Australia spent proportionately less on defense than almost any other developed nation; expenditure has now increased, but it is still proportionately below that of most comparable nations. For the first time in its history as an ally, an Australian government has not really put up the goods. And according to the new Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Holt, it does not intend to increase defense expenditure, despite British requests that it should do so. (This may not be Mr. Holt's last word on the matter.) While the public explanation is the extraordinary one that Australia's best contribution to defense is to proceed with its own economic development, the usual private excuse is that the electorate is too crammed with the artifacts of affluence to care for defense; but this would seem unlikely in a nation that sees itself as a warrior

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people. What seems to have happened is that the government has lacked the intellectual capacity to conceptualize what it is supposed to do about its armed services. Individual committees have got on with individual tasks, but none of it makes much sense as a whole. While field officers and men still seem as brave and resourceful as tradition demands, the intellectual weaknesses of their planners could mean that if Australia were faced with a sudden emergency the results would be most serious.

By contrast, the External Affairs Department is thoroughly well organized and coherent in operation. What it may suffer from is a rare thing in a country where there is a cult of improvisation: it may be too "professional," too concerned to see foreign policy as a matter only of professional diplomacy (whatever that may mean) quietly carried out by experts. There is no sustained attempt to indicate how Australia sees its role in those parts of the world that are its legitimate concern. So far as the Australian people are concerned, Australia hasn't got a foreign policy. In further contrast, the Department of Trade is public in its policies; it maintains many contacts with the Australian community beyond the administrative garrison of Canberra; and it displays high spirit and *belief* in the conduct of its policies. Its methods are sometimes slapdash, less professional than those of the External Affairs Department, but it may well be that being slapdash is the most efficient way for Australians to run their affairs.

It can be one of the most frustrating features of a provincial-minded society that it does not know its own strengths. The Australians' very love of improvisation, their delight in "giving it a go," their delight in action for its own sake, can mean that, given new directions, they can prove to be almost alarmingly adaptable. In this respect Australians are highly "westernized."

While it is difficult to make any predictions about future Australian policy because the long reign of Sir Robert Menzies acted as a kind of prolonged twilight of old attitudes, it might be safe to predict that events may force the new Prime Minister to take advantage of Australian adaptability even sooner than he might wish. In their attempt to continue to coöperate with the Americans by keeping some forces East of Suez, the British are demanding a greater contribution by Australia. In the last 16 years Australian governments have signed a lot of chits in the way of commitments to their allies; Mr. Holt may be inheriting the settlement day.

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THE SERVICE SECRETARY: HAS HE A USEFUL ROLE?

By Eugene M. Zuckert

CENTRALIZATION of functions under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara since 1961 has substantially altered the role of the military Service Secretary. There is a widely held opinion that it remains only for the Congress, in its own good time, to inter decently the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, together with their respective Secretaries. My own experience in two separate statutory tours totaling nearly a decade since 1947 does not at all support this conclusion. The military departments exist today, not as vestigial monuments to tradition, but as viable institutions. They perform in our constitutional democracy a function which emphasizes checks and balances in the determination of military policy.

Each military service continues to play an indispensable role in its own logistics, training and research and development. Each also influences strategy, concepts and force structures. And the Service Secretary, based on the evolution of his role as I have observed and experienced it, fulfills a managerial responsibility at precisely that middle level which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense as now constituted.

I approach this evaluation of the Service Secretary's role with concern, if not detachment. Nearly 250 years ago, Voltaire wrote to his friend, Bertin de Rocheret: "The man who ventures to write contemporary history must expect to be attacked both for everything he has said and everything he has not said." And so this appraisal of the Service Secretary in the Pentagon environment must necessarily suffer from the "soonness" of my departure, and be open to justifiable criticism from both flanks. But I trust that freshness of recollection may illuminate from a unique viewpoint the transformation of the national defense organization, to which Mr. McNamara has given the greatest single impetus.

That process of change began soon after V-J Day. In December 1945, President Truman gave White House approval for the first time to a legislative proposal which would unify the services within a Department of National Defense. These past two decades have witnessed an evolution in two stages. First, there was a diffusion of power from the War and Navy Departments to

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three co-equal services within a National Military Establishment, followed by an induced shift of power into the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In as much as the bulk of that power was taken from the Service Secretaries and signaled their decline as defense policy-makers, I began to question in my own mind soon after I took office in 1961, first, whether such a shift of power was consistent with the intent of the Congress; and second, whether the Secretary of the Air Force would usefully contribute to the high purposes of the new Administration so brilliantly articulated by President Kennedy on Inauguration Day.

II. THE POST-UNIFICATION ERA

My first Pentagon tour had started in February 1946. As Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, I was entrusted by Stuart Symington in 1947 with diplomatic and management duties incident to arranging an orderly "bill of divorcement" of the Army Air Forces from the War Department. The legal separation became effective in September 1947. But it was really just an end to a beginning, although at the time some of us took the Department of the Air Force to be an end in itself.

That belief was compounded of equal parts of enthusiasm and naïveté. Because of tight security, few Americans had any knowledge of the puny state of the U.S. atomic arsenal or of our really modest delivery capability. General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, who succeeded General "Hap" Arnold in command and became the first Chief of Staff of the independent Air Force, startled the public when he said he could not muster a single squadron to fight with wartime efficiency. This first sense of alarm was related to fresh and disturbing reports about our erstwhile allies. Already the Russians were busily subverting Iran, Greece and Turkey and upsetting the delicate equilibrium in Berlin.

By early 1948, two prestigious bodies—the President's Air Policy Commission headed by Thomas K. Finletter, and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, jointly chaired by Senator Owen Brewster and Representative Carl Hinshaw—had prepared reports which conveyed the strong impression that airpower was somewhat "more equal" than land and seapower.

Runaway affection for airpower was supported by some hard logic. As the world of 1947–48 became polarized between East and West, the United States found itself pitted against a non-insular adversary that was largely invulnerable except to land-

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based airpower. When Winston Churchill came to the Boston Garden a year later, he told an M.I.T. convocation that the atomic bomb in America's hands had stayed the communization of Western Europe. In as much as the U.S. Air Force was the only force then capable of intercontinental delivery, the philosophic basis for an air-atomic national strategy had been laid.

While military facts tended to pull apart the three "co-equal" military services, certain political and managerial strains were working centripetally toward strengthening the authority of a reluctant Secretary of Defense. James Forrestal, who came from a background of strong service loyalty, encountered identical reactions among the three independent services. Their bickering, essentially over money, did not yield to gentle restraints, as he had hoped.

As one interim measure, Secretary Forrestal, in March 1949, "consolidated" all public relations activities in his own office, and supported certain amendments to the National Security Act to strengthen his own hand. Five months later, these were signed into law. The military services were forthwith removed from the list of Executive Departments and made military departments within a "Department of Defense."

The Air Force Secretary lost his Cabinet status, but Stuart Symington and Thomas K. Finletter, the first two incumbents, lost none of their ardor for even greater unification. Underlying their advocacy was the continuing public esteem for airpower. During the Korean conflict, the Air Force had staked out nearly half of the total defense budget. Further unification of the Department of Defense would, in the opinion of air strategists, institutionalize what they regarded as the Air Force's justifiable domination of the defense structure.

Every action, however, sets up a counteraction equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. This is as true in politics as in physics. Thus, while Foster Dulles' articulation of massive retaliation in January 1954 rationalized airpower's place at the pinnacle of the Pentagon structure, other forces had already begun working to neutralize it.

For example, at the Atomic Energy Commission in 1952–53, I had become aware of the strategic implications of certain classified work being done there. The thermonuclear device which we had exploded for the first time in November 1952 could be compactly packaged in sizes considerably smaller than boxcars.

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Second, we received in 1953 alarming intelligence of Soviet progress in the nuclear and ballistic-missile fields. Both factors were to lead to the von Neumann "Teapot" Committee, and thence to a succession of major decisions at the White House level in 1955–56. The ballistic missile program, well under way by that time, acted to dilute the virtual monopoly which the Air Force had exerted in the atomic field. It meant that vehicles other than its own aircraft could soon deliver H-bombs to distant targets.

The von Neumann report of 1953, reflecting technological breakthroughs in nuclear packaging and portending new advances in the ballistic missile field, made it possible for the Army and especially the Navy to acquire their own arsenals of credible nuclear-tipped strategic weapons.

Certain managerial developments also weighed against continued Air Force domination of the defense structure. The incoming Administration in 1953 almost immediately reflected President Eisenhower's sensitivity to warnings which had been made during the campaign against undue military influence in government. The President tended to depart far from his own personal background to espouse firm civilian control of the Defense Department.

Reorganization Plan No. 6, based on Nelson Rockefeller's report, took effect on June 30, 1953. It created six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense, making nine in all. This provision clarified lines of authority by strengthening the civilian authority at the level of the Secretary of Defense. The Plan intended to make the Service Secretaries "truly responsible administrators," while shifting much of the policy direction of the executive agencies from the military departments to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Despite these changes, the advent of the ballistic missile by 1957 made clear the structural lag in the Pentagon in relation to the evolution of strategy. As the differences over strategic concepts among the services began to fade, the gap between strategy and structure seemed to broaden. In many aspects they were further apart in 1957 than they had been a decade before when the National Security Act became law.

III. NEW POWERS FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Reorganization Act of 1958 for the first time gave the Secretary of Defense the distinct power, subject to Congressional

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veto, to transfer roles and missions among the military services. Whereas they were previously responsible for the "conduct" of military operations, their responsibility was now reduced to the "organization, training and equipment" of the forces to be employed by the unified commands. These commands reported directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this way, the organization of the Department slowly adjusted to strategy. Significantly, as Professor Samuel P. Huntington has pointed out, the Act of 1958 was the first defense reorganization which was not associated with an economy wave. As a cool, rational act of national determination, that reform essentially split the Department into two parts: Operations and Resources.

When Secretary McNamara took office in January 1961, he virtually removed the Service Secretaries from the area of Operations and assigned to them major responsibilities for Resources. While I was not prepared psychologically to acknowledge this fact in 1961, the perspective afforded by nearly five years on the job has convinced me that the legislation was sound and McNamara's decision justified.

The Air Force in 1958 had welcomed the prospect of a stronger Secretary of Defense, just as it had been a leading advocate of previous reform. Within the Air Staff during the next year, a "Black Book of Defense Reorganization" was prepared urging total unification. This document claimed that "the full possibilities" of the Act of 1958 had "not been realized." It called for radical reforms. The Service Secretaries should be demoted to positions of Under Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The "Black Book" in time accumulated partisans who argued for perpetuation of the Air Force's dominant budget in a more unified structure. Like many such documents which continually circulate in Washington, the "Black Book" found its way into public print. The time was mid-December 1960, when I was considering the offer of the Air Force Secretaryship extended by President-elect Kennedy. In effect, the military service I was being asked to head was calling for the abolition of my job.

From the White House came a parallel proposal offered by the Symington Committee, which candidate John F. Kennedy had commissioned in September 1960 to make a "complete examination of the organization of armed forces." Right after Election

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Day, that Committee submitted its report proposing to do away with the existing department structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force, while preserving the military services as separate organic units. Members of the Committee included Clark M. Clifford, Thomas K. Finletter and Roswell L. Gilpatric. Like Symington, Clifford and Finletter had served in the unification wars of 1946–48. The Symington Committee concluded that the system itself engendered interservice backbiting and dissension. Their report embraced a hope that real unification might come to pass during the Kennedy Administration.

In those first days of dedication and decision that followed his Inauguration, President Kennedy decided to hold the Symington Committee recommendation in abeyance until the new Defense Secretary could size up his job. Few people on the Washington scene had ever heard of Robert S. McNamara until his name began to show up on certain key lists of candidates—one of them Robert Lovett's—submitted to President-elect Kennedy for one of two top jobs—Defense or Treasury.

McNamara took command not in months, but in days. His grasp surprised even me, though I had known him for 20 years and had considered him a remarkable man. We had met first in 1940 while serving on the faculty at Harvard Business School. In January 1943 he took a leave of absence from the University and went over to London as a consultant to the Army Air Forces. He helped bring into being a statistical control program which had started in the United States and was to encompass the whole personnel, logistics and training operation of the Army Air Forces. Commissioned as a Captain in the A.A.F. in March 1943, McNamara stayed on for six more months in the European Theater, then was reassigned to the Pacific. In 1945 under Major General LeMay, Lieutenant Colonel McNamara and a small staff began to turn out statistical analyses which increased the B-29's combat air time by 30 percent or more.

In the postwar era, our paths crossed many times, and when I left the Pentagon early in 1952 to take a post with the Atomic Energy Commission, I submitted his name as a possible successor. Later I recommended him as General Manager of the A.E.C. when that job came open, but it seems that none of the commissioners had ever heard of him. In 1960, McNamara was named President of the Ford Motor Company. A few months later, the job of Secretary of Defense came looking for him.

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When Secretary-designate McNamara went out to staff his team, my six years of service under Air Force Secretaries Symington and Finletter naturally came to his attention. From my own standpoint, a readiness to serve again in the Pentagon was compounded of a profound admiration for Symington's spectacular handling of a challenging assignment, and vivid reminiscences of deep personal involvement in programs successfully accomplished. I was not impervious to arguments advanced by old friends who felt that the cause of the Air Force had not prospered in the intervening period, when there had been no less than four Secretaries in five years. They said I could be effective in a short time because I knew the people and was familiar with the Pentagon scenery.

For the new Pentagon office-holders working for Mr. McNamara there was no honeymoon. One problem that could not wait was a floundering construction program for Atlas and Titan missile sites which had fallen well behind schedule. Secretary McNamara had quickly recognized that part of the problem lay in the division of responsibility among two Air Force and two Army agencies.

We held a series of round-robin meetings with McNamara. I recall vividly one meeting of January 28, 1961, four days after we were sworn in, but actually the culmination of our discussions. Secretary McNamara abruptly rejected a recommendation by the service conferees that they be left alone and permitted to work out the problem. He said he would look to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics for his answers. Tom Morris was to be sworn in to this new post the very next day. And that is the way it went from day to day. Secretary McNamara, mindful of the experience of James Forrestal, could serve in an active or passive capacity, but he did not see himself as either judge among the services or spectator: "I'm here to originate and stimulate new ideas and programs," he said, "not just to referee arguments."

By March 1961, Mr. McNamara had charged his Assistant Secretaries of Defense with functional supervision of their areas of responsibility. He spelled out his program of inquiry and possible reform in 92 questions, later expanded to 130. He did not accept the validity of protests from the Army, Navy and Air Force Secretaries that such assignments short-circuited their statutory functions. Mr. McNamara, as I had learned from long

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association, is pragmatic and basically unsentimental about his work. He believes simply that if what you are asking is not in harmony with what he wants to do, he should reject your proposal, and he should not feel sorry for you.

Those first six months were frankly disappointing because the scope and duties of the job were stripped down from those which had surrounded Symington's stewardship. A comprehensive management study was prepared by my staff and the barriers that lay between my office and the job I thought I had been hired to do were laid out in detail. At my troubled request, a number of my most trusted friends and advisers were subsequently called to meet informally at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. That meeting of December 1961 was somewhat overtaken by events, however, and the debated impact of my resignation as a protest against the usurpation of power by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (O.S.D.) had lost its thrust. The outlines of a new, important job for the Air Force Secretary as a defense manager had already started to take shape.

During that rather frantic first year, it was clear that my Army and Navy counterparts were also agonizingly reappraising their own scale of values. Secretary of the Army Elvis T. Stahr had made up his mind to resign, and did so six months later with a blast at the McNamara Method. In a *New York Times Magazine* interview (published July 8, 1962), Stahr charged that "more and more, the decisions once made by the Service Secretaries and the military chiefs, as individuals, are made by the Secretary of Defense and his staff." Stahr argued that an inordinate centralization of the decision-making process had occurred, and that the Defense Department was far too big to be run by a few people at the top. He suggested that Secretary McNamara's techniques constituted "overreaching" in personal control.

Many of these criticisms were well taken. My own management studies had also indicated an ever-widening circle of activities by the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and innumerable, anonymous Deputy Assistant Secretaries. They either bypassed the Service Secretaries to contact their civilian and military counterparts in the military departments or circumvented the military chiefs by dealing directly with action officers on the military staffs or even in the field.

I was unhappy because I did not see where these intrusions would end. For a while, it appeared that the Service Secretaries

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could make no decisions. To compound their plight, the Air Staff (and the Army and Navy military staffs as well) reacted violently to the intellectual-logical approach introduced by Secretary McNamara; hence the Service Secretary (the man in the middle) probably reached the nadir of his influence in the Pentagon. While we watched from our well-appointed offices, the O.S.D. assistants busily got into service functions to a degree never envisioned by the Congress, nor even anticipated by Secretary McNamara himself.

Partly as a matter of classic Parkinsonian momentum, a torrent of directives poured out of the O.S.D. limiting the powers of the Services in such minutiae as: issuing supplementary clothing allowances for enlisted men in excess of $83.00; establishing programs for refuse disposal; setting up polio immunization programs. Some of the petty irritants were personally rescinded by Secretary McNamara when brought to his attention.

IV. A NEW CONCEPT OF ROLES

While I felt a deep concern at the unwarranted intrusions, I was not wholly discouraged because I was already becoming aware of factors which were justifiably contributing to the reduction of the Service Secretary's powers in the operational field.

Two critical strategic conditions which the Kennedy Administration had to evaluate in 1961 had changed markedly since I left the Pentagon in January 1952, nine years earlier.

By the time McNamara took office, the practical U.S. nuclear monopoly had clearly evaporated. Each side had acquired the capability of starting and waging a general war. Nobody in official Washington grasped more quickly than McNamara the new dimensions of a strategic situation in which President Kennedy defined the alternatives as "humiliation or holocaust." Crisis management could no longer be diffused among many hands, any one of which could, by an irrational act, bring about Armageddon. It was necessary, even imperative, to shape our deterrent around a "controlled response" initiated by the President himself. McNamara was also the first man in Washington to act on the realization that the Reorganization Act of 1958 had provided the Secretary of Defense with precise management tools to achieve a controlled response credible to the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the pendulum which had swung so forcefully toward

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righting a generation of wrongs inflicted upon Billy Mitchell, Hap Arnold and other air pioneers had, in the opinion of the incoming Kennedy Administration, swung too far in the opposite direction during the 1950s. The strong reaction against "massive retaliation" was led by General Maxwell Taylor, whom President Kennedy named as White House defense adviser, then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Heavily increased emphasis was placed on the lower end of the conflict spectrum, and away from strategic missions.

The Air Force in 1961 was not wholly prepared to accept the budgetary implications of the immutable facts of strategy and Washington politics. The new Secretary and the new Chief of Staff (General LeMay had succeeded General Thomas D. White on July 1, 1961) were thrust into the breach, but none of their more or less valiant efforts materially slowed the swing of the pendulum toward greater equality among the services as reflected in the defense budget.

The trend was not universally accepted. I was not thirty days on the job when the substance of a sensitive memorandum from Secretary Rusk to Secretary McNamara recommending an increase in non-nuclear capabilities found its way into a Washington newspaper column. The implications of that memorandum were not only that our strategic force would be reduced but that our nuclear commitment to Europe might be withdrawn. The Air Force was blamed for the leak.

On Capitol Hill and in European foreign offices alarm bells rang to muster political support for retaining the full strategic deterrent. The leak also rang some bells in the White House—President Kennedy was "shocked"—and in the Pentagon. This partisan effort to reverse a national policy not only failed to achieve its planned objective but it gave Secretary McNamara the additional White House leverage he needed to bring the military services completely into line. The utter futility of such tactics had long been apparent to me. During the B-36 inquiry of 1949, the covert circulation of "anonymous documents" and the leaking of half-truths to chosen informants invariably boomeranged on their originators. Such misguided zeal recalls the words of philosopher George Santayana: "Fanaticism consists of redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim."

The aim that I was trying to keep in front of the Air Force in 1961 was that of achieving the best possible national security for

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the fewest dollars. The Air Force already had a sizeable portion of the total defense responsibility. And it so happened that Secretary McNamara essentially agreed with this division of missions. He was tremendously impressed with the first full test of the Minuteman missile conducted just ten days after he took office. The world's first solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile was launched downrange from Cape Canaveral on February 1, 1961. All three stages fired perfectly and the weapon achieved every objective set for it. In very short order we received a "green light" to increase production sharply. Minuteman was to become the staple in our strategic inventory. By October 1965, when I left the Pentagon, we had well over 800 Minuteman missiles on site and ready to fire upon a half-minute's notice.

In another area, economic factors had caused the strategic airlift mission to molder in Pentagon planning councils for at least five years. The Air Force had chosen instead to build up SAC while letting other missions slide. In 1960, the Rivers Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations conducted hearings which disclosed serious shortcomings in military airlift. After Secretary NcNamara took charge, quick and firm decisions were made to augment strategic airlift. The Air Force received a go-ahead to modernize the MATS fleet and to buy the C-135. Subsequently, we were authorized to produce quantities of the advanced C-141 Starlifter which is now coming into the inventory. The C-5A jet, now in development, will improve our airlift by geometric dimensions over current capability. The C-5A is designed to carry heavy Army equipment, or 600–700 troops, over great distances at high speed.

Secretary McNamara assigned responsibility for military space activities to the Air Force in March 1961, just when veterans of previous interservice disputes were girding for at least a five-year struggle to stake out "a piece of the action." His firm decision regarding a mission of obviously great potential nipped the debate almost before it could get started.

These sure-handed decisions began to win for McNamara my enthusiastic, if not always unquestioning, support. While smiling through the general pain of learning each day of the ubiquitous O.S.D. intrusion into matters which custom and usage had reserved to the military services, I came to realize that the Defense Department and the nation had found a man who had courage and acumen to sweep out the stables of vested service rights.

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"Horse-trading" of money on a basis of expediency was ended—forever, I hoped.

This sense of need had been felt as far back as 1948, when we started up "Management Control Through Cost Control," an embryo cost-effectiveness program. The Air Force, under General Edwin Rawlings, produced what was probably the first "performance" budget in the National Military Establishment. That budget and its innovating concept of a comptroller were singled out for high praise by the Hoover Commission. But as an example for service-wide emulation, the program went down the drain of interservice quarrels. Looking back at that early effort, one realizes that it did not really provide for a sophisticated systems-analysis technique. But that is not the reason it failed to gain acceptance. Maybe we were not high enough in the Pentagon hierarchy to argue persuasively for good management throughout the Department of Defense. Maybe the time for that idea was not yet ripe, and a decade of floundering about was necessary to document the need for legislative reform.

The Reorganization Act of 1958 provided the legislative authority for a Secretary of Defense who would be completely unsentimental about service traditions which had failed to keep pace with military requirements. After initial misgivings, I welcomed an active role in helping to bring about some of these essential reforms under Mr. McNamara. Since 1961 I have learned that discerning voices in the other services occasionally spoke out eloquently in support of management objectives which I was trying to bring about on my own. Last year, in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* Captain John B. Cline, U.S.N., chided his own service for its laggard response to Secretary McNamara's demand for documentable fact and untortured logic. He said: "Unfortunately, the record shows that the Navy's case has too often broken down under the intense light of operations analysis and cost effectiveness scrutiny." Captain Cline saw also an "unfortunate tendency on the part of Navy spokesmen, when unable to *prove* a point conclusively, to try to *argue* it based on 'military judgment' and appeal to tradition. . . ."

In October 1965, two Admirals, the Chief of the once nearly autonomous Bureau of Ships and his Deputy Chief, requested early retirement. They could not accept what they considered to be encroachment by Secretary McNamara's systems analysts into shipbuilding, which they regarded as BuShips' preserve.

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V. THE SAGA OF THE B-70

In the case of the B-70, the Air Force transition from intuition to intelligent appraisal also seemed too gradual. The case for this Mach 3 bomber was being made for at least two years before the Kennedy Administration came on the job. The Air Staff was ready to make production commitments by early 1961, but Secretary McNamara questioned whether missiles and missile-armed defenses had not overtaken it.

Inevitably, the missile vs. manned bomber debate found its way into the budget hearings for Fiscal Year 1962. As the new Air Force Secretary, I jumped into rising waters of controversy. Happy at first to be back in the swim, I went right along with the tide of affirmation. The B-70 was the successor to a line of big manned bombers which began with the B-17 Flying Fortress and extended through the supersonic B-58 Hustler.

Logic seemed to dictate that we should move to the Mach 3 bomber as soon as technology would permit it. There was a need to diversify the weapons in our arsenal to complicate the potential enemy's defense problem and prevent his "ganging up" on us. As every football fan knows, an uncommonly good running back can be bottled up unless the team also has a solid passing threat to spread the defense; then both the running and passing attacks are more effective. The extent to which the United States could afford to diversify its strategic deterrent came down to a matter of judgment—ours against the McNamara logicians. My strong, affirmative testimony followed that of other Air Force policy people, including General LeMay's. Our case received a somewhat better reception by the various Committees of Congress than by the Administration. I found myself in familiar surroundings. During the early years of unification up to 1952, the Congress was generally receptive to a larger Air Force while the Executive Department above our level seemed more restrained in its enthusiasm.

Yet the B-70 situation was not quite the same. Some decidedly negative signs popped up at the various Air Staff briefings and discussions. Argument frequently fell back upon intuitional judgments instead of calling up facts and logic which I had assumed lay behind the case.

The question of the B-70's vulnerability could not be satisfactorily answered. More than that, the portents of electronic tech-

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nology suggested its increasing vulnerability. Some Air Force leaders chose not to read that signal and stuck dead center on the argument of "military requirements." I have since learned that many people in the Air Staff recognized the serious shortcomings of the B-70.

On August 3, 1961, following a meeting in President Kennedy's office, I asked him for the opportunity to speak with him alone. I brought up a recent incident in which the Hearst press had bitterly criticized him for cutting back the B-70 program. Certain Administration officials wanted me to sign a rebuttal, but I had refused, and told the President that I had done so because my position would be ridiculous in view of the testimony that I had given on the Hill.

The President indicated his concern that a civilian member of the Administration should testify in opposition to it. I told the President of my own concern. When a Service Secretary merely restates automatically an Administration position which may be diametrically opposed to his views as expressed before that official position was announced, he soon loses his effectiveness. I had seen this occur in 1949–50. During the B-36 inquiry, Navy Secretary Francis Matthews was so far from positions held within his own Department that he was rendered almost useless in the job. He resigned a year later out of sheer embarrassment.

While sensing a growing opposition to the B-70 outside the Air Force, I was not initially convinced the President shared those strong views. Less than a year before, on November 2, 1960, he had praised Senator Clair Engle (Democrat of California) for persuading the Eisenhower Administration to release $300,000,000 which the Congress had appropriated for the B-70, saying: "I endorse wholeheartedly the B-70 manned aircraft."

In our conversation, I asked the President whether he thought my position on the B-70 would hurt the Administration to the extent that I should think of resigning. "Not at all," he responded with a quick smile. He was satisfied with my performance, he said, and was delighted to have had a chance to have this talk about it.

As I rode back across the Potomac, it seemed to me that the new role of the Service Secretary was coming into sharper focus, both in his relations with his superiors and within his own department. I had hoped the President would accept the fine point that, if I was to be effective in my job, I had to act and to be

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regarded by Air Force people as an advocate of their basic programs, even though I was a member of the Administration. I doubt that President Kennedy accepted this view. He wanted my support, and while he was willing in this instance to stand for a certain amount of "independent" thinking, that independence must in the future be neither frequent nor important.

What emerged from this confrontation was a clearer recognition of the role of the Service Secretary as "the man in the middle." He is called upon to do something that is often quite difficult—to fight for wha[illegible]hinks is right within the Pentagon, then help present a unifi[illegible]ade outside.

This definition of t[illegible]vice Secret[illegible] job has been reaffirmed on many occasions. Take the m[illegible]ary pay bill which came up for a vote last summer. My support for the McNamara position as against the larger increase dem[illegible]ded by Chairman Rivers hurt me with the "troops." People [illegible]n the field could not understand a Service Secretary taking the position which I and the other Secretaries took. Yet we were able to carry on the fight inside the Pentagon to raise the amount asked for in the Administration bill. We obtained the admission of a $97,000,000 error, and I think we have laid the basis for a better position on future pay bills.

The B-70 dialogue in 1961 stressed the virtues of better homework by the Air Staff before we came in with a position. Issues needed to be defined sharply, and possible courses of action assayed in the light of their consequences. Data would require more precise presentation.

As a needed education project, the multi-layered issues generated by the B-70 debate gave a fresh insight into the Service Secretary's job. To help close the nine-year hiatus in my own experience, I looked to General LeMay as Air Force Chief of Staff. However, in respect to the B-70 objective, the Air Staff supporting effort was not persuasive. Nevertheless, General LeMay strongly believed that the United States was taking an unnecessary risk in curtailing development of the B-70.

Such military confidence rested partly on the tradition that no Air Force bomber mission had ever been turned back in World War II. But that proud lance broke on the rock of survivability in the missile age. Secretary McNamara, and President Kennedy as well, began to lean heavily on civilian scientific opinion that even increasing the B-70's speed to Mach 3 would

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not permit it to survive in an environment of electronically-guided air-defense missiles. The same criticism applied to the vulnerability of B-70 air bases to enemy ballistic missiles.

My own view, now even stronger since I left the Pentagon, is that a manned strategic system is a necessary requirement of our diversified arsenal. I say this with mixed feelings, acknowledging that the B-70 could not fulfill this requirement.

At the same time, its cancellation became for me another point of personal decision. If my office was to retain its usefulness in the policy area, the Air Force needed to avoid any future situation that could lead it once again to the woodshed. That resolve shaped itself in terms of first, reeducation of the Air Staff to improve their analyses so that future Air Force programs would be accepted in the O.S.D.; and second, a related need to bring into key Air Staff positions men who were intellectually flexible.

VI. TFX AND TITAN III—REFLECTIONS OF A NEW TECHNIQUE

As early as June 1961, a new concept had begun to evolve. It led to the TFX decision, probably the most typical payoff of the McNamara technique. The Air Force and the Navy were called on to consider whether a single aircraft could meet their requirements for a tactical fighter-bomber and a long-range interceptor, respectively. Such commonality assumed a unique combination of high-speed and low-speed capabilities, but this was exactly the point of the TFX, with its revolutionary new wing that could be moved in flight to enable a single aircraft to perform a variety of missions.

Secretary McNamara's efforts began to be vindicated in the final round of the TFX competition, late in 1962. Not until then did the services jointly agree that either contractor could meet their combined requirements, and then it was agreed that both contractors had proposed acceptable designs.

The TFX decision also exposed the inadequacy of "military judgment" alone by establishing the concept of "development risk" as part of the vocabulary of weapon-system development. The selection decision had to go beyond the operational advantages claimed by the contractors for new and untried systems (such as thrust reversers for tactical use). It was also necessary to consider the price that had to be paid, in terms of dollars and delay, if the project failed to work out as planned. The technical experts who actually evaluated the TFX proposals understood

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this, but the military selection boards did not, and essentially failed to take development risk into account. Relying on our technical experts, I came to the conclusion I did.

The choice of the General Dynamics design showed also how the Service Secretary can achieve the support of his Department even though there is strong opposition to one of his decisions and the way it was made. In the final showdown, General LeMay understood that it was important for the Air Force as an organization to stand behind the Secretary. Otherwise, my problem of getting ready for the McClellan Hearings could have been impossible.

The first flight of the TFX (now the F-111 and the FB-111) in December 1964, just two years after the contract was signed, may well prove to have been the most effective documentation of the McNamara technique of "project definition."

Other examples of the McNamara method may be cited. We expect the Titan III-C to be the workhorse space-launch vehicle for the next decade. The Air Force had first recommended the program in October 1961, but Secretary McNamara asked for a complete program definition. We were called on to furnish preliminary design, main areas of technical risk, fund requirements, and to explore working relations with NASA, which is charged with the national space mission.

Nearly one year later, in August 1962, Secretary McNamara approved Phase 2 (engineering), contingent upon Air Force presentation of a suitable technical development plan. We submitted to him through Dr. Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, specifications for the overall vehicle, major subsystems and related ground equipment and instrumentation.

Every possible fact including unit cost was thoroughly checked out during four successful Titan III-A shots. Having satisfied himself that the Air Force would meet stated objectives, and that such attainment could contribute to the overall space mission, Secretary McNamara signaled a final go-ahead. Titan III-C performed spectacularly in its first flight test on June 18, 1965. This event marks our success in virtually overtaking the Soviet Union in the all-important area of thrust, after they had showed us their heels in this part of the race for eight frustrating years.

A big share of the credit for this achievement may properly be claimed by the Air Force. In 1961, we set up the Designated

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Systems Management Group as a successor to the old Ballistic Missiles Committee. D.S.M.G. provided a management technique by which the Secretary and the Chief of Staff kept special tabs on new critical weapon systems as integrated entities while they were being put into the inventory. D.S.M.G. has since then helped to bring three generations of I.C.B.M.s (Titan II, Minuteman I and II) and other weapon systems to operational readiness in record time. It has forecast management problems before they developed and has focused the collective judgment of senior Air Force people on avoidance of major problems.

After an obstinate start, the Air Force—and I think the Army and Navy as well—adjusted to the operating philosophy of McNamara. We all seemed less prone to cling to old concepts and more willing to look objectively at alternatives than we were five years ago. It seems curious that the Air Force in 1961 should have suffered a traumatic experience in adapting itself to the new intellectual approach to weapon-systems selection and programming. The RAND Corporation, the original "think factory," achieved its eminence largely as a result of Air Force sponsorship since the late 1940s. RAND nurtured the professional careers of Messrs. Hitch and Enthoven, who have so markedly influenced Pentagon policy under Secretary McNamara.

Today, by the yardsticks which count in Washington, the McNamara method has earned its laurels. We have centralized decision-making, which has brought about greater cost effectiveness. Most important, in all matters of defense, programs are now on a five-year basis. Without these reforms, the war in South Viet Nam might very well have escalated the national defense budget out of sight.

Before the Kennedy Administration, interservice bickering was accepted in Washington, especially in the spring, like the dandelion. Now it has almost disappeared. Many members of Congress who for years groused at base cutbacks within their states or districts now recognize the job that McNamara has done in five years.

If my latter-day relations with the Air Staff stressed one theme, it was to challenge a Pentagon executive-washroom aphorism: "Secretaries of Defense come and go, so let's all stick to the status quo." In 13½ years under "unification" up to 1961, eight Secretaries of Defense had been sworn into office. Parochialists clung to the reasonable belief that they could outlast any incumbent.

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Aside from the negative logic of this proposition, the matter has gone beyond the tenure of Robert McNamara. The unique quality of analysis that made him congenial to President Kennedy, and subsequently to President Johnson, has extended so deeply into the fibre of the Department as to make it unlikely that a change of Secretaries would uproot the major innovations he has brought about. After McNamara leaves the scene, as he inevitably must one day, can there be any turning back to the days of separate—but equal—military services under a paternalistic Secretary of Defense? I think the answer is "definitely not," no matter who he may be.

VII. WHITHER UNIFICATION?

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending," Abraham Lincoln put it so well, "we could better judge what to do and how to do it." At this juncture, a large segment of the powers which accrued to the Office of the Secretary of Defense were stripped from the Service Secretaries. In my own case, after nearly five years in office, I thought it worth measuring the differential between the functions which I thought came with the job and the powers which resided in it when I departed September 30, 1965.

The residual powers are not only more clearly defined than ever before, but are still surprisingly substantial. The Department of the Air Force discharges responsibilities for developing doctrine and concepts, weapon-system requirements, training, logistical support, maintenance and welfare; all of these are essentially unimpaired. There is no more critical responsibility, nor one that requires more careful husbanding of Air Force resources, than managing Research and Development, for example. All these Air Force functions involve annual budgeting of about $18 billion, greater than any other single entity in the Department of Defense, and nearly equal to the combined total financial resources of General Motors and Standard Oil of New Jersey, the country's two largest corporations.

The Air Force Secretary's specific job, as it evolved between 1961 and 1965, embraced the formidable management task of phasing no less than six major strategic weapon systems in or out of operational status—the B-47, B-52, B-58, Titan II, Minuteman I and II, as well as their trained manpower and all their supporting logistic facilities. He had to be mindful at all times of

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retaining a proper balance of skilled personnel and resources, without slackening total operational effectiveness.

These considerations shaped my decision to stay on the job. They helped to change my views. For a decade or more, I had been an ardent advocate of more unification. But I came to acknowledge, as did Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric in his farewell press conference in January 1964, that further unification of the Department of Defense is neither practical nor advisable. It seemed clear that the Symington Committee report of 1960 which he signed had gone too far.

In any circumstance that I can foresee, unification of the U.S. military establishment has gone about as far as it ought to go. This statement recognizes that some residual areas of service separatism have so far defied reform. For example, the services still retain flying training facilities that could be usefully combined. There are certain supply and service facilities that should also be combined. The recent merger of defense auditing functions is a good start in this area.

Then there are small pockets of nonsense in the personnel area that still need to be cleaned out in the interests of efficient operation. We should set common standards of officer procurement, promotion and retirement for the Army, Navy and Air Force. There is also a crying need for a joint personnel security setup at the Defense level. Presently, military or civilian personnel who transfer, let us say, from the Air Force to the Defense Intelligence Agency, or vice versa, are subject to additional investigative proceedings. The same applies to lateral transfers between two Services. A central repository of clearances should cover all personnel in sensitive jobs within the military establishment. This mutual agreement should be extended in time to include State and the A.E.C. We would use our manpower more efficiently, cut paperwork, and save the money we now spend on duplicating field investigations, which often give a very bad impression to the public.

Looking at the big picture of service roles and missions, no reason for separate services seems more important than the freedom to apply many years of thinking and experience to operational concepts and weapon requirements. In the Army, Navy and Air Force, and in the Marines, too, a sense of professionalism has been distilled to: develop each requirement; design and produce the suitable weapon; devise the doctrine to govern its proper use in battle; then train and supply the troops to operate that

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weapon effectively in a familiar medium. This collective effort by each service is then funneled to the Unified Commander in the field for use in his coördinated military machine as approved by the Joint Chiefs.

Take, as an example, the war in Viet Nam. Under present organization, Lt. General Joseph H. Moore, Commander of the 2nd Air Division, reports through General Westmoreland to the unified Pacific Command, thence to the J.C.S., but he continues to look to the Air Force for support. His need is not only for logistics, but for air battle concepts, where a close tie-in with the Tactical Air Command remains important. The same is true with respect to Research and Development. If General Moore could reach the Air Force only through unified command or J.C.S. channels, I seriously doubt that the effective Mini Gun would have been sent to the Far East.

It seems to me, therefore, that the criterion for the degree of unification desired is not so much size and logistics—although they are important. It is in the areas of originating battle concepts and new equipment design that the greatest stress upon the potential contribution of the individual service must be laid. If the Air Force has the job of logistic support to Air Force units in Viet Nam, it must retain a vital logistics capability. If its job is to formulate requirements and to pursue Research and Development, the Air Force must have a substantial and autonomous R.&D. capability. Similarly, it needs a limited but independent intelligence capability outside the Defense Intelligence Agency. Our people who are concerned with Air Force requirements must have an active understanding of the threats and the direction they are likely to take.

From a purely management view, retention of service identity is wholly consistent with the most sophisticated corporate organizations in the United States. General Motors, for example, maintains separate divisions for the production of Chevrolet, Buick, Oldsmobile, etc. They operate within the policy framework of the parent organization, which even encourages healthy competition within reasonable limits to keep everybody on his toes.

A structure embracing a centralized authority at the top and decentralized management responsibility at the service level is very close to being the most responsive to our need. As of October 1, 1965, the Department of Defense comprised nearly 3,800,000

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military and civilian personnel and over $170 billion in countable physical property. These assets are sited around the world and accomplish a thousand-and-one missions. They simply cannot be managed efficiently from one central point. I am convinced that this responsibility must be parceled out. The military services, essentially organized around the medium in which each one operates, offer through the Service Secretaries precisely that middle level of management which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the Department of Defense.

There is, too, the practical usefulness of deflecting some of the political heat from the Secretary of Defense. Where to? Certainly not to the professional Service Chiefs who should be insulated from this kind of pressure. The Service Secretary, as Leonard D. White has suggested in his "Introduction to the Study of Public Administration," personifies the supremacy of civil leadership over the military. He serves as "the outpost of the Chief Executive and a representative of the political party whose policies he is to pursue."

Why not Under Secretaries of Defense for Army, Navy and Air Force? This argument has been put forth under various unification proposals, including the Symington Committee's of 1960. To downgrade the job further might well upset the delicate balance-wheel function which the Service Secretary performs from his vantage as civilian head of the service, of advising the Secretary of Defense and of serving as an intelligent advocate of service interests at the O.S.D. level—a job which the Chief of Staff could not discharge as effectively. Secondly, it might further reduce the range of the President's choice of first-rate men, who might be less attracted to a downgraded post.

But, most important, it is no longer necessary. The Service Secretary has an expert managerial role to perform in personnel procurement, logistics, training and Research and Development. His job no longer overlaps the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The functional conflict between them is moot. The Service Secretary has a key role to perform, no matter what they call him.

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THE TUNISIAN WAY

By Habib Bourguiba

THIRTY-SEVEN years of fighting, thirty-three years of Destourian leadership, ten years of independence: a propitious moment to draw up a balance sheet, to illuminate the ideas behind our actions. When I go back in my mind to the 1930s, and compare the Tunisia of those days with Tunisia now, I am filled with optimism and rejoice to think of what my country and my people will be by the end of this century, or even before. Colonized, humiliated, crushed by centuries of decadence and anarchy, their resources exploited by a foreign minority who tried to assimilate them and destroy their identity, the Tunisians responded to my call and became one man, to face a long, hard and unequal struggle. Finally, they won, and in victory gained not only the dignity of independence but also the necessary conditions for progress and development. We find in that struggle legitimate reasons to be proud, a source of inspiration and proof of the effectiveness of our approach.

After years of impoverishment and occupation, the first task was to rescue the country from its torpor, awaken it, make it see the causes of its weakness and the possibilities of achieving a real élan. I established direct contact with the people by founding a newspaper, surrounding myself with a team of young intellectuals and organizing public meetings, in spite of official bans. This remains today a fundamental part of my method.

That method arises out of a deep faith in man, the reasonableness and creativity which he will show once he becomes aware of his individual worth and of the common interest binding him to his fellow citizens and transcending his selfish concerns. I have always felt that the fault lies not with men, but with their education, their way of looking at things, their mental framework—and these can be changed for the better by dint of intelligent and persistent effort. In spite of the disproportionate forces we confronted, the strategy we adopted in 1934 was to be fruitful. Neo-Destourism succeeded in breaking two archaic tendencies which for decades had failed to advance the national cause one iota: the sterile verbalizing of some and the intransigent extremism of others.

The basis of our strategy was realism. We had to recognize our

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weaknesses, work to overcome them, consolidate our internal as well as our international position, and at the same time curry the favor of the French government, seize every chance for talks, and present a moderate, evolutionary program, acceptable to any man of good will. Thus our realism implies progress by stages. Such a policy is fully justified when the ideal solution is not immediately feasible, but it must always be dynamic, each step preparing the way for the step to follow. Our compromises maintain the revolutionary momentum, because, ineluctably, they clear a path to the objective, whether sooner or later. The policy is the more effective because it takes into account the psychology of the adversary, the forces he must deal with in his own camp, and makes compromise appear the lesser evil to all concerned.

The Neo-Destour Party has consistently been the great force around which Tunisians have rallied in support of the idea of national dignity, which grew out of independence and democracy. We had to force the Tunisian people to see the realities of occupation, to feel the humiliation of it ever more intensely, and to react collectively, logically and persistently. It took more than twenty years. The circle of militants grew steadily wider and included more and more of the populace as a whole. Twenty years of organization, psychological preparation, cruel shocks and stubborn resistance opened the way to the diplomatic battle, which in turn led to new tests of strength, and so on, until the final victory.

II

Today in the struggle for development it is the same story. The only difference is that instead of the policeman or the foreign flag that wounds our dignity, it is the spectacle of misery, ignorance and underemployment. The Tunisian feels himself part of a large family, most of whom never reach the point of satisfying even their elementary needs. This is an outrage, a challenge to each of us. We are mobilizing ourselves for a struggle more difficult than that for political freedom, because it calls for the combined use of both our material and our human resources. It forces men to master their instincts and their egocentrism, to transcend themselves, raising their vision and their action to the level of the national interest. The battle is first of all a conquest of self; it is impossible to build on hatred of others. Our goal is to enlist the coöperation of every citizen and to build a nation which is neither

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the game preserve of the bourgeois nor the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is why the Party, since the days before independence, has enrolled various elements of the population in conscientious and responsible national organizations and in the professional movements which play a large part in the conception and application of Tunisian policy. This double environment, political and professional, is a harmonious, complementary system, providing a fruitful dialogue between the summit and the base and among the various social classes. The single-party régime has not been artificially imposed; it is the outgrowth of a long evolution. Neo-Destourism has worked because it incarnates the nation and its aspirations, and because through its mechanisms the people can express themselves freely and feel themselves masters of their destiny. By responding to the new imperatives that constantly evolve from this dialogue, the Party renews its mission and finds new courses demanding action. In this continuous interchange, rare in the third world, the Destourian Socialist Party finds support as the motivating force in Tunisian history. It is the crucible in which the vital forces of the country are fused, the center where basic choices are made. The Party's work is a matter of reflecting on the tasks which the nation assigns to it, conceiving the means, inspiring and directing their accomplishment.

This kind of democracy, different from the classic form known in the West, is more responsive to the actual conditions we face at our level of development, to the need for discipline, and to the difficult circumstances of our struggle.

As for relations between Party and State, they are relations between two parts of a whole. Their roles, certainly, are different. But their objectives and responsibilities are the same; and very often those responsible in Party and government are also the same individuals.

Since 1956, we have set ourselves resolutely to the task of building a state which is effective and respected because it serves its people. That was the first priority in a country which had lost its personality after long years of government by foreign despots and wasted itself in tribalism and anarchy.

Our state draws its power and stability from universal suffrage, its effectiveness from its modern structure. We have entirely decolonized the administration of the state and its principal institutions; thus they have become instruments for restoring our

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identity and promoting a sense of nationhood. We are trying to create a better society which by its structure and functioning will allow humanity scope to flower. That is why the activity of the state embraces every level of the population and acts simultaneously against every barrier to development.

III

Our achievements since independence are encouraging. In 1956 our G.N.P. was not above 265 million dinars ($508,800,000); in 1965 it reached 435 million ($835,200,000). Before independence its annual rate of growth was only 2.5 percent, just matching population growth. From 1960 to 1964, it rose at the rate of 5.5 percent yearly and last year at 6.5 percent, in conformance with the Four Year Plan of 1965–68. In the last few years domestic savings have grown considerably. Between 1960 and 1964 they grew 86 percent. Although capital formation represented only 10 percent of G.N.P. in 1956, it is now 23 percent, a rate generally observed in rapidly developing nations.

Substantial growth has been accompanied by far-reaching structural reforms. Agriculture has been modernized and diversified, and productivity increased. Before independence, agricultural output grew at an average rate of 1.5 percent annually; in recent years this rate has increased to 3.9 percent. We have taken concerted action to overcome the various obstacles inhibiting progress in the agricultural sector. The landed gentry is in the process of adapting itself to the exigencies of increased productivity. The *Habous* (once inalienable land whose revenues were assigned to an individual or an institution) have been abolished, and collective lands are being improved and exploited more rationally, in a coöperative framework. The old colonial plantations, reintegrated into the national patrimony, are provisionally being managed by a government bureau; later they will be used as the nucleus of coöperatives. Each unit, made up of small and medium-size individual farms, is to be large enough to make possible the full-time use of equipment, fertilizers and crop rotation and thus to bring the greatest profits.

At Sahel, the forest of olive trees is being improved and new orchards planted. In the south, the palm groves are being similarly looked after, and efforts are being made to develop new varieties. Irrigation is being extended, especially in the center and the south, where rainfall is insufficient. Crops until recently

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unknown there, such as beetroot and cotton, have already passed the experimental stages. Our vineyards present problems which we must tackle with vigorous, even radical, solutions.

In the past, almost all industrial products were imported. Today our national industries process a good part of our raw materials, supply more and more local substitutes for imports, and are already looking to the day when they can develop commercial markets abroad.

We have tried to avoid such false choices as between heavy or light industry, instead stressing industries which use native raw materials or meet a growing national demand. Thus the food industries have progressed remarkably, keeping pace with agricultural production. The search for minerals has been intensified; the oil which has been gushing in southern Tunisia since last year is being paralleled by the discovery of new deposits of minerals already in production, bringing new sources of energy and foreign currency. We also aim to increase the domestic use of our raw materials. In the north, a steel mill begins production just this year. Wool production justifies the building of the textile complex which is now under way. The cotton and synthetic fiber industry of Sahel and Tunis was established several years ago. In the south, the chemical industry will be based on production of nitrogenized manure. I have indicated the locality of some of the big industries to show that industrialization has not been a matter of "spontaneous generation" for us, but the result of a serious policy of regional development. Other industries continue to emerge in different parts of the country, and the new products they create increase the valuable contribution of this secondary sector. Nor can we overlook tourism, a rapidly soaring activity. In just a few years Tunisia has become an important Mediterranean tourist center.

Economic progress has been accompanied by a spread of education. The rate of school attendance in 1957 was 33 percent; today it is 70 percent; and basic education for all will be assured by the end of the decade. In addition, 250,000 adults have been taught to read and write. Scores of thousands of jobs have been created to absorb unemployed labor. Substantial progress has been made in sanitation and housing construction, particularly for lower and middle-income families.

Social security is guaranteed to workers and students. Full-time hospitalization insurance provides adequate care for all

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levels of the population, and the quality of the care constantly improves. We are also experimenting with family planning, and since it has proved efficacious we shall make it generally available.

The fact that the government is working to build a modern, progressive nation explains why its prestige has remained intact in spite of the heavy responsibilities it has had to shoulder. Tunisia's progress in every area during the last ten years, which is to say since Tunisians assumed responsibility for their country, is visible to the naked eye; every Tunisian senses it and sees it all around him.

But although the young Tunisian state possesses much authority, it is not authoritarian or tyrannical. It respects the individual, protects his fundamental rights and aids his moral, intellectual and material growth. If it has succeeded in substituting discipline and effort for secular anarchy, it has always tried to do so by persuasion, made possible by the dialogue described above. Those were our fundamental objectives from the time the destiny of our country fell into our hands and even before, during the struggle for independence. Our sovereignty regained, we now plan our economy, investments, indeed our whole environment so as to liberate Tunisia from the oppression of need, ignorance and fear, and to create an integrated, coöperative and fully responsible society.

A responsible statesman must first and above all be honest, hiding nothing from his people. It happens that I was once at odds with a part of Tunisian opinion. During the Second World War, the majority of Tunisians, including some having high responsibility in the Party, were seduced by the prospect of an Axis victory. From my cell in Fort Saint Nicholas I threw all the weight of my authority into the effort to incline the people toward the Allies. History proved me right; I was able to save the national movement by contriving possibilities for action which contributed to the victory.

It is because we are organized and strong, supported and respected, that we can undertake reforms and permit attitudes from which others would recoil: the liberation of women, the modernization of the structure of society, adaptation of Islam to requirements of development. We also are able to take courageous positions on international problems which elsewhere provoke traumatic reactions or devious manœuvres.

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IV

The same fundamental choices which dominate our domestic policy are seen in our foreign policy. Our action here shows that we have neither an inferiority nor a superiority complex; we are realists animated by solid optimism about the future of humanity. We believe in the perfectibility of man and do everything to improve and elevate him; but we do not hesitate to punish those who show they are not perfectible—the minority who consciously or unconsciously balk the efforts of the whole nation.

I do not cry neo-colonialism or imperialism when difficulties arise in my country. Such an attitude I judge to be frivolous. Whatever happens, the task is to search out honestly our own weak points, to work to erase them and to decide what path we will take in accordance with the moral values and interests of the people.

It happens that, due to our geographic position and our Mediterranean civilization, we share certain values with the democratic world, especially our attachment to liberty. Having struggled most of my life against the colonial régime, having freed my country of its after-effects, I need not take lessons from anyone about colonialism. I do not tolerate that anyone, under the pretext of serving some special kind of revolution, shall meddle in the affairs of Tunisia. We know better than anyone else the highest interests of our country. We recognize the same right for others and respect their choices, which I would like to believe are determined by their own specific conditions.

The principle of noninterference is a fundamental condition for peace in Africa. And peace, in that effervescent part of the world, is a categorical imperative if there is to be development. Recourse to arms, ambition for power, intervention on ideological or military grounds, border disputes—all these use up large sums which ought to go toward the development of nations and peoples. Recourse to force cannot be accepted unless one has exhausted all chances for a pacific solution. I think that in this primordial domain of peace, the United Nations despite its inadequacies can play an important role. It is a great hope of humanity.

The United Nations can be effectively aided by regional or continental organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. Although still young, the O.A.U. is capable of becoming an instrument of peace and unity on our continent, on condition that

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it place stronger accent on what unites us than on what divides us, and that it is not too hasty in its efforts toward unity.

African unity will be a long, hard pull. It took more than twenty years to cement the ranks of the Tunisian people. What can one expect, then, from a whole continent, as diverse, balkanized and so long subservient as Africa? In these circumstances, when people talk to me about continental government for Africa, my answer is that such talk is premature. We must instead apply the test of realism, of moderation. We must recognize what steps are necessary, and we also must identify the seeds of division so as to destroy them one by one. First of all we must know each other, granting one another our mutual esteem and loyal cooperation. I see no other way to arrive at unity.

Witness the slow pace at which the Maghreb was built. Yet this region constitutes a distinct geographical bloc; we speak the same language, have the same beliefs, the same culture, the same past. Ethnically we are homogeneous; the frontiers separating us are artificial. In spite of all this, we step gingerly. Why? Simply because we must take into account that newly independent countries are still very jealous of their sovereignty. Thus we try in the economic realm to make our interests interdependent, and to adopt common positions vis-à-vis the Common Market, or in our own industrial planning. But in all truth I must say that even in purely economic matters the pace is still very slow. It is up to us to accelerate it, and we are doing our best. This is why, in spite of everything, I remain confident in the future of this group of nations.

There are no foreign bases in Tunisia, military or ideological. We coöperate with the great powers all the better for being really decolonized. What could be more natural than coöperation with the European countries which are our neighbors, and particularly with France, which marked Tunisia with its culture?

At Dakar, on my recent tour of West Africa, I launched the idea of a French-speaking Commonwealth. The idea has made its way; the countries concerned have given much attention to it, for shared language can be a factor in drawing peoples into closer relations, and from there to coöperation. It can be a bridge between us in spite of diversities and unequal levels of development, and permit more and more active interplay in cultural and economic matters.

I believe that in working to build a united Maghreb and a

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jointly responsible Africa, we can achieve substantial results. For the future belongs to groups of nations, based on their affinity and common aspirations.

But it will be necessary for the poor countries to rid themselves of demagogues, of verbalism and the sterile conflicts engendered by power complexes or the will to dominate. Let them recognize their true problems, which are essentially domestic and, more precisely, economic. Today, we should profit from the similarity of our problems to organize and reinforce our solidarity, especially in international affairs. We should establish a systematic dialogue with the advanced countries to find a lasting solution to one of this century's greatest challenges: the development of the two-thirds of humanity who live today with the shooting pains of hunger. Strong from her experience, and with her international prestige, Tunisia, in spite of her limited size and modest means, is ready to do her best to banish that menace.

As a result of technological progress, humanity for the first time is clearly conscious of its oneness. We live in the same house, even if we do not yet belong to the same family. It is in our interest, as it is our duty, to see that the house is solidly built and agreeable to all. We must work together that it may be done.

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SOVIET SCIENCE APPRAISED

By John Turkevich

SOVIET science has been in the public eye for the last two decades. The dramatic confrontation of Marxist theory and genetics epitomized the dangers of Communism as a thought-controlling system. The rapid development of atomic weapons by the Soviets underlined the effectiveness of the Russian scientific task force. The flights of sputniks, luniks, laikas, cosmonauts showed the world that the party leadership had made an imaginative commitment to daring scientific ventures and that Soviet technology was discharging this commitment.

The reaction in the West was immediate. The Lysenko genetics controversy produced amazement that in a modern state, a political ideology should stifle development of a science. The Soviet weapon success showed that in the military area, science and technology often develop more rapidly in a dictatorship than in democracies. The space spectaculars of the Russians astonished the world. The alibi that Soviet success was based solely on "secrets stolen from the West" was broken. American education was made a scapegoat for the lack of American successes in space. On the basis of comparison of curricula and statistics, and as the result of superficial visits to select Soviet schools, a cry was raised that the United States was losing the "battle of the classroom." The average American became convinced that Soviet science and education were the best in the world. Our highschool curriculum was revised, new mathematics introduced. Government leaders were shaken into introducing new administrative agencies in Washington and new advisory councils in the White House. The Soviet challenge of a human flight to the moon was accepted by launching a multi-billion-dollar space program.

In the meantime, a cultural-exchange program was initiated to bring about understanding between American and Soviet scientists and to explore areas of scientific coöperation. The three Geneva Conferences on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, massive exhibits in New York and Moscow, numerous exchange visits of prominent scientists, prolonged stays by smaller numbers of younger scholars—all these brought about a better understanding between Western "capitalist culture" and the "culture of Russian Communism."

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We have learned much more about each other, and now that the change in leadership in the Soviet Union has been stabilized, it seems appropriate to assess the status of Soviet science.

II

The United States still commands the lead in world science, and America has won the battle of the classroom. Soviet scientific accomplishments have been spotty: outstanding exploits in space; solid engineering in application of nuclear science; brilliant work in mathematics, theoretical physics and astronomy; elegant experiments in certain branches of experimental physics. But in many important areas, Soviet work is either weak or pedestrian. This is particularly true of genetics, crystal and molecular structure, modern biology and most branches of chemistry. The Soviet Union has a number of leaders in science whom any country would be proud to claim as its own, but the number is much less than in the United States. Russia is particularly weak in "first-class second-class" scientists who serve as supporting cast to the scientific stars. Women occupy nearly half the posts in research institutes, mostly on the lower rungs of the ladder, and so far none has risen to a position of importance in Soviet science. Furthermore, most of the scientific work is carried out in research institutes rather than in universities, where there is a continuous flow of young scholars. These two factors contribute to the stagnation of scientific personnel.

The research base of the Soviet Union is very narrow, confined as it is to Academy institutes and four or five major universities. This may be contrasted to the diversity of research institutions in the United States: universities, government laboratories, foundations, small colleges, large corporations and small enterprises. Physical facilities for carrying out scientific investigations in the Soviet Union are barely adequate except in a small number of prestige laboratories. Old buildings poorly adapted to laboratory use, new buildings constructed with little knowledge of the best in contemporary laboratory design, are overcrowded. Scientific equipment is either copied from American models or imported. The Soviet economy has not developed an instrument industry sufficiently alert to scientific discoveries, nor adequate to give logistic support to Russian scientists. This is in sharp contrast to the help the American scientist receives from a highly developed scientific-instrument and chemical-supply industry. Time lost in

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waiting for scientific tools, the repair of instruments or for crucial compounds is minimal. Support facilities of this type, and on this scale, seem to be lacking in the Soviet Union.

All this emphasizes the remarkable qualities of that small group of Soviet scientists and technologists who were able to overcome an ever-present bureaucracy and a retarded economy to startle the world with their scientific discoveries and technological advances.

The Soviet space program has been both dramatic and highly successful. It is used with great effectiveness to support the conduct of foreign affairs. The first earth satellite, the first dog flight, the first lunar satellite, the first cosmic rocket, the first hard landing on the moon and on Venus, the first human in orbit, the first view of the back of the moon, the first walk in space, the first soft landing on the moon—all these achievements indicate a well-knit organization producing a new technology. The United States is giving the Soviet space effort very good competition, but it has difficulty breaking into the province of dramatic "firsts." The American space program has been more successful in using space vehicles for scientific research and for practical applications. The discovery of the Van Allen radiation belt around the earth, the photography of Mars, the probing of Venus are evidences of sophisticated American instrumentation. The use of satellites for communication, for television-program transmission, for weather-pattern recognition, for surveillance of the earth's surface, for nuclear blasts and missile launchings is a commentary on American ability to apply new science and technology for routine practical use.

A conversation the writer had with Premier Khrushchev in August 1958 at the American Exhibit in Moscow was revealing. After describing the American accomplishments in space, I pointed out that American scientists and engineers were disturbed by the fact that their Soviet counterparts were orbiting much heavier payloads. When I predicted that the United States would soon surpass the Soviet Union in space exploration, Premier Khrushchev's quiet answer was, "The United States is a strong and powerful nation. It can accomplish anything it sets out to do. However, it has a difficult time deciding what to do. Tell me more." I then related an incident of the preceding day. A Soviet visitor asked, "Is it correct to compare the Soviet and American space accomplishments as an alarm clock to a Swiss

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watch?" After some hesitation I replied, "Yes it is, but we should remember that it was the Soviet alarm clock that woke America to build the Swiss watch." Premier Khrushchev's retort to the story was, "Let us not put needles into each other. Tell me more." The conversation then turned to the cost of scientific research and to coöperation and competition in science as a means of international understanding.

The competition between the two countries in space may reveal basic characteristics of their science and technology. The Soviet Union tends to produce bulky, unsophisticated vehicles, designed to perform a particular task in an efficient way. Limited objectives are attained with maximum dramatic effect. The United States designs sophisticated machines which are difficult to produce and reflect an affluence of ideas, people and matériel, which has made American space technology unwieldly and at times inefficient. Once it works out its internal problems in a democratic, competitive manner, it will produce vehicles for space as it has for the highways and the airways of the world.

The Soviet missile and space success has had a great impact on international relations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have a large arsenal of weapons. No place on earth is safe from missile attack. There is no place to hide. For the first time, the continental United States is vulnerable. The Soviets have used dramatic space results very effectively to give the world "evidence of the strength of the Communistic system." They have timed their exploits to exert "psychological leverage" at important international conferences. Detection schemes, anti-missile missiles, military space stations, constant-surveillance satellites have literally introduced a new dimension into modern warfare. Truly Soviet science and technology have awakened the world to the great potentialities of space.

Atomic science and technology is another important area of Soviet excellence. Here, as in space technology, significant military accomplishments have been attained before peacetime potential has been realized. From 1952 on, the world was periodically reminded of the Soviet accomplishments in weaponeering. Underground tests are still being carried out and undoubtedly research and development of more effective nuclear weapons are vigorously pursued. Atomic-powered submarines are being constructed, and moving pictures of Polaris-type missiles have been shown on European television screens.

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The peaceful uses of atomic energy have not been neglected. The First Geneva Conference of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955 clearly demonstrated the direct dependence of a nation's standard of living on its per capita production of energy. Although the development of power from nuclear energy has been slower than expected, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom are turning increasingly to this source to satisfy the demand of growing populations and higher per capita consumption. At present the Soviet Union has a 900-megawatt capacity while the United States has more than a thousand megawatts distributed among twelve power stations. Fifteen additional power stations are under construction so that by 1970 the United States will have a 7,300-megawatt capacity, while the Soviet Union plans by then to have several thousand megawatts of power. Both countries are constructing portable reactors for remote regions, and new types of more efficient reactors are being developed. The Soviet Union has a nuclear ice-breaker *Lenin,* the United States a cargo ship *Savannah* and an aircraft carrier. Both countries have a fleet of atomic submarines. Just as in missile technology, the Soviet Union has been able to master the new atomic energy technology and to compete effectively with the United States.

In the field of power production from nuclear fusion, the situation is different. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have conceded that success is difficult. The competition and secrecy that characterized their early work have given way to coöperation and open discussion. This may be a pattern for future international coöperation in science—major countries working together on difficult problems which cannot be easily solved.

I obtained an insight into international coöperation and competition, as understood by the Soviets, at the First Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. I had told a Soviet Minister that it was good to compete in scientific fields rather than in military and economic areas. I used the Russian word *konkurentsia* for competition. The Soviet Minister replied, "Do not use that word! It has a bad connotation in the Soviet Union. It means getting ahead by crushing and destroying the opponent. We have a new approach to competition and a new word to designate it. The word *sorevnovaniye* means getting ahead by climbing on the opponent's shoulders." This statement epitomizes the Soviet concept of coexistence.

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III

Mathematics has been an area of particular excellence in Soviet science. Deeply rooted in the glorious pre-revolutionary tradition, it has produced important results and raised the level of performance of related sciences and engineering. All branches of pure mathematics are pursued. Mathematicians dominate the Soviet scientific scene; the rectors of the Universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk; the President of the Academy of Sciences; the founder and director of the science city near Novosibirsk—all are mathematicians.

The advance of Soviet science has been markedly accelerated by the readiness with which its outstanding mathematicians have applied their sophisticated analyses to scientific and engineering problems. In mathematical physics L. D. Landau, a Nobel laureate, has exerted a world-wide influence with his interpretation of low-temperature phenomena. I. Y. Tamm is another distinguished mathematical physicist who received a Nobel prize for his work in nuclear phenomena, and N. N. Bogolyubov is known for his mathematical elegance in dealing with a variety of problems in physics. M. V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, is an expert on vibrations in airplanes and missiles. Many of the leading mathematicians have been concerned with fundamentals of automation and cybernetics.

Automation is the great hope of the Communist Party leadership, faced with the problem of creating a modern industrial society with so few trained people and so many inefficient workers (which is one reason why the Soviet Union has no unemployment). The productivity of Soviet labor, including farm workers, is very low and their product is often shoddy. Automation would permit the Soviet Union to leap-frog over the barrier of training millions of people to become the technicians a modern state requires. Automation is based on the science of cybernetics, the theory of regulation and electronic computers. Cybernetics was founded in 1948 by the late American mathematician N. Wiener and was further developed in America by J. Shannon and J. von Neumann. It is a science of communication, direction and control in machines and living organisms. During the Stalin period it was considered a capitalistic "false science;" now it is the most popular science in the Soviet Union. The latest program of the Communist Party calls for the development of "cybernetics, electronic computers and regulating devices in production pro-

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cesses in industry, in construction projects, in transportation, in scientific investigations, in economic planning and engineering calculations and in the realm of accounting and management."

The field of electronic computation in the United States is far ahead of that in the U.S.S.R., in both quality and quantity. The machines in the United States work faster, have a higher memory capacity and are more varied and adaptable to different tasks. They are also better designed and show higher reliability, and their electronic components more elegant. Far more numerous, they are fully incorporated into both our economy and technology and into every type of scientific investigation. On the other hand, Soviet scientists and engineers have been able to utilize effectively their strength in mathematics, logic and non-linear mechanics. They can rely on the help of their leading mathematicians to solve problems crucial to their national security: design of nuclear weapons, calculation of satellite orbits and navigation of rockets.

IV

Chemistry has been a weak area in the Soviet scientific scene. In spite of the glorious tradition of chemistry in Imperial Russia and a brilliant outpouring of physical-chemistry research by the N. N. Semenov school before World War II, Soviet chemistry today is pedestrian. The exception is electrochemistry, so important for the development of the portable energy source of the future—the fuel cell. Here the work of A. N. Frumkin has been preëminent for several decades.

In recent years the Communist Party has been placing great emphasis on "big chemistry" as one of the three "material-technical bases" for Communism. (The other two are automation and electrification of the country.) Fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides are now more necessary than tractors and combines if the party is to solve the perennial Soviet food problem. Petrochemicals from abundant oil resources must be turned into synthetic fibers, plastics, elastomers (elastic substances), both for industry and for general household use. The fabrication of plastics is much faster and easier than that of metals, which are often in short supply. The Soviet consumer is developing esthetic discrimination as a reaction to many decades of drab functionalism. With lagging agriculture and limited livestock, consumer demands can be satisfied only by synthetic chemistry. Planning in this area has been handicapped by the poor contacts between

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Soviet chemistry and that in the United States. N. N. Semenov, the leader of Soviet chemistry, has never visited America, where chemical engineering and industries are so highly developed. The Soviet Union has only a small number of chemical research laboratories, the curriculum in chemistry is antiquated, and in undergraduate and graduate studies the proportion of women is very high. Biochemistry—the most exciting science giving us an understanding of the processes of life—is sadly underdeveloped in the Soviet Union.

Physics, on the other hand, is a strong area. Three times during the last six years Soviet physicists received Nobel prizes in physics: P. A. Cherenkov, Tamm and I. M. Frank (1958), for the discovery and interpretation of radiation given off by particles travelling with velocity greater than light; L. D. Landau (as noted above) for his theoretical work in the behavior of matter at very low temperature; N. G. Basov and A. M. Prokhorov (together with C. Townes of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) for their theoretical prediction of the laser. During the last 20 years 15 Americans received Nobel awards in physics (30 in other fields of science and medicine). The Nobel prize awards to Soviet physicists reflect their particular excellence in certain branches of nuclear physics, low-temperature research and radio-electronics. In the latter field, Y. K. Zavoyski discovered in 1946 that certain materials, when placed in a magnetic field, absorb radio waves. This phenomenon of electron spin resonance, together with nuclear magnetic resonance (discovered by F. Bloch and E. Purcell in the U. S.), is widely used in almost every science. It is of interest to note that the Soviet discovery was immediately and widely exploited in the West before the Soviet scientists began to use it. Even at present the magnetic resonance instruments made in the Soviet Union are inferior to those produced in the United States and in Japan.

Radioastronomy is keenly pursued in the Soviet Union. The radiation emitted by the sun, the planets, galactic and outer-galactic space is detected, analyzed and used for understanding the structure of heavenly bodies.

Geologists have been mainly concerned with the explanation of the geological structure of the vast reaches of the Soviet Union. Geophysical methods have been utilized for mapping mineral resources, investigating the origin of earthquakes and detecting atomic blasts. Preliminary work has been carried out

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on boring through the crust of the earth, a project similar to the American "Mohole." Geochemical research with modern instrumentation is actively pursued. Oceanographic research reflects the Soviets' heavy dependence on fish for its protein supply. Exploration of the Arctic, so important to the Soviet Union, has been supplemented in the last decade with continuous Antarctic investigations.

V

Biology has suffered most from the impact of Marxist philosophy on science. During the last decades of Imperial Russia and almost to the start of World War I, biology was a productive science in Russia. In descriptive and systematic botany and zoölogy, anatomy, cytology, histology, embryology and physiology, Russian scholars made significant contributions. Soil bacteriology was particularly outstanding. Viruses were discovered by D. Ivanovski in 1892, and I. P. Pavlov made the "conditioned reflex" a well-recognized concept throughout the world.

In the period between the two world wars genetics was developing rapidly and the Soviet geneticists attracted scholars from all over the world to come to work with them. However, just before World War II, N. I. Vavilov, their distinguished leader, incurred the displeasure of the Kremlin leaders and disappeared to an unknown death. In 1948, Lysenko baited the followers of Vavilov into public identification with "Western" genetics. They were then summarily crushed by an *ex cathedra* pronouncement by the Central Committee declaring Marxist genetics to be the "truth of the land." Genetics as we know it in the West disappeared from the research laboratories and textbooks of the Soviet Union. Lysenko dominated the biological sciences and agricultural research in Russia, and his influence extended well beyond the life sciences. Marxist philosophy battled relativity, cosmology, quantum mechanics, basic concepts of physics, cybernetics and the theory of chemical bonding. This Marxist inquisition continued through the period of Stalin terror, then abated in the Khrushchev period. The forces of reason within the Soviet scientific leadership gradually confined Lysenko's influence to a small group of research institutes and eliminated him from key committees. Genetics and molecular biology began to develop under the protection of powerful nuclear physicists who were particularly interested in the effects of radia-

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tion on inheritance. Scientists and engineers were intrigued by the relation between information theory, molecular structure and the genetic code. Work in molecular biology was encouraged. During the Khrushchev period several attempts were made to test Lysenko's strength in party circles, but they showed that he still had Khrushchev's backing.

In the meantime, genetics as recognized outside the Soviet Union was cautiously introduced to Soviet scientists and students through translations of Western treatises on biology and genetics. On January 25, 1965, Lysenko was accused in the *Literaturnaya Gazetta* of mismanaging the model farm, Gorki Leninski, near Moscow, and of making false claims that mineral-manure fertilizer is three times more effective than plain manure, and that crossing of Russian cows with Jersey bulls produces hybrids whose milk production does not depend on the milk production of the mother cow. Four days later the Presidium of the Academy named an investigating commission which reported last September that the farm was run inefficiently and was mismanaged, that the breeding and agricultural experiments were badly designed and records not kept, and that the advances claimed by Lysenko were not substantiated. Lysenko was thus attacked in the very area which had given him a following among Soviet agronomists. A 129-page report discussing in detail these shortcomings was widely publicized. In the annual report to the Academy on February 1, 1965, President Keldysh vindicated the late N. I. Vavilov and sharply criticized Lysenko's role in Soviet biology and agriculture over a period of 18 years. It seems that this tragic chapter in Soviet science is ending.

VI

The incorporation of science and technology into society is crucially important to the welfare of a modern state. The military and economic importance of technological developments, their limitless possibilities for good and evil, their inexhaustible demands for funds from the national economy, require immense organization—for gathering significant information, for making policy decisions, for planning, allocating manpower, conducting basic research and assigning priorities to development and production. Each of the major governments of the world has its own approach to the incorporation of science and technology into its society, but many of the problems that result are common to all of them.

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Maximum utilization of science for building a "material-technical basis" for Communism has been the concern of the Party leadership. It has been eminently successful in organizing research and development in the secret areas of atomic weapons, missiles and space vehicles. It has had difficulties in using the discoveries of science for the general welfare of the state. There have been many reorganizations of the Soviet scientific effort. Most recently, a State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on Science and Technology has been organized at the highest government level. Academician V. A. Kirillin, a Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, has been named chairman of this committee and given the rank of Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union.

The Academy of Sciences is still the stronghold of pure and applied research in the Soviet Union. Its institutes are prestige establishments, its academicians are the scientific élite. However, the size of its laboratories is about equal to that provided by the Boston-Cambridge area alone, and domination by academicians, who rule over extensive scientific "empires," has caused stagnation in policies and personnel. Some of these shortcomings have been criticized this year in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* by the elder statesman of Soviet science, Peter L. Kapitza.

In order to offer opportunity to younger scientists and to expand the scientific base in the Soviet Union, a large science city was established in Siberia. A number of energetic Soviet scientists left the comforts of Moscow for the climatic rigors of Novosibirsk. The scientific world is observing with interest this new approach to scientific productivity. As for the universities, the major scientific investigations are carried out primarily in Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk and Kiev; the other 36 universities have isolated areas of excellence. Overall, basic research activity is but a fraction of that in the United States.

The Committee for Coördination of Research, which was established in 1961 to exercise overall supervision of science and development, has had its role reduced to collection of information and development work. Under its supervision is the All Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information. A permanent staff of more than 2,000 experts scans the world's scientific literature for discoveries that will help to build the "material-technical basis" for Communism and to fill in the large gaps in Soviet basic research. The State Committee on Coördination of Research,

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however, is primarily concerned with applied research and development, and even here the Soviet record has not been impressive. In the West, the industrial development of a new process costs about ten times as much as the original research project. It requires engineering skills that the Soviet Union does not seem to have. For this reason the Soviets have been eager to buy processes already proven profitable in the West rather than bear the burden of independent development.

The major problem facing all major countries of the world is how to allocate the available amount of money and the available number of scientifically trained people among the various sciences and competing groups in universities, government laboratories and industrial organizations. This allocation must ensure the proper balance between pure research, with its emphasis on the "unexpected," and applied research and development, with its demand for economically profitable results. This problem we in the United States share with the Soviet Union.

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THE PHILIPPINES: CONTOUR AND PERSPECTIVE

By David T. Sternberg

THE Philippine Republic started the new year, its twentieth as a sovereign nation, with a new President, a partly new and re-shuffled legislature, and something of an innovation in presidential inaugural addresses. "The Filipino," declared President Ferdinand Marcos to his startled listeners, including foreign dignitaries attending the inaugural, "has lost his soul and his courage. . . . We have ceased to value order. Justice and security are as myths. Our government is gripped in the iron hand of venality, its treasury is barren, its resources are wasted, its civil service is slothful and indifferent, its armed forces demoralized, and its councils sterile."

Some felt that the assessment was overly harsh and gloomy, but many agreed that there was sufficient truth in the charges to justify President Marcos' anger; most trusted his judgment as to the intensity of shock treatment required to arrest the national decline and spur his people toward their neglected goals.

The foreign observer is tempted to take this assessment, substantiate it with confirmatory interviews and statistics, summarize it in the conceptual shorthand of modern journalism (under the lash of deadlines and a hundred crises), and probably conclude sadly that the Philippines is just another young, developing nation crumbling under the burdens and pressures of the times, soon to slide over the brink and be lost to the Free World.

What must be borne in mind is that Mr. Marcos' view is that of a Filipino aware of his nation's aspirations and potential, impatient with its shortfalls, and charged with the leadership function of galvanizing his people into action. His is the personally involved, close-up view, accurate within this frame of reference, and probably effectively expressed for the purpose intended.

The interested foreign observer, particularly the American, wants and needs quite a different perspective—one which views the nation in its several dimensions and relates it to place and time. He seeks trends revealed by the past to illumine prospects for the future. In a brief article we can attempt merely to organize what is readily perceptible as a guide to more searching study and analysis.

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II

How has the Philippine nation-building effort fared during its first two decades? Politically, quite well. Subject to authoritarian rule, political and military coups, and armed insurrection, the Philippines has demonstrated remarkable political stability. Recovering from the demoralization of a devastating war, grappling with the economic problems of building a new economy and replenishing an empty treasury, beset by a Communist-led armed insurrection and subsequently harassed by subversion, the Philippines nevertheless has maintained an unbroken record of constitutional representative government. Campaigns have been turbulent and elections at times marred by personal violence, but the principle of transfer of political power by popular franchise has been respected at all levels, and its official results have been challenged only by legal recourse.

The mechanics of the democratic process have shown steady improvement. In fact, the diversified pattern of selection in the last election shows intriguing evidence that Western forms of the democratic process are being ingeniously adapted by the Filipino to accommodate the intricate interplay of his traditional society's family and group-centered power structure. Also, and atypically in Asia, the Filipino military have remained strictly subordinate to the civilian sector.

On the negative side, however, must be noted the heavy cost of this accomplishment. Politics, as a game, has become a national preoccupation to the point of obsession. Political campaigning is literally continuous, all-pervasive and flamboyant. The public follows the show gleefully, ignoring the need for more sober national dialogue regarding social and economic problems.

In this highly personalized society, the political victor feels almost duty-bound to discard the works, good or bad, of his predecessor. The private sector must therefore plan and operate cautiously in a climate of uncertainty. Patronage has overloaded government with costly ineffectuals, diminishing the efficiency of even the most dedicated civil servant. The "pork barrel" principle has fragmented public-works expenditures, wasted scarce funds, left essential economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation projects in the blueprint stages.

Which brings us to the economy. How has it performed? What is its potential? What are its prospects?

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Here, too, the record of the past two decades is basically promising. The period saw a scramble to satisfy consumer hungers whetted by three years of war and enemy occupation during which there were no imports, inventories were requisitioned or looted by the enemy, and domestic production paralyzed. Foreign reserves sagged dangerously under the pressure, bringing on import and exchange controls, the circumvention of which imparted new skills of corruption to the society. Tax evasion and the urge to restore personal fortunes virtually emptied the treasury.

Independence was a heady new experience, its responsibilities not yet fully realized. Back pay, war-damage compensation, a multitude of other public debates of more personal than public concern conspired with the political game to distract government from its housekeeping chores. Yet, for all the neglect, adverse conditions and influences, the economy has registered a steady—though slow and admittedly inadequate—upward curve. Runaway inflation has been avoided. The peso, even after decontrol, has demonstrated a remarkable stability on the free market.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that responsible economic observers regard the level of economic activity achieved merely as testimony to the economy's innate vitality and resiliency and to the private sector's enterprise and initiative. Of all government agencies, the Central Bank alone, relatively sheltered from political pressure by successive administrations and staffed by competent professionals, is credited with avoidance of major economic crisis by its management of the currency.

What is the economy's present potential? The many expert and detailed studies available show a favorable consensus: low in population density (though a birth rate estimated at above 3.5 percent sounds a warning); rich in natural resources such as arable land, forests, fisheries, mineral deposits; rich in manpower resources, including a high rate of literacy, a skilled and semi-skilled labor pool superior to that of most developing countries; an existing agricultural and extractive industry capable, with modernization, of sharply increased productivity; a rapidly expanding industrial base; a small but highly competent body of planners and managers at the top level of the private economic sector; and a cultural predisposition toward private enterprise.

On the negative side are listed low per capita agricultural income, affecting 75 percent of the population; a high rate of unemployment and underemployment; inadequate government

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infrastructure; inadequate domestic and foreign investment incentives; a poor climate of public order. Of the latter three deficiencies, President Marcos shows complete awareness, and the electorate has expressed confidence in his qualities of aggressive leadership to overcome them. The first two will respond rapidly to accelerated economic activity

For the expansion contemplated, ample foreign credits are available from American government and private sources, as well as from international financing bodies, Japan and Western Europe. They await only the submission of sound, detailed project proposals. A major economic asset is the recently emerged and rapidly growing young entrepreneurial class, topped by a stratum of executive and managerial specialists who combine the best of Western education and training with scholarly understanding of the problems posed by their own culture.

The crucial question, of course, is what are the prospects that these impressive assets will be brought into play in an aggressive program of economic growth and development. Though past experience suggests caution as to the capacity of "new broom" pace-setters to endure, there is some basis for optimism. Most of Mr. Marcos' cabinet selections have met with prompt and general public approval. The priority legislative program now before the Congress is considered practical, feasible and effective and has been promised bipartisan support except for minor revisions. Forecasts are that passage might be effected before mid-session. The atmosphere of renewed confidence which every new administration imparts to the Philippine scene appears to be somewhat more action-minded and forward-looking than usual.

Most promising, perhaps, is the new kind and extent of interest that responsible elements of the private economic sector are taking in the government. It is not the familiar pattern of seeking influence and special privilege. It reflects an awareness that the safety and growth of their already considerable investment is moving into a competitive phase of reduced profit margins demanding elimination of at least those cost factors associated with inefficient and venal government. One manifestation has been the willingness of several top executives to assist President Marcos in policy planning on a volunteer basis. Another is the recent organization of a Council for Economic Development by the heads of the nation's largest Filipino enterprises. In composition and approach, it favors neither the public nor the private sector;

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its declared purpose is to maintain a continuing study of the economy, issuing policy recommendations as appropriate.

III

Can these promising factors in time begin to manifest themselves in terms of individual and national well-being? Does peasant unrest foretell revolution? Is Communism still a real threat?

High priority for rural development is probable in the short run, more as a requirement of economic growth than as an answer to the Communist menace. It is in this agricultural sector that even modest per capita increases in income would generate the growth of domestic markets so desperately needed by existing local industries, which have not yet reached levels of efficiency required for export competition. A greater increase of purchasing power in this sector is essential to the industrial expansion that is contemplated.

As a reliable indicator of revolutionary upheaval, the Philippine peasantry is given a somewhat modest rating. The prosperous peasant is conservative and resists change; and for the poverty stricken, survival is too easy in the benign tropical environment to generate strong political dynamism. But while politically inert, the impoverished peasant—as was demonstrated by past history and the Huk rebellion—may be easily recruited by a persuasive spokesman for any cause. Having little significant stake in the society—and that easily replaced—he is readily enlisted in any adventure promising personal satisfactions. Thus, if not an immediate source of trouble, the peasant cannot be discounted as the potential instrument of whatever dynamic element may rise to challenge the existing "establishment." And it cannot be ignored that remnants of the defeated Communist Huks still roam the mountains of Luzon, retaining a capability to recruit and direct an armed peasant force once again.

There is reason to believe, however, that the Communist hard core still operating underground in the Philippines respects the sobering lessons learned in the fifties when it suffered heavy reverses in orthodox "armed struggle." The Communists' continued activity in the more remote areas of Luzon is believed to be a feint to divert attention from the more intensive and admittedly more successful prosecution of "parliamentary struggle."

This phase must be viewed as the more dangerous because it is less readily detected. For one thing, there is a broad tolerance

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for the "radical" deriving from the Filipino's relatively recent revolutionary tradition. Except for the professionals of the security agencies, few Filipinos make the distinction between a revolutionary reformer and the conspirator of international Communism. This simplifies the task of the subversive *apparat*. Such sectors of the society as education, the press and even the business community are readily enlisted, under whatever banner best suits their personality, in the overall program of fostering discord and disunity, both within the community and between the nation and its external allies. This effort, which has registered significant gains, could bring about the classic "revolutionary situation" within the country, and isolate the nation from its Western allies, without a single Communist slogan being uttered. In this kind of subversive program, economic stagnation plays a major role by helping to provide intelligent and effective, though possibly unwitting, manpower. The area of discontent which should give the Philippines greatest cause for concern is the community of young citizens educated for far better jobs than the country is now providing.

There is need in the Philippines today for a vigorous and articulate nationalism, one which will subject the total society to expert scrutiny, determine its deficiencies and chart the course by which the people of this open society can most speedily and painlessly effect the transition from semi-feudalism to progressive nationhood. The need is for something more than a dilettantish commitment of the Filipino intellectual to his nation's growth and development. It calls for a wide-ranging public discussion of traditional values and behavior patterns which retard or inhibit the development of institutions—social, political and economic—essential to a modern, industralized democracy. Out of such public discussion should come the new values, the clearly defined directions and acceptable goals of the Filipino people.

A primary objective of such nationalism would be to strengthen the very concept of nationhood. No one questions the Filipino's patriotism, his devotion and loyalty to kind and place of origin, but his idea of "kind" is still too centered on family and kinship, his idea of "place" too narrowly confined to the province or region of his birth. He has yet to yield full commitment to the concept of the nation and the broadened responsibilities and obligations it entails. Stirrings in the academic world, and an increased flow of writing on these topics appearing in the more

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popular media, suggest that such a movement is in the making.

The banners of nationalism have been raised, but while their emotional content is high, their appeal is either too vague or too detached from the realities of the environment to develop any broad base of support. One school seeks to relive the glories and victories of the revolution, but fails to establish practical and specific relevance to current needs. Another couches its message in the familiar clichés of Marxism, ranging from Mao, through Khrushchev, to the respectability of Norman Thomas. It holds some attraction among students, at least until they begin to understand the incompatibility between subordination of the individual to the state and deeply rooted Filipino individualism. Both schools, of course, offer America as the villain of the piece, but both overdraw the caricature so crudely as to destroy credibility. The Marxist group, however, is reported to have developed the organizational capability and financing for instant demonstrations at a reasonable price per head.

A prominent Filipino educator deplores the more fashionable and current nationalist idiom because it distracts the youth by giving them a scapegoat, a comforting evasion of their own responsibilities of hard work and dedication.

> The more intelligent young Filipinos are coming to realize that some of the voices that concentrate so exclusively on attacking the United States or attacking the West are only diverting the attention of their compatriots from the hard job that has to be done and can be done only by the Filipinos themselves. It is not parity or bases or policy in Vietnam which are the fundamental problems facing young Filipinos; it is roads and railways, irrigation and food production, honest administration and tax collection, the raising of national income which will consume a growing national industrial production.

The Filipino for the most part has been too preoccupied with his domestic problems to give more than limited attention to his status and role on the regional and world stage. What is more, he labors under something of a sense of diffidence and inhibition deriving from the ill-advised effort to "shame" him into an aggressively nationalistic mood. Betraying a singular lack of familiarity with modern mechanics of motivation, this school of crusader has sought to wean the Filipino from his friendship with the United States by portraying him as the object of contempt and the spiritual inferior of his Asian and African counterparts. He was made to believe that somehow there was a stigma attached

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to having achieved sovereignty by wit and eloquence rather than blood and steel.

Such self-deprecation, of course, is wholly unwarranted. The Filipino technician and professional has been sought and gratefully employed not only in Laos and Viet Nam but as far afield as Africa. The Philippine educational system for all its flaws and shortcomings has been sufficiently attractive to fellow Asians to bring thousands of students from neighboring countries for enrollment in Philippine universities. And most recently the relative stability and sophistication of metropolitan Manila made it the choice of the new Asian Development Bank in competition with Japan.

Fundamentally, the Philippines shows every evidence of continuing to seek closer Asian ties within the community of common ideology and open society. Even the effort to ignore the leftist drift of Indonesia and court its friendship was motivated by a desire to open broader channels to the Asian world. In some circles, the search for a national identity has led toward such "enveloping" concepts as "Malayan" or "Afro-Asian." Others, especially those who have had first-hand experience with such groups as currently constituted, argue that this would merely submerge Filipino identity. They opt for a more independent course of national development which they hope will make the "Filipino" unique and respected. In any event, the present administration appears to be firmly oriented toward a closer association of non-Communist states, whether or not their policies embrace collective security.

IV

A phenomenon causing concern on both sides of the Pacific is the increased volume and intensity of hostility toward the United States carried by the local press and other information media. To be understood, these manifestations of hostility must be broken down into their diversity of sources and motivations. There is, of course, the honest critic holding either a real or fancied grievance, or the conviction that the interests of the two nations are in conflict. Another source is the otherwise well-disposed individual or group believing that tail-twisting or shin-kicking attract attention and create a climate for negotiation favorable to the kicker. A third source is the less energetic entrepreneur who reasons that a hostile environment here may put profitable, estab-

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lished American enterprises on the market at distress prices. Yet another source is the likewise impersonal member of the landed gentry who recognizes the ultimate need to transfer his base of economic and political power from the feudal agrarian to the modern industrial sector and would like to see promising areas of economic activity kept open for his future exploitation. There are others. But, finally, and most significant, there is the Communist "control," the source carrying out the Communists' publicly declared mission of isolating developing countries from the West. It is this last source, least representative of Filipino public opinion, which covertly stimulates, manipulates and orchestrates the other voices into a loud and self-feeding chorus.

Stemming from the foregoing are the questions: What has happened to the Philippine reservoir of good will and friendship toward Americans? What has happened to the special relationship between our two countries? Who is at fault? Unfortunately, there is no single culprit, no instant remedy. Though the terminology itself has taken on the somewhat irritant quality of the cliché, the "friendship" and "special relationship" were and are realities. They are simply less pertinent to the problems of today.

The early years of the Philippine-American relationship posed few complex problems. Once the scars of war had healed and America's good intentions had gained credence, the American official took stock of Filipino needs and aspirations and tried to meet them. Filipinos wanted education and it was given them. They wanted self-rule and were given training and broad areas of autonomy as fast as they were ready to staff them. They wanted independence and were able to negotiate it. Despite heated exchanges at top policy levels, the mass of Filipinos were able to relate the realization of their personal hopes and aspirations to a benign American presence. The private American fared equally well while he opened new job opportunities, paid the best wages and provided the best working conditions.

Through this period, occasional policy blunders were more than offset by impressive tangible contributions to Filipino well-being and development. The investment paid off in gratitude and friendship, the reservoir upon which we draw to this day. The problem is that we continue to draw upon it with too little conscious effort to keep it replenished.

The Filipino who has reached maturity since World War II has personally experienced little if any of the benign American

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presence. He may be the young Filipino who watched forlornly, once the euphoria of liberation and memories of hunger had dimmed, as an American G.I.—irresistible with jeep, PX goods and accumulated combat pay—drove off with his girl friend. He grew up amid the din of debate on the Trade Act and "parity," veterans' benefits and guerrilla recognition, war damage payments and military bases disputes—all emotionally supercharged and too complex for any but the experts to grasp. His awareness of the relationship is mainly one of contest in which, he is told, the Filipino has been bested.

America has spent millions in the Philippines since the war. Some benefits have been immediate, some long-range. But all have been necessarily institutional and bureaucratic, without the warmth of the personal relationship so essential to the Filipino temperament.

The solution? The past cannot be recaptured. To the Filipino who is now mature in his independence, the official American cannot play foster-father, source of personal benefit and guidance. The commercial American, though still benign employer, is also potential competitor. Perhaps the new American presence and personal bond will be found in the realm of ideas, an intellectual exchange of equals, rather than that of mentor-student.

In foreseeing what lies ahead for the Philippine-American relationship, the great imponderable, of course, is the state of the world in which it develops. Given roughly the present external and internal climate, there appears to be no reason why it should not operate as effectively at the new and more mature level as it did in its earlier stages, provided both sides accept the need for deeper understanding and improved communication. In all major respects the policy objectives of both nations are parallel and complementary. Both can benefit by a strong, stable, politically independent Philippines that can stand the most suspicious foreign scrutiny. Whether as an example of a small developing nation achieving economic strength and growth in association and cooperation with America, or as a potential customer, a prosperous Philippines is a common goal. And just as the United States sees a collective security system in Asia as diminishing dangers of war or contributing to victory, so the Philippines, standing in the shadow of overwhelmingly powerful neighbors, benefits from the American protection without having to shoulder the enormous burden of maintaining a defense force equal even to that of

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smaller neighbors. In brief, mutuality of national interest is a practical reality rather than a sentimental cliché.

True, there are short-range conflicts of interest between nationals of both countries, but these appear to be well within the scope of Philippine courts, the negotiating table or the solvent of enlightened national self-interest on both sides of the Pacific.

Perhaps most important, to begin with, is that the American shall forget the superficial similarities between himself and his Filipino associate—the command of English and adoption of other American manners and mores—and become familiar with the important operative differences between the cultures. Each has its own set of values and behavior patterns. Whether one is superior to the other is irrelevant. What is important is that the differences not be permitted to impair accurate communication. The Filipino, for his part, will find it even more useful perhaps to make a similar effort. As his range and role on the world scene expands, for example, he will find it necessary to develop a tolerance for the cold, crisp, efficient approach which his traditional social norms find obnoxious, but which are the vernacular of the modern technological society.

The Filipinos aspire to develop a politically and economically independent nation, an open democratic society of high living standards and ample opportunity for its people to develop their indigenous culture to its maximum potential. The American stake in the achievement of this goal is obvious. The possibility of a small Asian nation accomplishing such full flowering of its personality in coöperation with the American friend and ally holds long-range policy significance for the United States which far outweighs any possible short-range economic or political considerations. Once this fact of life is established, most of the suspicion and distrust in the relationship should be dissipated.

Nevertheless, it is predictable that American officials in Manila will not find their task simple or easy. They will be operating in an atmosphere beset by a variety of thorny negotiations common to the conduct of two sovereign states in today's complex world, and complicated by the blurred dimensions of the cold war, enemy propaganda and predictable conflicts of interest between individual Americans and individual Filipinos. Each government frequently will be faced with a difficult choice between the national interest and the interest of its nationals. The best of good will and good minds will be required of both.

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HOW THE BALTIC REPUBLICS FARE IN THE SOVIET UNION

By V. Stanley Vardys

THE Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had been independent between the two world wars, were annexed by the Kremlin in June of 1940, during the dramatic days when Paris fell to the Germans, and became republics of the Soviet Union. In thus reversing the course of modern Baltic history, Moscow separated the Baltic countries not only from Western Europe, toward which they had been oriented in international politics, but also from the nations of Central and Eastern Europe with which they shared most of their social and cultural characteristics. At present one of the main Communist propaganda themes aimed at the postwar generation of Balts is that the independence of their parents was a historical mistake, a deviation from their manifest destiny to be part of Russia. In the Soviet view, Baltic countries should not be independent; their national survival and progress can be assured only by the Leninist nationality policy of the U.S.S.R. Under Khrushchev, the goal of this policy was to establish melting-pot conditions for "the creation of a single nation with a single native [Russian] language."[1] Khrushchev's successors have continued to pursue this objective.

The purpose here is to sketch how the policy has affected the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national personalities and how the native Communist élites have responded to the integration of their republics into the Soviet Union.

II

The impact of 25 years of Soviet rule in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been very far-reaching, especially in demographic, economic and cultural respects. First, there has occurred an enormous influx of Russian settlers who came to serve in the Moscow-planned industries and thus to replace at least partially the labor of the more than half a million people deported from the Baltic States by Stalin. As a result, the percentage of Russians in Latvia has climbed from prewar 10.6 percent to 26.6 percent in the census year of 1959, and in Estonia from 8 percent to 20.1 percent. In Lithuania the Russian numbers increased more modestly, from an estimated 2 percent before the war to 8.5 percent in 1959. To these Russian percentages we must also add the Ukrainian and Belorussian immigration.

Available evidence also shows that since 1959 the number of Russians has continued to increase at a rapid pace, again primarily in Estonia and Latvia. According to the Soviet Latvian economist Mežgailis, between then and 1962 Estonia and Latvia imported 40 percent of the necessary new labor power, mainly from Russia and Belorussia. In Lithuania, only 8 percent of the total annual population increase has been reported to be technical, that is, immigrant. The Russian demographic pressure grows further as a result of the "exchange" of cadres, and in Estonia and Latvia by the com-

[1] A. A. Isupov, "Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR." Moscow: 1964, p. 9.

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siderably greater Slavic birth rate. Western observers estimate that if this population movement continues at the present pace, Estonians will be in a minority in their own country by 1985 and Latvians by 1975.[2] The situation in Lithuania is better because the country is less industrialized. The danger to Lithuania lurks in the Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg) region, now inhabited by more than 660,000 Russians. It seems conceivable, and under Khrushchev it was highly probable, that this territory, now an *oblast* of the Russian republic, may be added to Lithuania; such an arrangement, which is possible under the planned revision of the Soviet constitution, would immediately reduce the proportion of Lithuanians to about 60 percent.

These demographic changes were the principal result of an intensive growth of industries. As the inefficient collective farming could not release a sufficient number of *kolkhozniks* to man the new factories, and as Moscow made its plans without taking certain Baltic realities into account, the workers were imported, especially in the case of Estonia and Latvia. According to Soviet data, Estonia's production in 1965 was 18.6 times higher than in 1940; Latvia's and Lithuania's production in 1964, it was claimed, had increased 16 times. Estonia is today the most industrialized of Soviet republics. In the mid-sixties, it made over 30 percent of the Soviet Union's larger electric transformers and mined 65 percent of the entire Soviet oil shale. Latvia made 47 percent of all Soviet automatic telephone exchanges, and Lithuania contributed 33 percent of certain electric welding instruments. The republics made agricultural machinery, TVs, radios, refrigerators, cement, bicycles and furniture, and built ships. More than 70 percent of the total economic production now is industrial. Although Latvia and Estonia, as before the war, remain more highly industrialized than Lithuania, the index of industrialization in all three generally ran ahead of the Soviet average. Baltic Communists are very proud of these indeed impressive accomplishments. Their joy, however, may be mixed because they know that very many of the new industries can operate only on substantial quantities of imported materials and that they were developed without regard to local needs and the availability of local labor and without respect to the preservation of native ethno-cultural values.

Thus the economic and demographic policies of the Soviet Union have combined to create economically dependent industrial melting pots in the Baltic States. In cultural and social fields the aim has been to "internationalize" Baltic cultures. Conditions for what is called the "mutual enrichment of cultures" are especially ripe in large towns. In 1965, 62 percent of the Estonian and 60 percent of the Latvian population lived in cities, in comparison to 36 percent and 35 percent before the war, while Lithuania's percentage was 43 percent, compared to the prewar 23 percent. It is estimated that about one-half of the population of large cities like Riga and Tallinn is Russian. This makes the use of Russian a daily necessity and helps to encourage mixed marriages, linguistically mixed entertainment and recreation facilities, and creates a Russian élite which is favored linguistically and for various government positions.

The Soviet cultural and social policy is thus a policy of integration and

[2] *East Europe*, April 1965, p. 20.

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assimilation. While on the one hand each Baltic republic can produce statistics surpassing Western Europe in the increase of schools and students, the cultural communication, now developed on a mass scale, is highly saturated with ideas and practices aimed at transferring Baltic loyalties from their own to the Russian nation. This process consists of two complementary aspects—alienation from native culture and traditions and inculcation of melting-pot values. An example of the first is found in the rewriting of Baltic history to show an alleged cultural and political affinity with Russia; of the second, in the way the Russian language continues to squeeze out the native languages in public meetings, in print (especially scientific publications) and in education. On April 18, 1965, *Pravda* reported the existence in the Baltic republics of bilingual schools, where some classes are taught in the native tongue and others in Russian. In Latvia, the number of such schools, designed to encourage the use of Russian and to integrate children socially, runs into hundreds.

The Soviets apparently have made some ideological gains, for example, in alienating sections of the youth from religion (though not in converting them to atheism) and in superficial Communist indoctrination which produces more pliable citizens. The population on the whole seems to have become resigned to the reality of the Soviet régime.[8] The Soviets have not succeeded, however, in weakening the ethnic and cultural identity of the Balts, nor have they been able to change the priority of loyalties from native to Russian.

III

What has been the role of the Baltic Communists in this Soviet effort to integrate and to assimilate the Balts? Since they have no autonomy but merely act as the Soviet Communist Party's provincial leaders, they have no choice but dutifully to execute central policies. Almost daily, however, those Baltic leaders, like their East European colleagues, find themselves squeezed between Moscow's demands and their own countrymen's antagonism to Moscow. In trying to appease both, their general pattern has been to seek out the limits of Moscow's tolerance and to retreat, if not yet too late, in face of an accomplished central policy directive. What those limits are, and the potential for self-assertion, can be gauged from some of the more conspicuous cases in which Baltic Communist leaders have been involved. So far, their initiative has been only in economic and cultural, not in political matters. For them, the political relationship to Moscow was settled when the Baltic States "joined" the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940.

It was natural that since the effects of Soviet-style industrialization on a large scale first appeared in Estonia, the first important reactions of Baltic Communist leaders were registered there. The result was the dismissal in 1949–51 of the Estonian Party's first secretary, Nikolai Karotamm, and a

[8] This change of attitude contrasts sharply with the violent opposition of the régime just after World War II, when Soviet rule was resisted by force of arms. In Lithuania, for example, a guerrilla war between 1944–52 caused at least 40,000 casualties, half of them guerrilla, half Communist. These are Soviet figures and probably should be revised upward.

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number of other top Communists. The exact grounds for this have never been explained, but in April of 1951 Karotamm's successor, Ivan Käbin, suggested that the Estonians had resisted the immigration of Russian cadres, had attempted to keep the Estonian Communist Party in Estonian hands and had endeavored to defend some Estonian national traditions.

The new leaders, alleged to be more favorable to Russian influence, kept quiet until after the XX Party Congress in 1956 which raised hopes of autonomy. But on September 22, 1956, Alexei Müürisepp, then chairman of the Council of Ministers and at present chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, published an article in *Izvestiia* in which he scored Moscow's economic planners for neglecting the republic's "special economic needs." He sharply criticized the established economic interdependence which did not allow Estonia to use its own materials for Estonian industries and protested the export of Estonian products before the republic's own needs were met. In this very revealing bill of complaints he also criticized the policy of labor supply, singling out for condemnation the displacement of Estonian graduate specialists and the importation of Russians to take their place.

Since Khrushchev was then preparing for the decentralization of economic management, Müürisepp did not lose political favor. However, Latvian and Lithuanian attempts to resist Moscow's policies after the creation of *sovnarkhozes* in 1957 met with different results. In Latvia, a group of leaders allegedly headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Eduards Berklavs, was reported to have opposed a further development of heavy industry in the republic and demanded preference for industries for which Latvia had raw materials and could supply laborers. They also wanted their industries to satisfy Latvian consumers first. They further demanded priority for Latvians in admission to party membership and a knowledge of Latvian as a qualification for government and party jobs. In 1959, after an involved investigation, Berklavs and some of his colleagues were fired and disappeared, while others were dismissed from their positions. The purge continued for about two more years.

Lithuanian reactions, primarily because of slower industrial development, were of lesser proportions. The economic issues involved are not clear, but public warnings against "National Communism" in economic and even in political affairs, the purge of some members of the party's central committee for "nationalism" as well as the downgrading of old party stalwarts like Kazys Preikšas, indicate that the Lithuanians, too, probed the limits of the autonomy of 1957 too far. In the late fifties, the Lithuanians "sinned" primarily in the educational and cultural field, especially in schools of higher education and in the ministry of culture. They were charged with supporting nationalism and the nationalists. As a result, the rector of the University of Vilnius and a number of professors in this and other schools were dismissed for a string of "nationalist" deviations.

Since the Baltic Communists were unable to stop the dangerously large Russian immigration, they now seem to be working to slow it down. The Estonians are reported to have tightened residence requirements for newcomers to their larger cities. Furthermore, like all the Balts, they hope to

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reduce the need of imported labor by shifting new industries to small towns where an untapped labor source still exists among housewives and others not gainfully employed. These new industries would be in the light-industry category and would need few imported supplies. Lithuania seems to have the most concrete plans for such development. Arnold Weimer, chairman of the Estonian *sovnarkhoz* who was purged in 1951 as chairman of the Council of Ministers, assured Theodore Shabad of *The New York Times* in the summer of 1965 that "no more Russians are being settled in Estonia under government plans." The measures described, however, can hardly be considered sufficient to stem the tide of Russian immigration, because since October 1965 the control of the economy remains firmly in Moscow's hands.

In the cultural field, a number of Baltic Communist leaders also have attempted to maintain the rights of the native language and autonomy in literature and the arts. Continuous battles, some visible, others less so, are fought for cultural positions, with the natives mostly losing but trying again when conditions appear more favorable. In August 1965, for example, Estonians and Lithuanians led in the successful endeavor, important for preserving the native language, to save eleven-year secondary education. The exception was granted by Moscow at a time when the reduction of secondary schooling to ten years was ordered everywhere else. To make their success the more notable, they had even dared to issue public requests in the local and the central press.

It must be added, however, that these Baltic efforts may very likely have succeeded because of incidental help from public opinion abroad. Judging from the amount of publicity given to the matter in Moscow and the Baltic republics, it seems reasonably certain that a resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives (H.Con.Res. 416), passed on June 17, 1965, and calling attention of American and world opinion to the denial of self-determination to the Baltic States, set the stage for a favorable response in Moscow. The Soviets have always been sensitive to American opinion in such cases, and on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries may have felt embarrassed to disregard the Baltic pleas, especially since the United States still does not recognize the Soviet annexation.

Despite such occasional successes, the degree to which it is possible for Baltic Communists to protect the economic and cultural interests of their people is rather severely limited. This is due, at least in part, to their own ideological attitudes, but mainly to the Russian controls over the party and government apparatus and the lack of native strength in the local Communist parties. About 1957, Moscow fully restored the system of Russian "doubles" in party and government offices. In the mid-sixties, furthermore, the percentage of ethnic Balts in their own parties was still very low, despite the lessened reluctance by the younger generation to join Party ranks. The Estonian and Lithuanian parties have only about 60 percent native ethnic members, while the Latvian membership in the Latvian party has shrunk to less than 45 percent. In all three cases the percentage of ethnic natives is considerably lower than their percentage in

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population, showing that the Russian minority exercises a disproportionate share of influence in republic administration.

The Baltic future, then, cannot be determined by the actions of Baltic Communists, but will depend on the results of the broader Soviet nationality policy in the area. At present, Moscow focuses attention on creating melting-pot conditions which are expected to forward a natural process of assimilation. However, the pace of this endeavor is already slackening. The splits in international Communism, the slowing down of the Soviet economic development, the competition for power inside the Kremlin and the recurring international crises do not favor concentrated domestic action. These factors might induce an occasional breathing spell, as happened between the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964 and the centralization of economic management in October 1965; pressures for russianization might thus be slowed down. For these reasons, it does not seem that the Baltic melting pot will complete its work in the immediate future.

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ROOSEVELT AS FRIEND OF FRANCE

By John McVickar Haight, Jr.

PRESIDENT Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.

It was not until late 1937 that France seriously considered the purchase of American combat planes to help offset Germany's overwhelming aerial superiority. Since 1935, when Hitler tore up the Versailles Treaty and began to build his air forces, the German aircraft industry had adopted the latest aluminum construction techniques and turned out planes with heavier engines, higher altitudes and faster speeds than the wood and canvas planes which still made up the majority of the French and British air forces. By the end of 1937 Germany possessed some 1,000 war planes of the latest type, and a French Senator, Baron Amaury de la Grange, did not exaggerate when he informed his Senate colleagues in late December that "German aviation can fly over our territory with impunity."

Shortly after the Senator made this statement, the French Government requested him to cross the Atlantic and determine how quickly the American aircraft industry could produce 1,000 modern planes. De la Grange was selected because of his broad knowledge of both French and American air power and because of his personal friendship with the President. He had first met Franklin Roosevelt when he married an American in 1913 and had seen him often during a tour of duty in Washington in 1918. As he had kept up this friendship, he easily arranged a visit at the White House for the weekend of January 15–16, 1938.

Senator de la Grange found the American President in a particularly receptive mood. Since his Chicago speech of October 1937, Roosevelt had been

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seeking ways to implement his plea that the peace-loving nations of the world should quarantine the aggressors. Though he had not named them, he privately lumped Germany, Italy and Japan together at this time as the "three bandit nations." His concern grew in early November when the three officially joined together in the Anti-Comintern Pact and rumors spread that they were bound by new military agreements. He looked toward the Brussels conference of nations interested in the Far East to restrain Japan's undeclared war against China, but when the conference ended in a fiasco, the President sought other means to bring pressure on the aggressors.

Then in early December Japanese planes wantonly sank the U.S.S. *Panay* in the Yangtze River. Outraged, the President proposed to Britain a joint long-range naval quarantine of Japan and sent a naval officer to London to discuss the project. It was in effect laid to rest on January 14, however, when Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain asked the United States to join in recognizing Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Chamberlain's preference for appeasement had blocked the President's search for a resistance policy. It was two days later that Senator de la Grange arrived to open a new avenue by which the United States might help the European democracies to resist the Fascist dictators.

On that Sunday afternoon, January 16, the President invited his French friend into his study and together they discussed the world situation. Roosevelt outlined his plan for a long-range naval quarantine of Japan running from Hong Kong to Manila and thence to Alaska. The Senator in his turn requested rapid delivery of 1,000 planes of the type then used by the American Army Air Corps. A letter de la Grange wrote immediately after this meeting summarizes his impressions of Roosevelt's reaction:

> It is his conviction that, more and more, Japan will depend on Germany and Italy and that, in order to contain the ambitions of these powers, England, France and America will be obliged to combine their efforts.
>
> The President will thus be completely in favor of all measures that the French Government might believe necessary to reinforce its air formations in time of peace and in time of war.[1]

The President also pointed out, added de la Grange, that the arms embargo embedded in the Neutrality Act would not permit France in time of war to replenish its supplies from the United States "with complete freedom." Nevertheless, after further discussion in Washington, de la Grange stated in his final report: "As long as the White House is occupied by Mr. Roosevelt, who is francophile and fears German expansion," France could expect a broad interpretation of the embargo. The Senator personally thought this might mean "surreptitious delivery via Canada."[2]

Senator de la Grange could not report optimistically about his goal "to harness American industry to the French war machine," for he soon discovered that the production of combat planes lagged even more in the United States than in France. Thus he was finally forced to reveal, "It is

[1] Letter from Senator de la Grange to Senator Joseph Caillaux, Jan. 21, 1938. De la Grange Papers, held by the Senator's widow in Paris.

[2] Final Report on American Mission, Feb. 15, 1938. De la Grange Papers.

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regrettable that we cannot obtain in the United States beginning in 1938 a sufficient number of machines to reinforce our weak aviation." Only one plane appeared to measure up to France's needs, Curtiss Wright's P-36 fighter. However, as the company's production line was just beginning to turn out the first of the 200 ordered by the American Air Corps, France would have to finance a new assembly line, from which no more than 100 could be shipped before March 1939.

The need for fighters was so great that the French Government favored ordering the 100 P-36s. However, the threat that delivery might be halted by the arms embargo just when a belligerent France needed them most remained a stumbling block. In late February, Edouard Daladier, then the Defense Minister, discussed this problem with the American Ambassador, William C. Bullitt, who agreed to go to Washington to determine whether President Roosevelt would be as helpful as de la Grange predicted. Bullitt's suggestion that Jean Monnet accompany him as Daladier's representative gave this Frenchman his first opportunity to see the President in action.

Bullitt has recalled for this author that he and Monnet crossed the ocean on the same boat, but in order to avoid attention neither gave any sign of recognition to the other until they arrived in the President's study. There, in answer to Daladier's problem, Roosevelt told Bullitt to assure him that he was already campaigning for repeal of the arms embargo and expecting success. He hoped that the threat to ship American arms to the European democracies would make the Fascist dictators pause before launching a war. However, if war did come before the embargo could be repealed, the President said he would rush through the necessary revision of the Neutrality Act. If worst came to worst and he failed in this final effort, he had one last means of getting around the embargo, which specifically forbade flying planes out of the United States to a belligerent country. He would have the planes pushed across the border into Canada. He told Bullitt to search for areas where planes could land on the American side, and he sketched a map indicating likely places. Before leaving, Monnet requested the map as a memento and, with a characteristic grin, Roosevelt handed it to him. Though the map was later destroyed, it provided Monnet in the spring of 1938 with documentary evidence of Roosevelt's attitude toward the arms embargo.[3]

Obviously, the President had made no official commitment to the French Government; he had stated only his personal intentions. However, Guy La Chambre, who was French Minister for Air from early 1938 until March 1940, remembers that those expressed intentions were accepted for fact. Thus after becoming Premier in April 1938, Daladier decided to run the risk of having the P-36s rust on American docks and approved both the order for 100 and an option for an additional 300. It was in recalling this series of incidents that Daladier wrote recently to the present author, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend."

Daladier and La Chambre turned to President Roosevelt again that spring

[3] When asked recently about this sketch, M. Monnet wrote, "I am very much afraid I cannot find the sketch of the airfield on the New York State-Canadian border. My prewar archives were burnt in Cognac during the war."

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of 1938 because widespread opposition to the purchase of American planes had sprung up within France. The Finance Minister, Georges Bonnet, objected to the expenditure of France's limited gold reserves as required by the "cash and carry" clause of the Neutrality Act. Criticism also came from the Chamber of Deputies and the French press, as well as from labor and management in the aircraft industry. Most serious of all, technicians within the French Air Ministry doubted whether the export model of the P-36 would meet European combat conditions. Believing that other criticisms would be silenced if this last one were proved erroneous, the Minister for Air decided to send France's leading test pilot, Michael Detroyat, to the United States to fly the plane and make first-hand observations.

Permission for such a flight ran into direct opposition from the U.S. Air Corps. As deliveries of the P-36 had not begun, the Air Corps still wrapped its three prototypes in secrecy. Typical of its position was a memorandum written by General H. H. Arnold, then the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. After listing some dozen specific reasons why the French should not be permitted to fly the P-36, he concluded: "M. Detroyat is an engineer of unusual ability, a skilled test pilot and a skilled pilot of racing planes. He could learn more in twenty minutes alone in this plane than the average engineer could learn from a week's study of both the plane and its blueprints."[4]

President Roosevelt, who had a broader view of the international situation, provided the French with the first evidence that he could act as well as talk. He ordered the Army Chief of Staff to make secret arrangements for Detroyat to fly a P-36 "for just twenty minutes." As Arnold predicted, that was ample time to convince the French pilot of its merits; he reported to Paris that the Curtiss fighter was equal not only to France's prototypes but also to the operational model of the Messerschmitt 109, Germany's newest frontline fighter. The opposition of the French technicians crumbled and in mid-May France signed a contract for 100 P-36s.

The French Government's original expectations of obtaining 1,000 planes had been frustrated, but it could find some comfort in the fact that a British air mission which toured the United States in the spring of 1938 also concluded that only the P-36 could measure up to Germany's current fighters. Even after this mission had obtained President Roosevelt's special clearance to fly the B-18, the Air Corps' medium bomber, it recommended that Britain order no war planes but rather 200 trainers and 200 transports, the latter being adequate for coastal patrol duty far from the battle lines.

Despite the inferiority of American combat aviation, France turned again to the United States for further purchases after the Czechoslovakian crisis of September 1938. At this moment, when Hitler led Europe to the brink of war by demanding the annexation of the Sudetenland, the French Air Force was terribly inferior to the German *Luftwaffe*. According to official records, the French possessed but 17 planes which could match the performance of the hundreds poised on the Rhine frontier.[5] No wonder the French Chief

[4] Memo from Gen. Arnold to Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Marlin Craig, Mar. 9, 1938, Adjutant General's Office, File 452 (3-9-38). Washington: National Archives, Record Group 94.

[5] "Procès-Verbal de Comité de Matériel," Sept. 29, 1938, filed in Box B/104 in the archives of the Service Historique de l'Armée de l'Air at Versailles.

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of Staff for Air, General Vuillemin, informed the Government on September 26 that "only with great difficulty and at the price of heavy losses" could his Air Force fulfill its mission. If anyone was bluffing at Munich, it was Premier Daladier.

On September 30 Prime Minister Chamberlain returned to Britain to announce "peace in our time," but the French Premier took a more realistic view. On October 3 he called in Ambassador Bullitt who subsequently cabled Washington: "Daladier sees the situation entirely, clearly, and realizes fully that the meeting in Munich was an immense diplomatic defeat for France and England." The Premier also requested Ambassador Bullitt to leave as soon as possible for the United States to make another effort to help France build up its air defenses. Bullitt arrived in Washington late in the evening of October 13 and went directly to the White House, where his talk with the President continued into the small hours. Later that morning of October 14 the President electrified a press conference by calling for a vast rearmament of the United States. As reports circulated that the President gave priority to air power and aimed at an American production of 20,000 planes, the suspicion grew that he sought such large quantities of planes in order to divert them to Britain and France and thus strengthen their defenses against Hitler's Third Reich.

The truth of these rumors can now be underscored on the basis of a discussion which the President had with Jean Monnet, Ambassador Bullitt and Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr. on October 25. Monnet recalls that Roosevelt first spoke forcefully about the Nazi challenge to liberty and the danger that Hitler would resort to force in his drive to rule the world. The President then estimated that Germany had the capacity to turn out 40,000 planes while Britain could produce only 25,000 and France 15,000; he felt the United States should develop a 20,000 capacity in order to achieve overwhelming superiority.

It is significant that the President used exactly the same figures the week before during a discussion at Hyde Park with Arthur C. Murray, a member of the House of Commons and a prominent Liberal. The President added that these 20,000 American planes would provide "the necessary overwhelming superiority over Germany and Italy." He went on to discuss with Murray how Britain could obtain its share of the new planes and concluded by sending the assurance to Chamberlain, "I will help all I can."[6]

Monnet's report to the Daladier Government reveals that during the White House meeting President Roosevelt had joined in the discussion as to how many planes could be produced for France. The estimate was that in a year's time the American aviation industry, "with certain but not excessive augmentation," could deliver some 1,000 pursuit planes and 1,000 bombers. There were two conditions: "Such deliveries presuppose that only existing American models would be used and that the types would be limited to one or at the most two for bombers and pursuits."[7]

[6] Lord Elibank (formerly Arthur C. Murray), "Franklin Roosevelt: Friend of Britain," *Contemporary Review*, June 1955, p. 364–367.

[7] Monnet Memorandum, dated Nov. 14, 1938, filed as #6 in "Commandes Américaines" in the private papers held in Paris by Guy La Chambre, Minister for Air, 1938–1940.

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While Premier Daladier welcomed the prospect of obtaining large quantities of American planes, Prime Minister Chamberlain, despite a Royal Air Force recommendation that the United States be aided in developing production, approved the purchase of only 200 additional trainers. The French Premier spelt out his plans to his National Defense Council on December 5. "We presently have the possibility of receiving about 1,000 planes of the latest model in use by the American Army. The American Government has formally promised delivery but it must be kept absolutely secret." He went on: "Our aerial inferiority is tragic. One thousand American bombers are necessary."[8] The Finance Ministry, now under Paul Reynaud, again opposed the expenditure of gold necessary in the "cash and carry" transaction and refused to increase the budget. However, by the end of the week Daladier had juggled the budget sufficiently to provide the required funds and directed Monnet to proceed with his American negotiations.

In mid-December when Monnet returned to Washington to arrange the purchase of the 1,000 bombers, the White House suggested that he avoid opposition by working quietly through Secretary Morgenthau under the pretense that the sale of planes to France was a commercial matter. Morgenthau shared Roosevelt's conviction about the need to strengthen France, and as one of Monnet's colleagues wrote in early 1939, Treasury officials "never ceased aiding the mission."[9] Opposition came from other sources. First, the French technicians who accompanied Monnet soon concluded that none of the American bombers currently in production and released for foreign sale could survive European war conditions. However, on December 21 they learned from the Treasury that two light bombers were being developed for an Air Corps competition by Glenn Martin and Douglas. Monnet immediately requested clearance for his technicians to study the specifications of these bombers.

Recognizing that this request would run into powerful opposition from the Air Corps, Morgenthau went over to the White House. He forcefully backed the French request by referring directly to the President's own attitude toward aid to the European democracies: "If it's your theory that England and France are our first line of defense . . . let's either give them good stuff or tell them to go home, but don't give them some stuff which the minute it goes up in the air will be shot down. No sense in selling them that which we know is out of date." Roosevelt accepted this argument and wrote the following note on Morgenthau's memorandum requesting release of the two bombers: "This is O.K. for reasons of state . . . should be kept as confidential as possible and the French orders filled so as not to interfere with the United States' new orders this spring."[10]

After a Cabinet meeting that afternoon, the President persuaded Secre-

[8] Gamelin, "Servir," v. 2, "La Prologue de Drame (1930-août 1939)." Paris: Plon, 1946, p. 371–378.

[9] "Final Report, Air Mission to America," Dec.–Jan. 1938, filed as #9 bis in "Commandes Américaines." La Chambre Papers.

[10] John M. Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries," v. II, "Years of Urgency, 1938–1941." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964, p. 65.

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tary of War Woodring to give grudging approval to the release. Trouble came when General Arnold, now the Chief of the Air Corps, was informed. He was convinced that the sale of the bombers to France would upset the Air Corps' new expansion program and fought to retain the Douglas bomber, believing it the better of the two. Air Force archives reveal that from December 21, when the General first heard of the French interest, until mid-January he threw every possible obstacle into the path of the French negotiations for the Douglas plane. His tactics ended only on January 16, 1939, when the President called a conference of all interested service officials. After Roosevelt reiterated his wish that every effort be made to assist the French air mission, he turned to Ambassador Bullitt, who spoke eloquently of time running out and of the need to aid France in building its air defenses. Secretary Woodring hedged and referred to his isolationist friends in Congress who might embarrass the President if the plane were released. It was a tense meeting and Roosevelt got his dander up. The upshot was that he signed a formal order and addressed it separately to the Secretaries of War, Navy and Treasury. It included the terse phrase, "You are directed" and implied compliance or resignation.

Under this pressure General Arnold granted the release and Monnet sent two French representatives out to California in order to satisfy the Air Ministry's requirement to test the new bomber. After watching a flight demonstration, the French test pilot, Captain Paul Chemedlin, irritated the Douglas test pilot with some caustic observations. The American, as General Arnold later reported, decided to "make the Frenchman eat his words, or in other words, to give the Frenchman a ride," and Chemedlin was invited to climb into the after-section of the bomber. The plane was put through its usual paces, but to provide further proof of its manœuvrability the pilot brought the bomber down to 400 feet and feathered one engine. He then made a sharp right turn, with the dead engine on the lower wing, and followed this with a snap roll. The plane, pushed too far, stalled. Tragically, the American pilot was killed when his chute failed to open, but miraculously the Frenchman rode the plane down and survived the crash. A compatriot rushed up and, pushing his way through the crowd of bystanders, began excitedly to speak in his native language. The secret was out.

The publicity given to the crash of the Douglas bomber with a French observer on board thoroughly alerted the American public to the fact that the United States was providing aid to the European democracies. In an effort to upset the isolationist argument that such aid would lead the nation down the road to war, President Roosevelt invited to the White House the Senate Military Affairs Committee which was investigating the presence of the Frenchman in what one of the Committee members called "the very latest word in American plane construction." According to a contemporary account by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, the President at this meeting on January 31 tried to establish the fact that France and Britain were the first line of America's defense.

> He began by painting the dark picture of Europe, describing the German ambitions in the most lively terms, stating that Hitler would not be thwarted, warning that war was imminent. War, he said, . . . would directly affect "the peace and safety of

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the United States. The immediate struggle," he went on, "was for the domination of Europe, but so soon as one nation dominates Europe, that nation will be able to turn to the world sphere."

After reviewing the German challenges to eastern and western Europe, the President added:

"That is why the safety of the Rhine frontier does necessarily interest us."
"Do you mean that our frontier is on the Rhine?" asked one of the Senators . . .
"No, not that. But practically speaking if the Rhine frontiers are threatened the rest of the world is too. Once they have fallen before Hitler, the German sphere of action will be unlimited."[11]

It was too strong medicine for many of the assembled Senators. Instead of persuading them to curtail their investigations and support the sale of planes to France, Roosevelt only fanned the isolationist conviction that he was pushing the nation toward war. The secrecy with which he attempted to surround his comments was broken. The strength of the nationwide outcry against what was called extension of the American frontiers to the Rhine prompted the President to back down. Three days later he issued a denial. From a position of leadership Roosevelt retreated into a waiting position of silence.

Monnet's mission was permitted to sign contracts for the new bombers, but, because of the prospect that delivery would be slow, only 100 of each were initially ordered. At the same time, France exercised its option for P-36s and ordered an additional 100 of these fighters. Once again the limited capacity of the American aircraft industry limited France's efforts to secure American aid.

What was perhaps of prime significance for French leaders that winter of 1938–39 was that their negotiations for American planes had proved the sympathy of President Roosevelt and his closest advisers. Though in public he might feel forced to deny that England and France were the first line for the defense of the United States and that the American frontiers thus extended to the Rhine, the leaders of France knew that this belief was in fact the basis of his European policy. While the Air Corps and the isolationists might continue to oppose the sale of other new planes to the European democracies, Daladier, Guy La Chambre and Jean Monnet were now assured that the American President would, when the time came, do all in his power to aid France. And this in fact Roosevelt did.

When war broke out in September 1939, a third French air mission rushed to the United States and, even while Congress debated the repeal of the arms embargo, secretly and successfully negotiated the purchase of 1,000 combat planes to be delivered by the end of 1940. Of even greater significance for the expansion of the American aircraft industry, France agreed to invest $10 million, a huge sum in those days, to double production of engines, the current bottleneck. In March 1940, patient and careful persuasion by Jean Monnet led Prime Minister Chamberlain's Government to agree to share equally with France in the purchase of 4,300 American fighters and bombers. The larger order, as Premier Daladier had stated in

[11] Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, "American White Paper. The Story of American Diplomacy and the Second World War." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, p. 30–31.

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December 1939, aimed to obtain "absolute dominance in the air" over Germany. The Premier had been so determined that France make this purchase that he was ready "to make every French resource available to obtain these planes . . . . Versailles or any other possession of the French Government."[12]

The ultimate significance of the French and British orders was underscored by the official Army Air Forces history: "The initial expansion of the American aircraft industry in 1939–1940, and one which was of great benefit to the country, was paid for by Great Britain."[13] Secretary Morgenthau claimed that this investment speeded American production of war planes by a crucial 12 to 18 months. Though the planes did not arrive in time to protect France's frontiers on the Rhine from Hitler, they contributed directly to speeding France's liberation in 1944.

Today many Frenchmen, influenced by President de Gaulle's wartime relations with President Roosevelt, remember him less as "a very great and noble friend" than as an essentially hostile ally. Many persons believe that the wartime incompatibility of de Gaulle and Roosevelt is at the base of current Franco-American differences. To whatever extent this is true, contemporary French feeling against America can perhaps be dissipated by recalling President Roosevelt's aid to France in ordering the planes needed so desperately for defense. Indeed, the memory of that Franco-American cooperation has greatly influenced the policy stressed since the war by Jean Monnet. While President de Gaulle has urged what would in effect be the withdrawal of the United States across the Atlantic, Monnet has argued for the maintenance of Roosevelt's frontiers in Europe in both an economic and military sense. Perhaps Franco-American coöperation on that basis will be aided if people will recognize President Roosevelt's courage, conviction and foresight in attempting, as early as January 1938, to pry open the American arsenal for the benefit of France.

[12] Ambassador William C. Bullitt to the Secretary of State, Nov. 23, 1939, in "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939." v. II. Washington: G.P.O., 1956, p. 520–522.

[13] "Army Air Forces in World War II," v. 6, "Men and Planes," eds. W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, pt. 2, Alfred Goldberg, "Equipment and Services." Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 191.

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TRENDS IN WORLD POLITICS. By Bruce M. Russett. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 156 p. $1.50 (Paper).

A concise account of changes in the international political system, particularly since 1945, together with an introduction to some of the newer empirical techniques for the study of international relations. For the future he sees a trend away from the bipolarity of recent decades.

THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: ITS STATUS AND PROSPECTS. Edited by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965, 182 p. $4.75.

A collection of papers prepared for colloquia at Ohio State University and dealing with a number of problems relative to NATO—its military features, the role of certain members and its prospects.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A GENERAL THEORY. By J. W. Burton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965, 288 p. $7.50.

In this significant work, a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at University College, London, offers a critique of orthodox power theory and its application, and turns to new models involving decision-making, communications, non-alignment and a system of state relations not dependent upon power.

WORLD POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. By Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 326 p. $7.50.

A serious effort to use some quite sophisticated quantitative techniques in describing and analyzing the political process in the General Assembly.

REGIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER. By Ronald J. Yalem. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965, 160 p. $4.50.

A study both of the theoretical premises of regionalism and of regional organizations and their operation under the League of Nations and the United Nations.

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, New York.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Georg Schwarzenberger. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1965, 209 p. $7.50.

A leading student of international law defines the inductive approach to the subject and defends it against a number of objections that have been raised against this method.

THE POLITICS OF SOCIALISM. By R. H. S. Crossman. New York: Atheneum, 1965, 252 p. $5.95.

Essays and articles of the 1950s and 1960s by a lively maverick member of the British Labor Party. The two prominent themes are the rethinking of socialism—a much needed enterprise—and thoughts on the cold war.

STRANGE COMMUNISTS I HAVE KNOWN. By Bertram D. Wolfe. New York: Stein and Day, 1965, 222 p. $6.00.

A portrait gallery of unconventional Communists, including John Reed, Angelica Balabanoff, Rosa Luxemburg, Maxim Litvinov and Trotsky.

THE SPY WITHOUT A COUNTRY. By H. K. Ronblöm. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965, 222 p. $4.50.

The story of the Swedish Air Attaché, Colonel Stig Wennerström, a quite successful double agent until his arrest in 1963.

THE WORLD CHANGERS. By Bruce Bliven. New York: Day, 1965, 418 p. $6.50.

A former editor of *The New Republic* reviews the 1930s and 1940s in the form of biographical sketches of Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Gandhi, Chiang Kai-shek and Hirohito.

AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH CATASTROPHE, AND HANNAH ARENDT'S NARRATIVE. By Jacob Robinson. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 406 p. $6.95.

A sharp, detailed, at times pedantic, critique of Hannah Arendt's book on the Eichmann trial ("Eichmann in Jerusalem"), which not infrequently misses the point of her report.

DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG UND DIE KRIEGSSCHULDFRAGE (DIE HOGGAN-KONTROVERSE). By Kurt Glaser. Würzburg: Marienburg-Verlag, 1965, 167 p. DM. 14.80.

A discussion, itself bound to raise controversy, of the dispute over the "war guilt" question, centering on David L. Hoggan's book.

COMMUNITY OF FATE: GERMAN-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1922–1928. By Kurt Rosenbaum. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965, 325 p. $6.75.

While affording some useful documentary evidence from the German archives, this is not a major contribution to what is by now a rather familiar subject.

LETTERS FROM THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. By Charles Seymour. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 289 p. $7.50.

Valuable for the historian of the Peace Conference of 1919, this volume comprises letters which the late Charles Seymour, a member of the Inquiry, wrote to his family during his stay in Paris. The book has been edited by Harold B. Whiteman, Jr.

THE UNIVERSITY LOOKS ABROAD. New York: Walker, 1966, 300 p. $6.00.

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The result of a study conducted by Education and World Affairs on the international activities and interests of six American universities—Cornell, Indiana, Michigan State, Stanford, Tulane and Wisconsin.

HISTORICAL SURVEYS AND PORTRAITS. By G. P. Gooch. London: Longmans, 1966, 258 p. 50/.

A selection of Professor Gooch's articles and addresses over the last 40 years dealing both with general historical themes and with sketches of writers and statesmen.

CONVERSATIONS WITH WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1965, 242 p. $4.95.

A collection of the columnist's periodic C.B.S. television interviews since August 1960.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, 1919–1943: DOCUMENTS. VOLUME III, 1929–1943. Selected and Edited by Jane Degras. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 494 p. $14.40.

This valuable selection of documents on the Comintern covers the years from the disastrous turn to the left through the period of the popular front to the formal dissolution of the organization in 1943.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1961. By D. C. Watt. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 652 p. $17.60.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1961. Selected and Edited by D. C. Watt. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 834 p. $17.60.

The 1961 volume in the well-known series of "Surveys" resumes the practice of dealing with the events of a single year, though certain subjects, such as the effects of the break-up of the United Arab Republic, are being reserved for the subsequent volume. The arrangement of the volume of documents corresponds to the chapters in the "Survey."

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1966. By Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 360 p. $8.50.

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1966, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies. Includes a 32-page supplement of political maps.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION. By Arthur H. Dean. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 153 p. $3.50 (Paper, $1.95).

Ambassador Dean, who had a prominent role in negotiating at Geneva and elsewhere, gives his views on the negotiating process and on the major political and other problems related to the nuclear test ban, limited arms control and general disarmament. A volume in the Policy Books Series of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB. By Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965, 348 p. $6.00.

Another, and quite useful, contribution to the growing body of studies dealing with the complex of considerations that led to the decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. The book developed out of research for some N.B.C. television documentaries on the subject.

MARITIME STRATEGY: A STUDY OF DEFENSE PROBLEMS. By Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton. New York: Praeger, 1965, 210 p. $6.75.

A British naval officer seeks "to discover whether the expression 'Maritime Strategy' has any modern relevance," and if so, whether its principles still apply as far as the defense problems of Britain are concerned.

SECRECY AND THE ARMS RACE. By Martin C. McGuire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 249 p. $5.95.

An effort to present a theory of the arms race, with particular reference to the role played in it by information and secrecy. A quite technical study using a number of tools of economic analysis.

THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONFLICT. Edited by Elton B. McNeil. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, 315 p. $9.25.

An inter-disciplinary effort to get at the roots of human conflict, especially in war and international relations.

THE CRISIS GAME: SIMULATING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Sidney F. Giffin. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 191 p. $4.95.

A helpful introduction to an evaluation of the techniques and utility of political and military gaming, by a former Air Force General, now a research associate of the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington.

LE DRAME DE 1940. By General Beaufre. Paris: Plon, 1965, 273 p. Fr. 13.50.

A leading French writer on military strategy here offers his recollections and reflections on the catastrophe of 1940 and its background.

PEDDLER OF DEATH: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR BASIL ZAHAROFF. By Donald McCormick. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 255 p. $5.95.

An effort to trace the still murky career of the arms merchant who sold weapons from the Boer War to World War I.

FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW: THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE FISHER ERA, 1904–1919. VOLUME II. By Arthur J. Marder. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 466 p. $14.00.

This second volume of Professor Marder's major history of the British Navy in the First World War carries the story from the outbreak of war to the eve of the battle of Jutland in May 1916.

General: Economic and Social

MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER. By Andrew Shonfield. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 456 p. $10.50 (Paper, $4.50).

"What was it that converted capitalism from the cataclysmic failure which it appeared to be in the 1930s into the great engine of prosperity of the postwar Western world?" In pursuit of that question, the Director of Studies at the Royal

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Institute of International Affairs has written a remarkable book examining in depth the postwar economic policies and practices of Britain, France, Germany and the United States (and several other countries more briefly). Out of contrasts and similarities he draws explanations of the characteristics of the postwar period and sets forth suggestive ideas about the relation of government and business in a modern democracy.

THE WORLD ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS. By Harry G. Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 106 p. $3.50.

An excellent short survey by a leading Canadian economist of the basic current problems of international economic policy facing the advanced countries: monetary organization, trade barriers and discrimination, and trade and financial relations with the less developed countries.

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: PLANNING AND CONTROL. By Ursula K. Hicks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 187 p. $3.50.

In writing this straightforward and systematic discussion of government getting, spending and control, Lady Hicks draws on a good bit of experience in advising governments of developing countries.

CAPITAL AND GROWTH. By John Hicks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 339 p. $5.00.

The other half of the Hicks team has written a theoretical book about a subject that, he says, "has no particular bearing on underdevelopment economics. . . ."

FUNDAMENTALE FRAGEN KÜNFTIGER WÄHRUNGSPOLITIK. Edited by François Bochud. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1965, 230 p. DM. 23.

The gold price, flexible exchange rates and related matters as discussed by a group of experts in March 1965.

THE LAST REVOLUTION. By L.-J. Lebret. New York: Sheed, 1965, 213 p. $4.50.

A French Dominican who has influenced development planning in a number of countries denounces the Western world for unconcern, materialism and betrayal of its own values. Originally published in France in 1960.

GOVERNMENT RISK-SHARING IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT. By Marina von Neumann Whitman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 358 p. $8.50.

The most comprehensive account we have of the devices—other than tax incentives—by which the U.S. Government and several international agencies have sought to encourage private investment abroad. Professor Whitman's careful analysis shows how hard it is to get a clear assessment of the effects of these measures.

DIE NEUE OEKONOMISCHE POLITIK IN RUSSLAND UND DIE DEUTSCHE WÄHRUNGS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSREFORM: WÜRDIGUNG UND VERGLEICH. By Miklòs Gaal. Winterthur: Schellenberg, 1965, 221 p. Swiss Fr. 24.

A comparative study of the N.E.P. in Russia and the German post-1945 currency and economic reforms.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION. Edited by Stewart Fraser. New York: Wiley, 1965, 373 p. $7.50.

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A symposium on various themes relating to the title, including sections on international education under Communism and our development of area studies.

PROBLEMS OF AID TO EDUCATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Ladislav Cerych. New York: Praeger (for the Atlantic Institute), 1965, 213 p. $7.50.

An effort to analyze the body of recent experience with respect to educational aid to developing countries—its role at various levels, forms and means, and problems of creating appropriate organizational and institutional frameworks.

The United States

A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 1,087 p. $9.00.

This account of the Kennedy Administration by the late President's Special Assistant is both absorbing reading and a very important source for American domestic and foreign policies in those years. It is, as the author says, a personal memoir and at times the personal element outruns the balance of the historian or the prudence of the recorder of contemporary issues. The occasion of much debate and argument, the book will remain, however, a prime document for the Kennedy years.

LBJ'S INNER CIRCLE. By Charles Roberts. New York: Delacorte Press, 1965, 223 p. $5.00.

A somewhat journalistic account of the White House staff by the Acting Bureau Chief of *Newsweek's* Washington bureau.

THE UNCERTAIN GIANT: 1921–1941. By Selig Adler. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 340 p. $6.95.

This work "intended primarily for the nonspecialist" provides a concise review of U. S. foreign policy between the two world wars.

THE OPINIONMAKERS. By William L. Rivers. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965, 207 p. $4.95.

A report on the Washington press corps, including such influential figures as James Reston, Walter Lippmann and David Brinkley. The author, formerly a correspondent, is currently a professor of communications at Stanford.

AMERICA: PURPOSE AND POWER. Edited by Gene M. Lyons. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965, 384 p. $7.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A selection of essays, sponsored by the Public Affairs Center at Dartmouth College, dealing with the general theme of changing forces in American society, including the impact of international affairs.

THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM: A HISTORY. By Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 380 p. $8.50.

A history of the program, properly associated with the name of Senator Fulbright, that initiated, under Public Law 584 of the Seventy-Sixth Congress (1946), vastly expanded American activities in the fields of international educational and scholarly exchange.

SCHOOLS FOR STRATEGY: EDUCATION AND RESEARCH IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. By Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton. New York: Praeger, 1965, 356 p. $7.50.

A valuable review of the intellectual role of American universities and research groups in contributing to national security activities in recent years.

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UNDERCURRENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By M. S. Venkataramani. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965, 218 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.00).

Four episodes as viewed by an Indian scholar: The Roosevelt Administration and the Indian famine, the U.S. and India's food crisis in 1946, the Suez crisis, and the U-2 incident.

THIS U.S.A. By Ben J. Wattenberg in collaboration with Richard M. Scammon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 520 p. $7.50.

A lively account of some of the findings about American life to be drawn from the 1960 census. Mr. Wattenberg, a journalist, was assisted in this endeavor by the Director of the Bureau of the Census, 1961–65.

HOME PLACE: THE STORY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. By William S. White. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 175 p. $4.00.

The author of "Citadel," a study of the U.S. Senate, has turned to the House of Representatives, its tone, the types who sit in it, its strengths and weaknesses.

MORNING AND NOON. By Dean Acheson. Boston: Houghton, 1965, 288 p. $6.00.

These ably written memoirs of the youth and early career of the former Secretary of State are pleasantly revealing of the man, but stop at 1941 when Mr. Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

THE HIGH MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF FRANK MURPHY. By Richard D. Lunt. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965, 263 p. $8.50.

A study of the political career of a man who served as mayor of Detroit, Governor-General of the Philippines, Governor of Michigan, U. S. Attorney General and eventually justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Western Hemisphere

IN DEFENCE OF CANADA: APPEASEMENT AND REARMAMENT. By James Eayrs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, 261 p. $6.95.

In this second volume dealing with Canadian defense issues and foreign policy the author covers the period from the Italian attack on Ethiopia to the autumn of 1940.

OBSTACLES TO CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Claudio Veliz. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 263 p. $6.75.

Drawn from a conference at Chatham House in February 1965, these essays, by prominent Latin American academicians from different disciplines, emphasize the need for fundamental institutional change in Latin America and the necessity for Latin America to find indigenous solutions for her problems.

LATIN AMERICA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND HEMISPHERIC SECURITY. Edited by Norman A. Bailey. New York: Praeger (for the Center for Strategic Studies), 1965, 289 p. $9.00.

Compiled from a conference at Georgetown University in July 1964, these papers treat varied aspects of contemporary Latin American issues. Of particular interest are those by Donald Dozer, Eudocio Ravines and Paulo Ayres Filho, dealing respectively with the issues of the Canal, the ideological and intellectual conflict in Latin America, and the fall of the Goulart régime in Brazil.

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L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE ENTRE HIER ET DEMAIN. By Christian Rudel. Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1965, 191 p. Fr. 10.50.

Scattered journalistic reflections on the revolutionary nature of contemporary Latin America, with an optimistic assessment of the role being played by the developing Christian Democratic movement.

ALLIANCE WITHOUT ALLIES: THE MYTHOLOGY OF PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Víctor Alba. New York: Praeger, 1965, 244 p. $6.95.

A translation of "Parásitos, Mitos y Sordomudos" (1964), this book is a passionate and purposely polemical condemnation of the Alliance for Progress. While the author accepts the objectives of the Alliance, he believes these goals have been denied by the actions of the oligarchic élite in Latin America and by U.S. policies which fail to identify or reach the masses.

AN ATLAS OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. By Ronald M. Schneider and Robert C. Kingsbury. New York: Praeger, 1965, 136 p. $4.00 (Paper, $1.75).

Part of the Praeger series of world-affairs atlases, this lucid and pertinent text accompanies 60 maps and covers general Latin American problems along with essential national data.

LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS. By Donald W. Baerresen and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965, 329 p. $6.00.

This study, primarily a compilation of statistical materials pertaining to Latin American trade, examines the problems of economic integration of the region.

DOMINICAN DIARY. By Tad Szulc. New York: Delacorte Press, 1965, 306 p. $6.00.

In this provocative, fascinating and perceptive first-hand account of the Dominican tragedy, the correspondent for *The New York Times* analyzes the impact of U.S. policy during the early weeks of the civil war. The author contends that the U.S. inability to comprehend the nature of the struggle, caused in large measure by fear of another Cuba, resulted in actions which have only strengthened extremist groups of both left and right while negating the influence of those who speak for a democratically social revolution.

THE UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT: DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By Juan Bosch. New York: Praeger, 1965, 239 p. $5.95.

In this terse and cogent story of the post-Trujillo period, from May 1961 to May 1964, President Juan Bosch examines those attitudes resulting from the Trujillista legacy which have prevented the emerging of a meaningful democratic revolution in the Dominican Republic.

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES 1826–1954: HISTORY AND PROBLEMS. By Samuel Guy Inman. Washington: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1965, 282 p. $7.00.

Published posthumously, this optimistic history of the Inter-American System is highlighted by the personal experiences of a man long identified with and sympathetic to Latin America, its people and its problems.

U. S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY. By Edwin Lieuwen. New York: Praeger, 1965, 149 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.75).

This brief and factual historical account of U.S. hemispheric policies stresses the "ever-increasing United States concern over Latin America."

A CENTURY OF DISAGREEMENT: THE CHAMIZAL CONFLICT 1864–

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1964. By Sheldon B. Liss. Washington: University Press of Washington, D.C. (for the Latin American Institute), 1965, 167 p. $6.00.

A concise and studious appraisal of the thorny Chamizal dispute between the United States and Mexico, its origins and final settlement during the Kennedy Administration, supplemented by statistical materials and two inadequate maps.

THE CARIBBEAN: ITS HEALTH PROBLEMS. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965, 273 p. $7.50.

This uneven and varied collection of papers is based on the Fifteenth Annual Caribbean Conference held at the University of Florida.

PARTY POLITICS IN PUERTO RICO. By Robert W. Anderson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, 269 p. $6.75.

A somewhat pedantically written but worthwhile examination of political parties in Puerto Rico—from 1940 through 1964. The author, in examining Puerto Rico's political structure through its own party system, stresses that "Puerto Rican political life is conditioned by the island's preoccupation with its constitutional, political, and cultural 'status.' "

A STUDY ON CUBA. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1965, 774 p. $12.50.

In this abridged English translation of the 1963 edition, the Cuban Economic Research Project, centered at the University of Miami and under the direction of Dr. José R. Alvarez Díaz, traces statistically the development of the Cuban economy, past and present.

LAS EMPRESAS ESTATALES EN EL PERÚ. Lima: Centro de Documentación Económico-Social, 1965, 219 p. Soles 20.

Published by an agency dedicated to the defense of free enterprise, this book examines various state enterprises (*i.e.* steel, oil, electric power, banks, housing, tourism, etc.) and not surprisingly concludes that these "state enterprises dedicated to industrial or commercial operations have retarded rather than aided the development of Peru."

Western Europe

THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE PATH OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN. By Stuart A. Scheingold. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 331 p. $7.50.

The activities of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, like those of the U. S. Supreme Court, are of more than legal interest. By studying the political and economic aspects of the Court's work under the coal and steel treaty, Dr. Scheingold has turned a Ph.D. dissertation into a significant addition to the literature on the Schuman Plan.

THE STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND LAW OF A FREE TRADE AREA: THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION. By John S. Lambrinidis. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1965, 303 p. $12.50.

A Greek barrister with British experience provides a detailed exegesis of the EFTA treaty and the practices under it.

THE EUROPEAN RIGHT: A HISTORICAL PROFILE. Edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 589 p. $9.50.

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An analysis by American and European scholars of the diverse manifestations of right-wing movements in 11 East and West European countries, chiefly in this century. An indispensable, if uneven, introduction, with thoughtful efforts at synthesis by the editors.

LA FUSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES. Liège: Université de Liège, Faculté de Droit; The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965, 295 p.

A symposium on the legal aspects of the fusion of the European communities.

THE POLITICS OF BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY, 1945–1962. By William P. Snyder. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965, 284 p. $6.25.

A clear and useful survey of the evolution of British defense planning in a period of shrinking power, by a West Point graduate and instructor.

BRITISH STRATEGY AND POLITICS, 1914 TO 1918. By Paul Guinn. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 359 p. $7.20.

A fine study of the political background of Britain's strategic planning in the Great War, written with verve and objectivity, and based on new sources. This scholar's work has more dramatic impact—and provides greater impetus to reflection—than most popular accounts. The terrifying limitations on intelligence and imagination in the wartime leadership have rarely been drawn better.

THE BRITISH ECONOMY IN 1975. By W. Beckerman and Associates. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965, 631 p. $15.50.

While the British Government was working out a five-year plan, a group at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research was trying to see what the British economy would look like in the mid '70s, provided it grows faster than it did in the '50s and early '60s. Requirements and interrelations are important to the analysis but basically, says the director of the Institute, this is a book "about the opportunities open to us. . . ."

COMMONWEALTH BANKING SYSTEMS. Edited by W. F. Crick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 536 p. $8.00.

"Outside the United Kingdom" might well be added to the title, though London comes back in as the center of the system. This basic survey, written mostly by people from the areas covered, largely replaces the volume edited by Professor Sayers in 1952.

VIA PORTS: FROM HONG KONG TO HONG KONG. By Alexander Grantham. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 205 p. $6.00.

British Colonial Service memoirs in outposts of the far-flung empire, from 1922 to the author's retirement as Governor of Hong Kong in 1957.

A NEW ROAD FOR FRANCE. By Jacques Soustelle. New York: Speller, 1965, 278 p. $5.95.

A bitter indictment of the Gaullist road, by a former close associate of the General in the Resistance. Soustelle broke with de Gaulle over Algeria and still thinks the Algerian settlement "the greatest crime in the history of France." Embittered in exile, he is nevertheless an intelligent spokesman of the irreconcilable opposition to de Gaulle and decolonization.

LES ORGANISATIONS PROFESSIONNELLES FRANÇAISES ET LE MARCHÉ COMMUN. By János Szokolóczy-Syllaba. Paris: Colin, 1965, 372 p. Fr. 27.

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French industrialists were generally opposed to the Common Market or at least worried about it, but they adapted to the change rather well and developed more favorable views. The author documents this process with valuable studies of the cotton, woolen, automobile and electrical industries, describing their economic problems and pressure-group activities.

UNITED STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FRENCH CHARGES. By Allan W. Johnstone. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 109 p. $4.00.

This book examines the complaint in some French quarters that U. S. investment is a threat to French economic sovereignty. Facts, figures, a recital of recent events and the results of a questionnaire to American firms with French subsidiaries make this a useful little book.

PARIS JOURNAL: 1944–1965. By Janet Flanner (Genêt). New York: Atheneum, 1965, 615 p. $8.95.

A selective and intelligent portrait of postwar France, drawn by *The New Yorker's* Genêt, who began her Paris reporting in 1925. Her letters range from the wretched gloriousness of the Liberation to the prosperous uncertainties of today.

LA DÉCISION POLITIQUE EN BELGIQUE: LE POUVOIR ET LES GROUPES. Under the Direction of Jean Meynaud and Others. Paris: Colin, 1965, 403 p. Fr. 22.

A summary of the bases of Belgian politics and an analysis of the politics of major decisions since 1945. A valuable work, by many scholars.

LES PAYS NORDIQUES (DANEMARK, FINLANDE, NORVÈGE, SUÈDE, ISLANDE). By Raymond Fusilier. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1965, 295 p. Fr. 36.30.

A French scholar offers a brief, useful survey of the political institutions of the five Nordic countries today.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORWAY: A COMMUNITY STUDY. By Henry Valen and Daniel Katz. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Tavistock Publications, 1964, 383 p. 55/.

A Norwegian and an American political scientist join in a broadly gauged study of the structure and functioning of Norwegian parties, based largely on interim research of the Stavanger region in the general election of 1957.

LA SUISSE OU L'HISTOIRE D'UN PEUPLE HEUREUX. By Denis de Rougemont. Paris: Hachette, 1965, 305 p. Fr. 14.59.

A splendid survey of Swiss culture and a fervent argument that that happily diverse country should become a model for a federated Europe. A serious and delightful book.

THE GRAND DESIGN: A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. By Franz Josef Strauss. New York: Praeger, 1966, 105 p. $3.95. (London: Weidenfeld, 1965, 18/).

The former West German Defense Minister outlines his activist program: The building of a European Federation, armed by Anglo-French nuclear weapons, allied to the United States, and strong enough to bring about German reunification. An important pronouncement, and a clear plea for his nation's political rehabilitation—and his own.

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DER NOTENWECHSEL ZWISCHEN DEM HEILIGEN STUHL UND DER DEUTSCHEN REICHSREGIERUNG. I: VON DER RATIFIZIERUNG DES REICHSKONKORDATS BIS ZUR ENZYKLIKA "MIT BRENNENDER SORGE." EDITED BY DIETER ALBRECHT. Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1965, 459 p. DM. 45.

A collection of the diplomatic notes between the Vatican and the German government from July 1933 to March 1937. Most of the Vatican notes were written by Cardinal Pacelli and add an important dimension to the current controversy about his role. Some Vatican messages to the German episcopate are included in this scholarly edition sponsored by the new Catholic Academy of Bavaria.

THE GERMAN ECONOMY AT WAR. BY ALAN S. MILWARD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 214 p. $6.00. (University of London, Athlone Press, 35/).

Drawn largely from documents of the Speer Ministry, this study supports previous analyses of the less-than-total mobilization of the German war economy and shows how resistance to adequate concentration of power in any part of the government helped produce that result.

GOEBBELS AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA, 1925–1945. BY ERNEST K. BRAMSTED. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1965, 488 p. $12.50.

The most complete study of the subject as well as a scholarly and suggestive contribution to the general study of the functions of twentieth-century propaganda.

SPAIN: THE GENTLE ANARCHY. BY BENJAMIN WELLES. New York: Praeger, 1965, 386 p. $7.95.

A pleasant, exceedingly gentle introduction to contemporary Spain, by a *New York Times* correspondent who liked his six-year stint there.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

COMECON: INTEGRATION PROBLEMS OF THE PLANNED ECONOMIES. BY MICHAEL KASER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 215 p. $5.60.

Combining some personal observation with an impressive review of the rather fragmentary published evidence, this book immediately takes its place as the leading Western work on the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance of the Communist countries. The author is an Oxford don who spent a number of years on the staff of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe dealing with East-West relations.

RUSSIA AND HISTORY'S TURNING POINT. BY ALEXANDER KERENSKY. New York: Duell, 1965, 558 p. $8.95.

The readable and historically informative memoirs of the leading figure in Russia's Provisional Government following the fall of the Tsar. The narrative naturally centers on the critical year 1917, which was indeed a major historical turning point.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BY LEONARD SCHAPIRO. New York: Random House, 1965, 191 p. $3.95.

A useful and concise introduction by a leading scholar in the field.

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A STUDY IN SURVIVAL: THE CHURCH IN RUSSIA 1927–1943. By William C. Fletcher. New York: Macmillan, 1965, 168 p. $4.95.

A monograph on the Russian Orthodox Church's struggle for survival in the Stalin era, with particular attention to the work of Metropolitan Sergii.

SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE USSR. Paris: Mouton, 1965, 297 p. Fr. 35.

A survey of the historical, philosophical, economic and juridical sciences, prepared by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences at UNESCO's request and designed for the Western reader.

BEZ TIESĪBĀM UN BRĪVĪBAS: LATVIJAS SOVJETIZĀCIJA 1944–1965. By Adolfs Šilde. Copenhagen: Imanta, 1965, 436 p.

An account of the Sovietization of Latvia from 1944 to 1965, containing detailed information on the Communist Party of Latvia, economic and population problems, educational reforms and anti-Soviet resistance.

FINLAND AND THE GREAT POWERS. By G. A. Gripenberg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965, 380 p. $5.75.

The diplomatic memoirs of Finland's envoy to London, the Vatican and Stockholm during the Second World War.

FINNLAND HEUTE: EIN LAND BEWÄLTIGT SEINE GEGENWART. By Reinhold Dey. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1965, 296 p. DM. 19.80.

A general survey of postwar Finland by a German journalist with ten years' experience in the country.

PALUU KARJALAAN. By Seppo Simonen. Helsinki: Otava, 1965, 337 p. Fmk. 30.

A detailed study of the Karelian refugees' return to their homes for three years of valiant reconstruction work, followed by a second flight, 1941–44.

YUGOSLAVIA. By Phyllis Auty. New York: Walker, 1965, 251 p. $6.50.

A concise but informed and informative general history by a scholar at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. Her emphasis is on the period since 1945.

ALBANIA'S CAPTIVES. By Pyrrhus J. Ruches. Chicago: Argonaut, 1965, 213 p. $5.00.

A hardly dispassionate plea for the return of "Northern Epirus" to Greece.

The Middle East

THE ARAB COLD WAR, 1958–1964: A STUDY OF IDEOLOGY IN POLITICS. By Malcolm Kerr. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 139 p. $1.70 (Paper).

A compact and authoritative interpretation of inter-Arab rivalries, the Egyptian-Syrian relationship in particular, by an American political scientist of long experience in the Arab world.

ALLENBY OF ARABIA: LAWRENCE'S GENERAL. By Brian Gardner. New York: Coward-McCann, 1966, 314 p. $6.50.

"What an idol the man was to us," wrote Lawrence of his commander General Allenby, the victor in Palestine in 1918. To Lawrence, Allenby remarked, "In fifty years your name will be a household word; to find out about Allenby they will have to go to the War Museum." Not so if this able biography of an outstanding officer has the circulation it deserves.

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THE LEBANESE CRISIS, 1958: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY. Edited by M. S. Agwani. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian School of International Studies), 1965, 407 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $10.75).

An Indian scholar's reconstruction of a Lebanese crisis which became, with the landing of U. S. troops, a major cold-war confrontation.

ISRAEL: GROUP RELATIONS IN A NEW SOCIETY. By Alex Weingrod. New York: Praeger (for the Institute of Race Relations, London), 1965, 82 p. $4.00.

"With its proportionately huge influx of immigrants, Israel has become a multi-ethnic society. . . . Can a viable state emerge from a society so fragmented?" Dr. Weingrod in this very brief and sensible book believes it can, although in all probability Israel would continue to be a multi-ethnic society.

STRUKTURWANDLUNGEN DER ISRAELISCHEN VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT, GLOBAL UND REGIONAL, 1948–1975. By René L. Frey. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1965, 142 p. DM. 20.

Forecasting national and regional trends in Israel as a basis for maintaining a satisfactory rate of economic development.

BEN GURION LOOKS BACK: IN TALKS WITH MOSHE PEARLMAN. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, 260 p. $5.00.

Reminiscences, philosophy and opinions, always interesting, recorded with Boswellian devotion by a leading Israeli writer and public servant.

AREA DEVELOPMENT FOR NATIONAL GROWTH: THE TURKISH PRECEDENT. By Malcolm D. Rivkin. New York: Praeger, 1965, 228 p. $15.00.

The lessons drawn from Turkish efforts over 40 years to stimulate the development of its interior regions are of clear import to other similarly motivated nations.

DER WIRTSCHAFTSAUFBAU DES IRAN. By Sohrab Farahmand. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1965, 179 p. DM. 19.

This compressed study is a well-grounded contribution to the literature of economic development.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Cranley Onslow. New York: Praeger, 1965, 242 p. $7.00.

Case studies of postwar economic development in Burma, Ceylon, India, Malaya, Pakistan and Thailand by leading economists in each of those countries. The final chapter, a comparative analysis by the editor, urges greater initiative from the more developed countries and a change in their aid programs, which currently retard rather than promote material progress in Asia.

CONTEMPORARY INDIA. Edited by Baidya Nath Varma. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965, 362 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $13.00).

A collection of chapters on social institutions in India and its political, economic and socio-cultural processes, together with an assessment of their sources of strength and weakness.

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH, 1885–1929. By S. R. Mehrotra. New York: Praeger, 1965, 287 p. $8.50.

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An Indian's study of India's role in the shaping of the Commonwealth idea from the establishment of the National Congress Party in 1885 to 1929, when the goal of "complete independence" was set. Dr. Mehrotra, now of the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, includes valuable analyses of the attitudes of the Muslim League and the contribution of the Liberals and of the Liberal Federation.

LAL BAHADUR: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By D. R. Mankekar. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964, 168 p. Rs. 10. (New York: Heinman, distributor, 1965, $4.50).

The life and career of the late prime minister, Mr. Shastri, and the major influences that shaped Indian politics during his premiership. Based primarily on interviews with him and the detailed answers to a lengthy questionnaire submitted by the author.

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN AN INDIAN STATE: THE CONGRESS PARTY IN UTTAR PRADESH. By Paul R. Brass. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 262 p. $6.00.

An analysis of problems of party organization at the local and district levels, and the means the Indian National Congress has used to cope with them.

A GEOGRAPHY OF PAKISTAN. By Kazi S. Ahmad. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 216 p. $8.00.

The state of Pakistan, constituted as it is of two divided parts dissimilar in physical features, climate, people, language and means of livelihood, poses unusual difficulties to a geographer. Professor Ahmad, of the University of the Panjab in Lahore, nevertheless provides a handy reference geography that encompasses the entire area.

COMMUNALISM AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN MALAYA. By K. J. Ratnam. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press (for the University of Singapore), 1965, 248 p. (New York: Oxford University Press, $7.70).

The political consequences of communal divisions in the Federation of Malaya, with emphasis on the postwar period up to 1961, which saw the non-Malay population demanding increased political rights and thus posing a threat to the privileged Malays. Dr. Ratnam is a political scientist at the University of Singapore.

VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. By Hans J. Morgenthau. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965, 112 p. $3.25.

A collection of occasional pieces by one of the most articulate opponents of United States policy.

THE PREVAILING WIND: WITNESS IN INDO-CHINA. By Michael Field. London: Methuen, 1965, 392 p. 42/.

Michael Field, a correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, spent the years 1956–1962 observing and analyzing political events in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Viet Nam.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDONESIA: ITS HISTORY, PROGRAM AND TACTICS. By Justus M. Van der Kroef. Vancouver: Publications Centre, University of British Columbia, 1965, 347 p. $7.50 (Paper, $5.50).

An outline history of the Indonesian Communist Party, its program and organization, its power at home and its role in the international scene—ending, of course, before last autumn's cataclysm.

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The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA. By A. T. Steele. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 325 p. $7.50.

An examination of American public attitudes toward China and U. S. China policy based upon more than 200 interviews with persons in leadership positions throughout the country and a number of opinion surveys. The author concludes that Americans today are generally ill-equipped to deal with the issues which the China problem poses for U. S. foreign policy, and he recommends that the President take the initiative in reopening a public dialogue on the subject.

POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: VIEWS FROM SIX CONTINENTS. Edited by A. M. Halpern. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 528 p. $9.95.

Sixteen country and area specialists examine the China policies of non-Communist countries. Mr. Halpern contributes an introduction and a concluding chapter in which he points up the significant patterns and unique features which emerge from the individual analyses and assesses the implications for U. S. policy.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE. By Alexander Eckstein. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 363 p. $8.50.

A long-time student of the Chinese economy looks at economic progress and economic problems on the Chinese mainland from the standpoint of their impact upon Communist China's foreign policy. He pays particular attention to the relationship between internal development and foreign trade. This and the two preceding books are the first of perhaps a dozen volumes resulting from the Council on Foreign Relations' three-year "China study."

PARTY AND ARMY: PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE CHINESE OFFICER CORPS, 1949–1964. By Ellis Joffe. Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965, 198 p. (Harvard University Press, distributor, $3.25, Paper).

A detailed analysis, based largely on translated Chinese publications, of the relationship between party leadership and the officer corps in Communist China, with emphasis on the clash between military professionalism and the need for political control. In the concluding chapter of his work, which grew out of a Harvard East Asian Research Center seminar, the author raises numerous questions without attempting to answer them because of the uncertain nature of the available data.

CHINA IN CRISIS. By Sven Lindqvist. New York: Crowell, 1965, 125 p. $5.95.

Mr. Lindqvist records his keen observations on life and politics at Peking University in 1961–62, when he was the Swedish Embassy's Cultural Attaché to the People's Republic of China. Interesting and informative.

PLANNING IN CHINESE AGRICULTURE: SOCIALISATION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 1956–1962. By Kenneth R. Walker. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965, 109 p. $5.00.

In a short but well-documented survey, Mr. Walker points to the important and controversial role of agriculture in Communist China, especially its non-socialized, as opposed to its governmental and communal, aspects. He also compares it with

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Soviet collectivization. He concludes that home-owned garden plots have come to play a significant part in China's economic life.

REPORT FROM A CHINESE VILLAGE. By Jan Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1965, 373 p. $6.95.

Mr. Myrdal, Swedish anthropologist, and Mrs. Myrdal lived in the village of Liu Ling, in northern Shensi, for a month in late 1962. The book gives, in the form of biographies of a number of its inhabitants, accounts of changes in life and thought among the villagers.

A BRIEF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN. By Morinosuke Kajima. Rutland: Tuttle, 1965, 216 p. $4.50.

Mr. Kajima, diplomat, businessman and member of Japan's House of Councillors since 1953, reviews the development of Japan's foreign policy from postwar recovery to the present, with stress on major diplomatic issues still pending—recognition of Red China, Japanese-Nationalist China relations, economic diplomacy, relations with Korea.

Africa

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF AFRICAN STATES. By Doudou Thiam. New York: Praeger, 1965, 134 p. $4.50.

The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Senegal provides an incisive and lucid assessment of the ideological bases and the political and economic determinants of the foreign policies of African states. (The French edition appeared in 1963.)

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF TROPICAL AFRICA. By Robert I. Rotberg. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965, 440 p. $12.50.

A first-rate and highly readable history of the peoples of tropical Africa from ancient times through the triumph of contemporary nationalism.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE ALGÉRIENNE DÉMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE. By François Buy. Paris: Librairie Française, 1965, 257 p. Fr. 15.

An indignant French documentation of events in Algeria under Ben Bella 1962–65, its accelerating economic and social degeneration toward Communist totalitarianism, and its increasing involvement economically and militarily with the U.S.S.R. and its allies.

MODERNIZATION AND AFRICAN LABOR: A TUNISIAN CASE STUDY. By Willard A. Beling. New York: Praeger, 1965, 259 p. $12.50.

An examination of the influence of Tunisian nationalism and trans-national ideological currents (Pan-Arabism, Pan-Maghrebism and Pan-Africanism) on the international relations of the Tunisian labor movement.

LABOR AND POLITICS IN LIBYA AND ARAB AFRICA. By John Norman. New York: Bookman Associates, 1965, 219 p. $4.50.

A well-done study of the Libyan labor movement past and present, in a context of desert, poverty, nationalism and new-found oil.

SUDAN REPUBLIC. By K. D. D. Henderson. New York: Praeger, 1965, 256 p. $8.50.

A readable account, "personal, but not, I hope, subjective," of the training period and preliminary trials of the new Sudan by a 36-year veteran of the Sudan political service, author of "Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" (1946) and "The Making of the Modern Sudan" (1953).

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THE SUDAN: CROSSROADS OF AFRICA. By Beshir Mohammed Said. Chester Springs (Pa.): Dufour, 1966, 238 p. $7.50.

"A Divided Nation" would be a subtitle more appropriate for this outspoken volume. A leading Sudanese journalist traces the history of, and apportions blame for, the problem of the South, and calls upon Northern statesmanship and Southern patience to produce a real Sudanese unity.

POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA. By W. Arthur Lewis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 90 p. $3.50.

In these three lectures Professor Lewis offers a provocative and critical analysis of basic issues in African politics—the problem of national integration, the centralizing tendencies of single-party régimes, and the prospects for democratic institutions in Africa.

TROIS EXPÉRIENCES AFRICAINES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT: LE MALI, LA GUINÉE ET LE GHANA. By Samir Amin. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1965, 233 p. Fr. 16.

An informative analysis of Malian efforts to restructure the inherited colonial economy and a critical evaluation of economic planning and development in Mali, Guinea and Ghana.

RECHERCHES SUR L'EXERCICE DU POUVOIR POLITIQUE EN AFRIQUE NOIRE (CÔTE-D'IVOIRE, GUINÉE, MALI). By Seydou Madani Sy. Paris: Pedone, 1965, 230 p. Fr. 35.

Originally a doctoral thesis for the University of Dakar, this work provides a thoughtful comparative analysis of three single-party systems. The author, a Senegalese scholar, traces the inapplicability of Western models of constitutional democracy to the economic conditions and social structures which have decisively influenced the organization and exercise of political power in Guinea, Mali and the Ivory Coast.

NIGERIA: THE TRIBES, THE NATION, OR THE RACE—THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE. By Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 316 p. $10.00.

This interesting study of recent Nigerian political history is focused on the implications of regional and ethnic diversity for the creation of a new nation and the operation of democratic institutions.

THE SUDDEN ASSIGNMENT. By Lord Alport. London: Hodder, 1965, 255 p. 35/.

Lord Alport, who served as British High Commissioner in Salisbury from January 1961, gives his personal account of the final dismemberment of the Central African Federation, 1961–63.

PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 307 p. $7.50.

Mr. Nye's informative account of the social, economic and political bases of East African integration and his analysis of the reasons for the failure of attempts at federation in 1963 underscore the complex and significant role of ideological factors.

BRITAIN AND AFRICA. By Kenneth Kirkwood. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 235 p. $5.00.

A knowledgeable and rather optimistic survey of the historical evolution and

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contemporary character of British-African relations in different parts of the continent.

HISTORY OF EAST AFRICA. VOLUME II. Edited by Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 766 p. $13.45.

This volume, the second in a three-part work on East African history, is an authoritative, scholarly study of the period from about 1890 through the Second World War.

ZANZIBAR: BACKGROUND TO REVOLUTION. By Michael F. Lofchie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 316 p. $7.50.

A perceptive, well-informed examination of the historical, sociological and political origins of the January 1964 African revolution in Zanzibar.

SOUTH AFRICA. By John Cope. New York: Praeger, 1965, 236 p. $7.50.

Mr. Cope, a South African journalist and parliamentarian, traces the historical, economic and sociological roots of the racial crisis. He concludes that although it is unclear whether the political and economic freedom of non-whites will be achieved by violent revolution or peaceful political means, the sheer preponderance and economic indispensability of the African population assure the inevitable destruction of the apartheid order.

SOUTH AFRICAN TRAGEDY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAN HOFMEYR. By Alan Paton. New York: Scribner, 1965, 424 p. $10.00.

The dilemmas of contemporary South African history are masterfully interwoven into this penetrating portrait of the liberal South African leader, Jan Hofmeyr (1894–1948), and his inner struggle to free himself from the rising tide of white racism.

THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC: MADAGASCAR TODAY. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, 504 p. $12.50.

A detailed, comprehensive study of Malagasy history, post-World War II political developments and the consolidation of the independent republic, together with sections dealing with religion, education, literature, economic policy and planning, transportation, finances, industry, trade and labor.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. Report, Committee on Finance, Senate, to accompany H.R. 9042, Sept. 27, 1965. Washington, 1965. 40 p. (S. Rept. 782.)

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